


COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

GENESIS AND RESPONSE

Editor

K.S. SHUKLA



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
FOREWORD

Violence in a civilised existence portrays only a dangerous, negative trait of personality. When this trait erupts in the shape of a strong, impatient reaction against some grievance (s) or frustration (s) by a group of people in a social setting, it is identified as collective violence. Though collective violence can be totally curbed or at least effectively contained by gearing up the law and order machinery of that society, yet collective violence gains tremendous significance due to the fact that it points to magnification of the state of anomie which normally remains dormant in all social systems. Therefore, it can be brushed aside lightly only at our own peril.

Realising the importance of the subject, an all-India seminar was organised at IIPA on April 1, 1985 to discuss the genesis and response of collective violence.

Besides active and keen participation of the seminarists in the proceedings, 16 papers on different important aspects of the theme were also presented by the participants. Keeping in view the significance and usefulness of the contributions made by the participants and others who addressed the inaugural, valedictory and business sessions of the seminar it was decided to bring out the proceedings of the seminar in printed form.

I hope the rich information packed within the covers of the book would be of great use to all interested in the study, teaching and containing the threat of collective violence.



(S. RAMANATHAN)

Director

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NEW DELHI
MARCH 21, 1988



PREFACE

It is being felt that every social system has an inherent scope for management and resolution of grievances and conflicts and such avenues appear to be diversified and intense in our social structure. In spite of such scope and measures for the resolution of frustration and grievances, we are observing that a large number of persons are resorting to violent—individual and collective—modes of expression. The modes and means adopted by the affected are likely to endanger the life and property as well as affect the national feeling of order and tranquillity in our society. Violence in any shape or form is likely to have serious social implications.

Violence would invariably include all types of behaviour, either threatened or actual, that result in or are intended to result in damage to property or destruction or injury or death of an individual. The threat may be overt or covert to physical, psychological, economical, political existence or prestige with a view to coerce a person or a group to act in accordance with the design or wish of the instigator.

The nature and pattern of violence may invariably be historically conditioned and its determinants may be the prevailing social conditions. A review of available records [Crime in India, Uniform Crime reports, Statistics brought out by the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and national statistics of other countries] and literature newspapers, magazines and journals, research studies indicate that after the fifties of this century, a growing trend of violence particularly collective violence, emanating from various socio-political situations and having extensive and intensive social and/or political implications is discernible. A closer analysis and scrutiny of the incidents indicates

that the major prompting and catalytic forces for the manifestation of violence could broadly be grouped under the following areas :

- (a) Those emanating from the prevailing value and cultural systems of a community or society;
- (b) Generating from the policies and practices of the State;
- (c) Sprouting from the response and reactions of the administration;
- (d) Proliferating from the handling of a situation or event by the official functionaries; and
- (e) Springing from and by the situational demands for the fulfilment of a genuine and legitimate social need or other local issues affecting a large group, etc.

The violence may germinate or be nourished by the value or cultural systems, by the prevailing political environment and situations, by the existing social conditions, or by other factors. The initiation of violence may be for a national cause—preservation of a value, custom, practice, belief system, etc., or against the enactment of a policy and the implications of a policy for a particular sector or group; against the administration—inefficiency, abuse, arrogance, etc., and could be started by the national or local level organizations. The participants in the people may be a event could be the affected persons only or a cross cultural groups may join fray.

Invariably, in conventional societies, violence in any form or shape is not considered to be a desirable mode of achieving the objective. Nevertheless, multiple forms and dimensions of violence are discernible in these societies. In additions, these expressions and turbulences have assumed complex shapes and different shades in time and space.

The phenomenon of increasing number of populace resorting to individual or collective modes of violence for settling grievances or disputes in India causes concern to those subscribing to the notion of methodology of order or peaceful co-existence and having faith in handling difference through discussions and conciliation. In spite of prevailing dominance of the concept of non-violence, the frequent

occurrence of violence prone situations has lead the thinkers to ponder over as to whether:

- (a) The individual or collective violence has started dominating the sentiments and thinking of the masses;
- (b) Citizens have come to believe or have realized that violence is a safe and sure method of achieving the objective;
- (c) Cumulative and consistent frustrations experienced by individual members have compelled them to resort to this action; and
- (d) The issues involved in the eruption of violence are genuine and have wider social implications affecting a larger group.

A multitude of intertwined factors and forces may influence and determine the nature and pattern of violence in our society. The background factors and nature of social support may condition the nature, methodology, strategy, use of tools and techniques and as to whether the violence would be momentary or would persist. Frequently, the possibilities of continuance or control of violence may also be influenced by the prevailing social responses. These background factors invariably may determine as to whether the erupting violence would be contained immediately or would be beyond control. Notwithstanding these realities, the outcome in regard to the management and control may be dependent on the political will and administrative alertness and efficiency. Public support to administrative efforts may play equally significant role in combating and handling collective violence. Concerted efforts undertaken at the national level on a particular issue could be significant ingredients in containing and handling local acts of collective violence and checking its proliferation.

It is being emphasised that the phenomenon of violence may have various facets—both concrete and diffused. The issues could be related to its: (a) legitimacy or illegitimacy; (b) goals, objectives and other related aspects for which the group commits violence; (c) who commits violence; and (d) who is the object of violence. As a consequence, various shades of violence emerge in India. Broadly these violence

prone situations could be grouped as tribal, agrarian, sectoral, communal, caste, political, and mixed or over-lapping type.

The nature, pattern, frequency and intensity of collective violence, particularly the organised violence, have turned out to be a major source of concern to every sector of our society. Cross-sections of our society appear to be opposed to its recurrence and ultimate consequences. Therefore, an increasing concern is being shown and steps were being undertaken to understand the dynamics of violence in our social context. It was, therefore, felt that it would be appropriate and desirable to scrutinize the nature, factors, forces and other related issues associated with the phenomenon of collective violence and concretise thinking as well as appraise and scrutinize the prevalent modes of responses.

The theme of 'Collective Violence' for the Seminar was specifically chosen because of the topicality and the growing concern in the public regarding this issue. The existing contradictions in our social system need to be understood with a view to analyse their possible role in the emergence, recurrence and persistence of violence. The Seminar broadly discussed the whole issue of collective violence in six major sessions between February 12-14, 1986 :

1. Concept and dimensions of collective violence.
2. Caste/Class collective violence.
3. Inter-community collective violence.
4. Policy and administrative implications of collective violence.
5. Development and change and collective violence.
6. Trends in collective violence.

The Seminar addressed itself to: (i) analyse and understand the genesis—by scrutinizing the possible causes and factors; (ii) understand the linkages and possible roles of the institutions, groups, actors in the dynamics of violence; and (iii) carve out, within possibilities, the remedial measures that could be effectively managed by the existing institutional

structures. Intricate shapes and shades of collective violence have been posing concern to all thinking individuals of our society. Nevertheless, it is difficult to focalise attention on the precise nature and pattern of collective violence due to varying ideological positions and perceptions of the participants. At times, the personal stakes of the judge with the social system or the phenomenon of collective violence remains doubtful. These realities complicate the task of those keen to contain or control the rising trend of collective violence. Moreover, invariably, an emotive situation comes as and when this issue to be scrutinise in detail. An objective assessment of this reality creates variety of in-built riddles and the genuine concern may gets side-stepped in our evaluation.

In a pluralistic society of India it would be naive to explain this phenomenon entirely with the help of the theories developed in other countries. Nevertheless we may derive lesson from available thinking on the subject. We have therefore, attempted to analyse the nature and pattern of collective violence and have scrutinised/critically evaluated the existing modes and methods of handling this issue.

We have endeavoured to highlight that the inherent contradictions of Indian society need not only be discussed and talked about but there is a need to evolve effective strategies and plan of action to control and contain collective violence, as neither in terms of heritage or culture nor in terms of our value pattern, we can afford to nature violence.

We have attempted to understand this reality as per the text and context of India. It is an attempt to initiate a debate on this issue. It is a modest endeavour which needs to be kept up. Our effort has been to provide focus to and to encourage the thinkers of the country to look at the phenomenon as a national concern. We appeal to all the thinking individuals that not only the context of collective violence is to be understood but effective strategies and action plans are to be suggested/evolved and initiated in the context of our social reality.

All the major factors/dimensions covering political, social, economic and related areas were discussed and many useful suggestions were given by the participants as all the underlying issues whether they be social, political, economic or administrative or local, etc., were scrutinised. The participants deliberated on these issues afresh analysed all possible undercurrents.

About one-hundred eminent and distinguished persons drawn from the academics, administration, media, MPs, etc., participated in the deliberations of the Seminar.

K.S. SHUKLA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The genesis of this Seminar lies on April 1, 1985 when I called on the Director, after joining the IIPA on March 30, that we may organise a National Seminar on Law and Order, and the gathering of today is the response to that genesis.

The platform of the Institute of Indian Institute of Public Administration for this Seminar is most appropriate because of the issue being of immediate concern to the public administration of the country. From conception to reality the Seminar has given hopeful and anxious moments to me.

I am extremely gratified that all of us could collect here today to discuss on this issue. The dream would not have been realised without the willing and active cooperation of the Director, IIPA, financial assistance from the Indian Council of Social Science Research, suggestions and cooperation of my fellow colleagues in the Institute and outside, help and assistance of the administration of the IIPA, the contributors of papers and willingness of participants, consent from the chair-persons, and discussants, as also of the rapporteurs of sessions. Without their active cooperation, we would not have been able to deliberate upon the complex factors associated with Collective Violence.

I would like to express my grateful thanks, on behalf of the IIPA and on my personal behalf, to Dr. B. Venkatappiah, Vice-President of the Institute and Chairman of the Standing Committee for his provocative and illuminating Inaugural Address, and Shri Arun Nehru, Minister of State for Internal Security, Government of India for the Valedictory Address.

I am grateful to the then Director, IIPA, Dr. P.R. Dubhashi, for his guidance, advice, cooperation and sustained interest. Thanks are also due to the Indian Council of Social Science Research for financial assistance. I am also obliged to all my colleagues on the faculty for their suggestions, cooperation and help. My thanks are also due to the Registrar, to the

Training Division, and officers and staff of the Institute. I am indebted to all chair-persons, discussants, working paper writers, contributors of papers, rapporteurs and participants in the Seminar.

I am thankful to Shri M.K. Gaur, Assistant Editor and his dedicated colleagues in the Publication, for getting the volume printed in time. I am also grateful to Shri K.P. Phatak and Mrs Sunita Gulati for preparing the bibliography.

I am particularly grateful to Shri S. Prakash of IIPA for the secretarial assistance and suggestions in the preparation of the report for publication.

K.S. SHUKLA

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FOREWORD	V
PREFACE	VII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	XIII
INTRODUCTION	
WELCOME ADDRESS	1
<i>P. R. Dubhashi</i>	
INAUGURAL ADDRESS	5
<i>B. Venkatappiah</i>	
VOTE OF THANKS	14
<i>K. S. Shukla</i>	
I : CONCEPT AND DIMENSIONS	
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND INDIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE	19
<i>Rajendra Singh</i>	
THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE RECONSIDERED	34
<i>Uttam Bhoite</i>	
DISCUSSION	46
II : CASTE/CLASS VIOLENCE	
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE OF THE WORKING CLASS—WITH A FOCUS ON THE COLLECTIVE CRIMINALITY OF THE URBAN SURPLUS LABOUR	59
<i>B. B. Pandey</i>	

	PAGE
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN VIOLENCE : A CASE STUDY OF AN AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY <i>Uday Jain</i>	70
DISCUSSION	84
<i>III : INTER-COMMUNITY/SECTORAL VIOLENCE</i>	
CHANGING URBAN ETHOS : SOME REFLEC- TIONS ON HINDU-MUSLIM RIOTS <i>A. R. Saiyed</i>	97
POLICE VIOLENCE <i>T. Ananthachari</i>	120
DISCUSSION	131
<i>IV : POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS</i>	
POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE <i>J. N. Chaturvedi</i>	149
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE : POLICY AND ADMINIS- TRATIVE IMPLICATIONS <i>S. Venugopal Rao</i>	163
DISCUSSION	170
<i>V : DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE</i>	
DEVELOPMENT, CHANGE AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE <i>N. C. Saxena</i>	181
DEVELOPMENT AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE : A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE <i>Ram Ahuja</i>	213
VALUE STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE <i>B. M. Sinha</i>	226

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE IN INDIA : A CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE	234
<i>R. S. Shrivastava</i>	

MULTIPLE CAUSATION OF COLLECTIVE VIO- LENCE : A SKETCH OF THE NELLIE TRAGEDY	246
<i>C. D. Tripathi</i>	

DISCUSSION	255
------------	-----

VI: TRENDS

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IS THE CHILD OF POLITICS	265
<i>N. S. Saksena</i>	

CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM IN INDIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PUNJAB	269
<i>S. S. Srivastava</i>	

DISCUSSION	280
SUMMATION	295

P. R. Dubhashi

VALEDICTORY ADDRESS	301
<i>Arun Nehru</i>	

APPENDICES

MAJOR INCIDENTS OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN INDIA DURING THE LAST THREE DECADES	309
<i>K. M. Mathur</i>	

PARTICIPANTS AND CONTRIBUTORS	329
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BUSINESS SESSIONS	335
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A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY	339
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Welcome Address

P.R. Dubhashi

Dr. Venkatappiah and friends, delegates to this National Seminar, I have very great pleasure in extending to all of you a very warm welcome to this Seminar which is on a theme of very great contemporary concern. Not a day passes without the newspaper headlines screaming about occurrence of violence—Collective Violence—in one part of the country or another, and the whole atmosphere in the country seems to be pervaded with the fear of collective violence. Therefore, it becomes very important for all concerned—the academicians as well as the administrators—to consider this phenomenon of collective violence in all its manifestations and dimensions. In a way, the prevailing atmosphere of collective violence is unfortunately in contrast to the tradition and philosophy of this country—the philosophy of non-violence—which has been propagated in our ancient land from the days of Bhagwan Buddha to Mahatama Gandhi. In our own times, Mahatama Gandhi was the apostle of non-violence like Bhagwan Buddha and he led India to freedom through a movement which was based on non-violence. When he first had his non-cooperation struggle launched, you would remember that there was a mob violence at Churi Chaura Police Station which was burnt and he immediately called off his mass-movement which was symptomatic of the very great significance that he attached to means as well as to the ends; and the means, according to him, had to be non-violent. There were terrorists like Bhagat Singh and Khudi Ram Bose who were considered to be great patriots, but I think the freedom movement as a whole was quite aware that these means were not consistent with the basis of non-violence of our freedom struggle. Therefore, on the whole, the freedom movement was free from

2 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

collective violence.

The British left this country with a great deal of good will and after Independence we adopted the insignia of Ashoka Chakra which was in a way indicative of the fact that the free India would renounce war and violence as a means of settling disputes. Unfortunately, all these hopes that India would be a state based on abjure collective violence or violence in any form, these hopes have not come true and we have been unfortunate witnesses to the recurrence of collective violence in a frightening form and in aggravated proportions over the last several years. And that is why we thought that in this current climate which is affected by the occurrence of collective violence, we should invite the academicians and the administrators who have to deal with this phenomenon of collective violence in one way or the other. The theoreticians of course deal with this in an analytical way. They go into the depths and the root causes of collective violence. They try to analyse the economic systems, the social systems, the political systems and social-psychological bases of our existence to lay bear the causes of collective violence. On the other hand, the administrators have to face collective violence when it actually takes place to suppress it—may be when it comes up and then find out the manner in which the coercive power of the state can be mobilised to put down the incidents of collective violence. However, the administrators also have to realise that there is a limit beyond which mere brutal exercise of the coercive powers of the State would not be helpful in removing the very basic causes which lead to collective violence. And, therefore, the administrators have to, as it were, have a dialogue with the academicians in order to understand the phenomenon of collective violence so that it could be treated in a more effective manner. Hence the academicians and the administrators have come together to discuss this vital issue.

It is not my intention to go into the whole phenomenon of collective violence right at the stage of welcoming you to this Seminar. Of course, one can talk in terms of political, economic and social system of a sort which will give no place to collective violence. I believe that in human history no such perfect system has been designed which can eliminate

altogether all the causes which lead to collective violence. However, it is expected of such a system that it will have sufficient resilience to deal with the problems which are created by discontent persons, and I would even say antagonistic tendencies which may arise because of the working system. A more important point is that even those who are dissatisfied with the system do not think a violent overthrow of the system is the solution and they have faith in the system in order that the system cures itself and removes the causes of disaffection sooner or later. It is these people who will really prevent the frequent occurrence of collective violence. In the past, however, there have been philosophers, leaders, thinkers who have pleaded that the system is so pernicious that only a violent overthrow is the solution. But we have the rule of law, we have democracy and these institutions are based on the belief that law can deal with these problems and democracy tells us that problems can be solved by counting heads rather than breaking heads. And it is for us to consider whether these institutions would sustain a situation in which we can solve our problems, deal with grievances without collective violence. Is it possible? I think, it is the question before this Seminar.

We have received a number of very important papers which have dealt with the various aspects of collective violence, its nature, its character, the causes of collective violence, possible cures and then we will have here in the Seminar an interaction between the academicians and the administrators in the hope that these discussions will enable us to understand the causes of collective violence and throw up fresh ideas which can help us, as a nation, in dealing with these problems. Collective violence sometimes seems to tear our society apart. I do not think that thinking people will like that we should come to a stage where the very survival of our society, as a nation, as a peaceful entity, would be endangered by a continuously aggravating manifestation of the phenomenon of collective violence.

I will, therefore, once again welcome you all. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Venkatappiah, the Vice-President of the Indian Institute of Public Administration and the Chairman of Standing Committee and an administrator of profound

4 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

experience, who has been greatly interested in contributing to our knowledge of the social phenomenon. I would request him on behalf of all of you to deliver the Inaugural Address of this Seminar.

Inaugural Address

B. Venkatappiah

Dr. Dubhashi, Prof. Shukla, distinguished academicians, administrators and friends!

I should first of all like to endorse the words of welcome already extended to you on behalf of the Indian Institute of Public Administration.

I have been asked to make inaugural remarks to serve, if possible, the additional purpose usually assigned to a keynote address. That, at short notice, is a difficult task. I shall try my best to discharge it.

The theme is collective violence. When dealing with it today I would divide the subject into three parts. First of all, what is the scope of this theme? Secondly, what are the underlying factors or causes of collective violence? Thirdly, what might be the remedies, if I may use that term, in relation to those causes, as also the agencies on whom rests responsibility for applying the remedies? Thus divided, the first part of my talk, may be labelled 'Scope and Definition', the second, 'Causes and Categories', and the third, 'Remedies and Responsibilities'.

SCOPE AND DEFINITION

Let us consider the scope and definition of the phrase 'collective violence'. First, there is the concept of violence itself. Is violence to be defined purely with reference to what may be called 'physical' violence or threat of violence such as, for example, is termed 'assault and battery' by the Indian Penal Code? Is that the central factor in the concept of violence or are there other elements which too have to be taken into account? It does seem reasonable to hold that,

6 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

apart from the purely physical, there are a number of contexts which deserve the name of violence. An instance might be the threat of general strike—the threat to deprive common citizens of a number of essential services, including, say, hospital facilities—however important, of course, the cause itself may be so far as the strikers are concerned. On one historic occasion, decades ago, a general strike which threatened to paralyse the life of London was commented on in the British Parliament as in effect an act of violent tyranny meriting the words of protest of one of Shakespeare's characters : "O ! it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant".

Some of you will remember not only George Orwell's 'Nineteen Eighty Four', but also Anthony Burgess' '1985' where the latter refers not so much to the State as the threatening 'Big Brother' as to the super-powerful corporations and their organised labour as the real source of collective violence against the citizen. He points out how a strike by doctors and by the nursing and other services concerned has resulted in a series of deaths in the hospitals. Now, is that violence or is it not violence ? Does violence consist only in the act of inflicting physical injury on somebody ? Such a view, even in the context of collective violence, would possibly be too narrow. It would remind one of what the poet (Arthur Hugh Clough) includes in what he calls "The Latest Dialogue" or the "New Ten Commandments":

Thou shalt not kill ; but needst
not strive
Officiously to keep alive.

We must now ask the question : What is the implication of 'collective' in the phrase 'collective violence' ? While 'collective' violence is of course distinguished from 'individual' violence, is it not also distinguishable from, say, 'mob violence' ? One might say mob violence is usually spontaneous. It is, generally speaking, neither premeditated nor pre-organised. What are the objectives of mob violence ? Mob violence, perhaps, could be said to have no long-term purposes, as for example has terrorism. Nor are there, usually

in the frenzied operations of a mob, explicit, calculated short-term aims, such as, for instance, could be said to underlie certain reactions of a local community to a local event—e.g., religious or linguistic—repellent to that community. The ‘mob’ is often *ad hoc*, i.e., brought together by chance, as, e.g., in a road accident that provokes fury among those who happen to be passing by. The local community, on the other hand, is clearly not *ad hoc*.

When exactly does something become ‘collective’ in the sense in which that word is used in the phrase ‘collective violence’? It seems reasonable to suggest that, generally speaking, collective violence emerges from a situation in which a common purpose, in varying degrees pre-meditated and deliberate rather than spontaneous and impulsive, is shared by a number of people whose local, communal, occupational or similar affinity is significant enough to enable the meaningful sharing of such a purpose.

Let us go on to the application of these approaches towards definition tentative as they are, to the context of the present Seminar. From that point of view it does appear to me that the alternative title which has been given in some of the papers of the Seminar, viz., ‘collective political violence’, rather than just ‘collective violence’, has a great deal to commend it because of the clearer focus and greater relevance which can then be brought to bear on the components of the theme. By reason of inclusion of the word ‘political’, the State and its establishment come into the picture, as also those who are opposed—may be violently opposed—to government, its institutions and its policies. On the one side there is the authority of the State, and on the other there is something which rises against or protests against that authority in some form or the other. Also, I think, the phrase ‘collective political violence’ brings to notice the fact that collective violence is not necessarily confined to a group of individuals however large it might be; collective violence can also be on the part of the State itself. It can be on the part of the government, it can be on the part of the establishment, it can be on the part of ‘authority’, and not only on the part of those who take up arms against the State.

So far I have dealt with possible connotations of the word

8 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

'violence' and the epithet 'collective'. I have also indicated that for all practical purposes, the range of discussions most relevant to this Seminar is perhaps best comprised in the phrase 'collective political violence'. So much then on 'scope and definition', the first of the sections into which I said I would divide the theme of this address.

CAUSES AND CATEGORIES

The second of these sections, I have termed 'causes and categories'. A great deal has been said, not only in the papers that are submitted for the Seminar, but in various articles which appear from time to time in journals and in newspapers about these 'causes', *i.e.*, about the factors which underlie collective political violence. Much of what is there set out must be has been said is familiar ground to most of you here. Among the most recurrent 'causes' are those categorised as religion-based, language-based, community-based, caste-based and sometimes class or occupation-based. But if we take the deeper motivations as underlying factors, we come across a somewhat different classification. There is, for example, the somewhat widespread psychological phenomenon of 'frustration'. We are familiar with this in many fields—in universities, for example, almost all over the world—as leading to angry, often violent gestures against establishment and authority. One analysis of this academy-oriented or intellectual frustration would have it that the root cause is all-round disillusionment. The components of disillusionment are best expressed in the title of a French book which, translated, reads : 'God is dead, Marx is dead, I myself am not feeling very well'. (Parenthetically, one may add that the title is based on what Mark Twain once said in introducing the subject of a lecture he was delivering on "Decadence of English Literature". He started off by saying : "Ladies and Gentlemen, Shakespeare is dead, Milton is dead, I myself am not feeling very well".

Now, there is a great deal of frustration when religion is moribund, when communism is no longer in the forefront of ideologies and when, for young people, paths which in the past promised to lead to self-fulfilment now seem to turn

round and lead back into morbid introspection.

But apart from frustration, let us look at other significant factors.

Economic deprivation and even threats of economic deprivation are a very important cause which has been dealt with in some of the papers submitted to the Seminar. The deprivation may take the form of some rights being denied to one class of people, or some other class being unduly favoured in the eyes of the deprived class and so on. We are familiar with what is called the reservationist agitation in Gujarat. We are also familiar with the almost daily reports of outbreaks of collective violence against Harijans because economic privileges are being threatened, or economic favours are being granted or the socio-economic balance of thousands of years is being disturbed. Economic causes are thus among the most potent factors which underlie concerted physical violence on the part of those who consider themselves affected.

Closely allied to economic deprivation, as one of the prime motive factors, is occupational competition between different groups of people. There are, for example, the well-documented cases of powerloom weavers in Maharashtra and elsewhere. Another important set of contexts is that connected with possession of land and instinct for territory. The contexts may involve territorial encroachment on the one side and territorial denudation on the other, the motivating factors being, respectively, territorial aggression and territorial frustration. When the scenario covers an identifiable community, the result is collective anger leading to collective violence.

These are then some of the important factors which come to mind as underlying collective violence. And the collective violence is, in Indian conditions, often of a nature and magnitude to attract political attention and involve political participation.

If one single label is to be attached to factors provocative of collective violence, I would choose the phrase 'identity aggression'. Among other things, a community which is suffering from a feeling of 'identity aggression' holds out to all other communities, and especially to those near enough to compete with it, a challenge of which the gist is best expressed

10 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

in the words of an old doggerel : "Anything you can do, I can do better ; I can do anything better than you". What one witnesses is the ego, the enlargement of the ego, the inflation of the ego. The inflation of the rupee is bad enough but the inflation of the ego, I suggest, is much worse. In contemporary India, such an inflation has occurred at different places, at different times, again and again. The ego can be inflamed or inflated through caste, sect or religion. It can be inflamed or inflated through dialect or language. It can be inflamed or inflated through location, region or state. When two or three of these things coincide such as language and religion and state, you have an identity, a large identity, which feels extremely aggressive and inordinately important. Then comes in a great deal of unrest and agitation, together with the attempt to get the better of the other group or community by any one of a number of different means. Language unifies or ought to unify; but by the same token it can also divide. Religion can or ought to unify, but it can also divide. The slogans which divide instead of uniting are : 'My religion is more wonderful than yours', and 'My language is more wonderful than yours'. These are things which are happening today. These are the motivations which express themselves in the collective violence of a collectively aggressive identity which often defies that other collective identity which is the State.

Terrorism is certainly a form of collective violence. So too, for example, is a communal riot. Terrorism is almost by definition political. So too, quite often, is the collective violence which expresses itself in a particular riot on communal or linguistic grounds. But the pattern of violence—sporadic, interspersed and chronic in one case : concentrated, localised and short-term in the other—differs in the two instances. The issues or objectives are also different. As pointed out in some of the Seminar papers, terrorism does of course have an objective which may be described as an extremely long-term one. The individual victim chosen is often of no significance. What is important is the instilling of fear, the creation of terror, the induction, if possible, of movement and migration in a whole section—the targeted section—of the total population. Terrorism has a long-term

purpose, while a communal riot, unless part of a planned and long-drawn series, centres generally on some immediate or short-term objective.

Are there even more fundamental 'causes' which today underlie the spate of collective violence, among other forms of violence, which we witness in this country? This is a question which merits attention in the Seminar. One view, for example, has it that the phenomenon of violence is in large degree attributable to a general and distressing diminution in the citizen's respect for law. Ethics has given way to politics. Everything is politicised and people have no confidence in ministers or politicians, departments of government or courts of justice. This general demoralisation, it is averred, leads to deterioration of law and order. Added to this, the media—and in particular the cinema and television—publicise, elevate and encourage violence. Indeed (it is said), besides projecting its first favourite, which is sex, the cinema is all the time spurting out violence and yet more violence. What else, it is asked, can be expected to be the response of the citizen except violence, frequent violence, even collective violence? Such comment—in fact condemnation—may be strong, perhaps too strong, but here certainly is an aspect which needs to be considered seriously and discussed objectively at this Seminar.

REMEDIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

That brings me to the third of the sections into which I have divided the subject, namely, 'remedies and responsibilities'. I would particularly stress the word 'responsibilities'. In this context of collective political violence, it is important that we identify those parties who can be said to share in some measure, large or small, the responsibility for dealing with violence and with the causes which lead to violence.

First of all, of course, there is the State itself. By 'State', I mean, the Central Government, the State Governments, and allied authorities. Then there is the public. The public, through its voluntary and other organizations, is in a position to influence events, to guide them towards peace and amity rather than towards violence and disorder. Moreover, just

12 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

as there is collective violence, there is collective responsibility for preventing violence. Thus, if violence does occur, it is possible in certain contexts, to impose collective punishment on those who could otherwise have prevented it. These are fairly familiar concepts in jurisprudence.

Most important of all are the responsibilities of the media and especially the press, in the situations we have reviewed. Among these responsibilities is the task of presenting a true and sober picture of events to the public : a picture of each situation as it emerges from day-to-day, which is neither inaccurate to the extent of hiding facts, nor inflammatory to the extent of inciting passions. Investigative journalism, honest journalism, often acts as a much-needed corrective to partisan versions and deliberate distortions which tend to nourish violence, as also to official hand-outs and doctored news-columns which are designed to foster complacency.

The respective roles and responsibilities of different agencies, bodies and authorities—the State, including the Central and State Governments, the general public, the voluntary organisations, the political parties, and importantly the media, among which stands out the press, with its daily papers and its journals—these then constitute, together, an important section of the theme which will engage the attention of today's Seminar.

CONCLUSION

Before concluding these remarks, I should like to draw attention once more to one or two aspects—preventive or remedial in their nature—of the situation of violence, including collective violence, which confront the country today. If the diagnosis points not only to frustration among certain classes of people, but to significant recurrence of group-resentment and group-anger or deprivation of economic rights or imbalance in regional development or subjugation in different ways of the politically weak by the politically strong—some or most of the grievances would seem not only to be political in nature, but to present the possibility of being politically anticipated and preventively forestalled. Some of the situations could, to some extent, be met by what may be

called the decentralisation of authority—the decentralisation of the establishment, the decentralisation of government itself. We are now familiar with some recent hopeful trends in India: how some of the country's chronically difficult situations, most of them with both past and present records of collective violence, seem to be in the process of being reassessed politically, in the light of possible decentralisation. The responsibility is sought to be devolved on the State Government or on the political group concerned, so that it is not from the Centre that every new crisis is met, but by the ruling party or the particular government which is acting from within the State. This, of course, is something closely related to the vexed question of Centre-State relationship. But decentralisation need not be confined to issues at the constitutional level or to the relationship between the Central and State governments. There are other important contexts as well. Reasonable, justifiable and appropriate decentralisation of authority seems to be one of the most important of the means whereby widespread discontent can be prevented and collective violence, to that extent, forestalled.

Similarly, in the process of development, a great deal can be achieved at the stage of planning itself by attempting to reduce to a minimum the imbalances—economic, social and other—not only as between classes, but also as between states, regions and smaller areas. Formulae for this purpose are well-tried and plentiful and the methodologies to be employed many and sophisticated. What is generally lacking is goodwill in general and political will in particular. Often enough, the pudding is for the powerful and the cake for the contentious. Or, to put it somewhat differently, there is too little Christmas pie to go round, and too many Jack Horners, sitting in enjoyment or expectancy, in too many corners of the country.

I welcome you again to this National Seminar on Collective Violence and have pleasure in inaugurating it. I am confident that through your collective wisdom there will emerge, from the discussions which follow, a series of suggestions and conclusions which will be of practical value, no less than of analytical significance, in dealing with one of the gravest problems which face the country today.

Vote of Thanks

K.S. Shukla

Friends ! Collective violence is a contemporary topical issue of social concern in our country. The genesis of this Seminar lies on April 1, 1985 when I called on the Director, after joining the IIPA on March 30, that we may organise a National Seminar on Law and Order, and the gathering of today is the response to that genesis.

The platform of the Institute of Indian Institute of Public Administration for this Seminar is most appropriate because of the issue being of immediate concern to the public administration of the country. From conception to reality the Seminar has given hopeful and anxious moments to me.

I am extremely gratified that all of us are here today to discuss this issue. The dream would not have been realised without the willing and active cooperation of the Director, IIPA, financial assistance from the Indian Council of Social Science Research, suggestions and cooperation of my fellow colleagues in the Institute and outside, help and assistance of the administration of the IIPA and the contributors of papers and willingness of participants, consent from the chair-persons and discussants, and also of the rapporteurs of Sessions. Without their active cooperation, we would not have been able to deliberate upon the complex factors associated with Collective Violence.

I would like to express my grateful thanks, on behalf of the IIPA and on my personal behalf, to Dr. B. Venkatappiah, Chairman of the Standing Committee and Vice-President of the IIPA for his provocative and illuminating Inaugural Address. Sir, let me assure you that we shall touch upon all the important issues that have been highlighted in your Inaugural Address. A job well begun is half done. Sir, we

shall touch upon almost all the critical issues with care and caution during the deliberations of the Seminar.

I am equally grateful to Director, IIPA, Dr. P.R. Dubhashi, for his guidance, advice, cooperation and sustained interest. I am also obliged to all my colleagues on the faculty for their suggestions, cooperation and help, in particular to Dr. Guha Roy and Dr. Singh. Thanks are also due to the Indian Council of Social Science Research for financial assistance. I am indebted to all chairpersons, discussants, working paper writers, contributors of papers, rapporteurs and participants in the Seminar. I keenly look forward to their active cooperation during the Seminar.

I: CONCEPT AND DIMENSIONS

Some Reflections on the Study of Collective Violence and Indian Social Structure

Rajendra Singh

The concept of an organised society as an on-going self-perpetuative system of human relation is linked with two antithetical types of social thoughts. Thomas Hobbes is the first among the classical thinkers to examine the question of social order. His major propositions about society have re-incarnated themselves into the contemporary functionalist prospective to society. Hobbes asserted that society is "a conquest of violence" ! Society as a viable enterprise according to this school of thought comes into being after its individual members have ascended from the 'state of nature' in which "every man was at war with every one". This ascendancy of man from the state of nature is marked by their acceptance of certain set of collectively cherished system of consensual values and related to these values, certain set of collectively accepted system of regulative norms. Absence of collective values and norms characterise Hobbesian man in the state of nature.¹

The other school of thought however begins its inquiry from an *a priori* assumption of the existence of social order and then, tries to see violence as an endemic social data of all social structures. Ortega Y Gasset finds existence of built-in social bases of violence among societies. According to him "Man had always had recourse to violence; sometime this recourse was a mere crime and does not interest us here. But

¹Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, cited in Chalmers Johnsons in his book, *Revolutionary Changes*, London, University of London Press, 1968, p. 9.

at other times violence was the means resorted to by him who had previously exhausted all others in defence of rights of justice which he thought he possessed. It may be regrettable that human nature tends on occasion to this form of violence but it is undeniable that it implies the greatest tribute to reason and justice. For this type of violence is none than reason exasperated." Violence is thus treated as *ultima ratio*.² Need to resort to this *ultima ratio* arises at the principles on which Hobbesian social order or the functionalists conception of social system is based play partisan role to various groups of men who are part of social order and whose relations constitute the social systems and is immune to all other recourse except to the use of force and violence.

The raging question of order and its rejection, of conformity and device and of quiscence and revolt *vis-a-vis* the question of man's relation to society and the *vice versa* are issues of teleological nature. Significant as these issues are to our present context of research and reflections on violence and social order, they ought to be bypassed at this juncture with an observation that they have convulsed themselves into a specific form of social philosophy which glorifies violence. This is referred to as the New Left Philosophy.

THE NEW LEFT PHILOSOPHY

The New Left Philosophy, from Sorel, Sartre to Fanon, excluding the revolutionary fighters, such as Mao, Che Guevara, Giap and Debray and their popular classics³ on the techniques of revolution, has shown a tendency to transform macabre of murder and the morbidity of killing and blood shed into a civilised man's sacred ritual for the redemption of the fallen. Sorel treats violence as a metaphor of 'Life-force' or of 'creativity of man'. Violence for him is the weapon in

²Ortega-Y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, New York, Norlon, 1932, p. 82.

³Such as, Mao Tse-Tung, *On the Protracted War*, 1960, Peking Foreign Language Press; Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare*, (H.C. Peterson), Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army*, 1962, New York; Frederick A Page and Regis Debrey, "Revolution in the Revolution", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 19, July-August, 1967.

the hands of the toiling working-class to resurrect themselves.⁴ Sartre, who dubs Sorel's writing as 'facist utterances' outpaces Sorel in romanticising violence. "Irrepressible violence is neither sound and fury nor the resurrection of savage instinct, nor even the effect of resentment; it is man recreating himself", writes Sartre. He further goes to state that "The rebel's weapon is the proof for his humanity. For in the first days of revolt you must kill: to shoot down a European is to kill two birds at the same time: there remains a dead man and a free man". The nihilistic phenomenology of violence is taken to the extreme when Sartre concludes, "...Violence, like Achilles lance, can heal the wound that it has inflicted".⁵

Fanon is keen to attach therapeutic potency to violence and blood shed in the colonial situation. He asserts, "at all levels of individuals, violence is a cleaning force. It faces the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect", and further, he goes to affirm that "this violence because it constitutes their only work, invests their characters with positive and creative qualities. The practice of violence binds them together as a whole, since each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upwards..."

This tendency of glorifying violence and blood shed by the New Left philosophers and intellectuals is a unique phenomenon in the growth of social thought in history. Not that it infects the minds of young, but also that it provides a moral justification and accords seemingly academic tone to the acts of revolt, terror and collective crime as just and legitimate. Abhorrence is appreciated and adorned. The emergence of this anarchic psyche grounded deep in the logic of negations, nihilism and mutual destruction is a dangerous tendency menacing our age. And worst, by treating the acts

⁴Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, New York, 1961, See Chapters II & III.

⁵See, Jean Paul Sartre's Preface to Frantz Fanon's book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Penguin Books, pp. 18-19 and 25, 1974; see also R. D. Laing and D.G. Cooper, *Reason and Violence: A Decade of Sartre's Philosophy*, London, 1964, Part III.

22 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

of destruction as that of creativity, it misguides the generation. Killings and counter killing end only in further killing and not in the creation of a 'whole man'.

The dialectical relation between negation and violence resolved by violence applied to the concrete life situation of men yield nothing but demean the meaning of man and rob his goals and ends of their intrinsic values. Negation is a poor producer of rich values among men and societies.⁶ A tendency to glamorise things gruesome is an attempt to conceal crudities of man in the guise of intellectualism. But such an attempt can not be discarded at their face values as they are, in part, the natural outcome of contradictions of 20th century societies. The rise of working class at the face of persisting knights, priests and princes, rise of the value of liberty and freedom in the midst of the oppressed, colonised and exploited men living in bondages and of the rise of the global centres of powers with enormous access to the means of violence and destruction of man are some of the oddities in which the contemporary man lives. No doubt that in circumstances as it exist today intellectuals are liable to oddities of thought.

IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

What concerns us most is the fact that such type of thought system coincide with the growth of various types of arms and ammunition and techniques of destruction easily accessible to the ordinary man. Combined with the ideology of violence, the spread of the means and techniques of violence is one of the most acute problem of various contemporary societies and their political systems. And if societies, as they often do, contain and reflect contradictions in their structure, chances for the ideology of violence and the weapons available to the bearers of such an ideology to succeed sabotaging social order become greater. The substantive status of violence as social data, therefore, belong to the study of social structures

⁶On this issue see, Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, London, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 12-13 and 74-75, see also her book, *On Revolution*, Harmondsworth Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1973, pp. 48-50.

of societies. We shall confine our analysis to the situation of Indian society.

The present article is therefore programmatic in nature. It seeks to examine the correspondence between the increasing incidence of organised and unorganised violence and blood shed in the name of symbols, such as caste, community, creed and armed rebellion and revolt against the state with the changing patterns of Indian social structure. *We treat violence as a purposive social act negatively resorted to realise certain ends and interests in violation of the existing normative order of the society.* It is a purposive social act as it always involves subject-object relationship. The relationship between the killer and the killed, the violator and the violated, tormentor and the tormented and finally, between the carriers of coercion, force and fraud on the victims, mirror the situation of subject-object relationships. Morbid and abhorring as these social relation may be, they are the surest indicators of the degree of conflicts and built-in tensions of social structure. For, it is the social structure in which these tensions are embedded and from which they smerge and assume various forms of relations of violence. Before we elaborate our perspective to the study of violence and its relation with Indian social structure it is advisable to define violence and to attempt at its typification.

Defining Violence

Violence is one of the oldest social data. It is universal and ubiquitous*. Violence is the dramatic force in the corpus of myth and legends of people living in various cultures and societies. And indeed, it is the prime raw material with which history of civilization are built. Rise and fall of empires, of tribal chiefs and of king and monarchs are the historical records of wars and violence. The acts of the throat slitor, knife wielders, gun-bearing thieves and bandits are acts of violence. All these varieties of people can further be enlarged to include violence committed by the 'true believers'; the fanatics, the political rebels, the clever politicians who stage

*Ruth Benedict concept of Apollian Culture drawn from the data on the Zunis is perhaps the exception. See her, *Patterns of Culture*.

24 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

violent processions and counter processions against the state or the state atrocities on the people. The unscrupulous greedy who adulterates edible materials and the medicine, killing hundred of people only to get few more easy coins and similar other expressions, including killings by drugs and the cases of bride burning belong to the category of violence.

But the question is how to develop a generic definition of violence which can account for the varieties of conducts we listed above ? Prof. Rasheedudin Khan's schematic article on violence begins with a statement that, "Violence is a term that suffers from the surfeit of meaning".⁷ He critically surveys the definition of violence formulated by various scholars. However, he does not offer his own definition. Johan Galtung⁸ defines violence as, "anything avoidable that impedes human self realization". Galtung attempts to relate and, possibly to quantify the concept of self-realization with the concept of basic needs or rights. Allen D. Grimshaw⁹ on the other hand define violence as "Assault upon individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category. It may be noted that while Galtung concerned himself in evolving a definition of and a paradigm for the study of violence at global scale, Grimshaw's concern is to the study of ethnic riots in the specific American situation. In the context of New Guinea, L.L. Longness defines it as "the use of forcible means to attain goals".¹⁰ Chalmers Johnson relying essentially on Weberian theory of section, defines violence as "action that deliberately or unintentionally disorient the behaviour of others".¹¹

The relations between power and violence, between legiti-

⁷Rasheedudin Khan, "Violence and Socio-economic Development", in Jean-Marie Domenach, *et al.*, (ed.), *Violence and Its Causes*, Paris, UNESCO, 1981, p. 167.

⁸Johan Galtung, "The Specific Contribution of Peace Research to the Study of Violence" in Domenach, *et al.*, (ed.), *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁹Allen D. Grimshaw, "Interpreting Collective Violence", in James A. Short Jr. and Marvin E. Wolfgang (eds.), *Collective Violence*, New York, Aldine Atheton, 1972, p. 38.

¹⁰L.L. Langness, "Violence in the New Guinea Highland" in Short and Wolfgang (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 172.

¹¹Chalmers Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

mate and illegitimate violence and similar other questions need to be carefully taken into account before we attempt at defining violence. If democratic systems are rule of majority, and if, such a majority has power to inflict violence on the minorities in a plural society in the name of legitimate violence, as it happened in the case of Nazi Germany, what would be the criterion of defining violence in light of the fact that legitimacies without morality often amount to atrocity. Keeping in view the complexity of the sense in which the term 'violence' has been used in social science literature, it would be worthwhile to narrow down its meaning to certain set of concrete identifying specific features relating to India. The process of identification in science involves both, the definition of the phenomenon as well as their classification. Identification of social reality of violence in Indian society will begin with or will pre-suppose :

1. The existence of at least two more individuals or groups in a conflict-situation. This involves actors of violence and their victims.

These negatively interacting human units in the case of Indian situations may symbolise two or more individuals, castes, communities, ethnic and political groups and finally, groups and the state. Suicide, mesochism and self infliction of wound or injury remain outside the realm of violence as suggested above. But in a situation where people are driven to or forced to commit such a self destructive acts, those acts will be the part of the sense in which we assign meaning to the term violence in sociology. This should also include attack on beliefs and faith of people.

2. The act of violence assumes its true meaning when an actor or group of actors, including state forcefully inflicts bodily harm, such a killing, maiming, torturing or subjecting the body of the victim to degradation against his wish.

Bodily harms may result on account of direct causes, such as out of caste and communal riots, ethnic conflicts or on account of war between two societies. These are

the cases of direct violence. But violence on people may also be perpetrated by curtailing, abolishing or snatching away of their means of subsistence or of source of life. Artificial creation of scarcity of essential commodities, of poverty and of deliberately curtailing or adulterating the supply of food and medicine, polluting the environment, enacting laws to degrade citizens are some of the examples of indirect types of violence. Since the meaning of the term violence direct or indirect, converge on the body of men, therefore, we are in a position to formulate a preliminary working definition of violence. "*Violence can be defined as socially a negative act used to detract, destroy or deform human life or sources on which human life depends.* Sociologically, violence is an act which either abolishes others' behaviour or disorients them."

We are deliberately keeping the normative aspects of social acts out of the definition of violence. For, killing on the street and hanging in the prison are *de facto* acts to destruct and harm the body. Both are acts of violences. What one can do is to separate them into the categories of legitimate and illegitimate violences. But, both are essentially acts of violences : one enacted illegitimately in the street, the other legitimately in the prison by the state. The question of citizen's act and the acts of the state in relation to violence must be settled in the interest of just social order and in the interest of maintaining the dignity of life.

CLASSIFYING VIOLENCE

An attempt to classifying¹² a complex phenomenon like violence of heterogeneous types must yield sociologically amenable typification. Since most of the expressions of violence are off-shoots of issues which are cultural-specific in nature, therefore, it would be advisable to identify native types

¹²On typology of violence, see Johan Galtung, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-96 and Rasheedudin Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

of violence for the purposes of empirical studies in the Indian social settings. Foreign categories of violence are suggestive but they are not to be accepted uncritically. We, therefore, intend to systematise the data on violence with the help of a scheme consisting of following classificatory points. These points are :

- (i) Issues, interests, goals and objective for which violence was committed. Issues and interest could be personal, collectives, sectarian, communal or territorial, etc.
- (ii) Who committed the violence ? Burning down of huts and home, such as it happens occasionally in the case of caste and communal violences in different parts of India belong to one set of type. Burning of the bride for more dowry however, belong to other type. When individual and collectivity participation aspect is linked with the issue and interest (1) aspect of our classifying device, we approach closer to developing a basis of violence typification.
- (iii) Finally, who were the objects of the violence ? The answer would lead to a person or to a group of persons having a specific social, political and economic status in the society. It may be the state and its various organs or it may be a specific caste or class, community or a political body. Pursuing own exercise step by step further, we note that the three classificatory points, we identified above, do help us in separating various expressions of personal violence which are carried out for personal or familial interests from those, that are collective in nature.

Excluding personalised violence from our direct attention, we are able to get the following broad types of violence in India, which we hope, telescope the Indian scene with relative authenticity. These are the types of the various expression of group violence. They are as given below:

- (a) *Agrarian Violence* and protest, involving peasants and land lords and peasants and the state.
- (b) *Tribal Violence* and uprisings, involving the tribal

28 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

population and rural money lending zamindars and tribals with the state.

- (c) *Sectarian Violence*, involving an ethnic community with a specific type of religious values which the community intends to use as an instrument of bargain for more power.
- (d) *Communal Violence*, involving such groups as the Hindus and Muslim population in India.
- (e) *Caste Violence*, involving various caste groups of Indian social structure to fight for their share in the sources of production and power in society. Atrocities on Harijan belongs to this type of violence.
- (f) *Political Violence*, in its pure type political violence in India hardly exist. Military Coups, loss of the legitimacy of the government and revolt of people against it under the banner of opposition parties ought to signify this type of violence. However, we retain this category as politics has tendency to associate itself with other types of violences.
- (g) *Mixed Type of Violence*, it is indicated by such situations as those in which communal, castists, tribal and sectarian issues are politicised. Most of the peasant rebellions in India have had linkage with political parties. Not only that political parties come into being as an agent of particularised ethnic and sectarian social groupings but also try to transform the total ethnic issue into a national problem.

Crude and preliminary as the attempt at typifying violence is in this article, it does help in getting a way to relate the intensity, severity and frequency of violence of a type (as compared to others) to various socio-cultural components of Indian social structure. In 1964, Harry Eckstein summarising the conclusion of a symposium. On the sociology of internal war and violence argued that most urgent pre-theoretical need in internal war (violence) studies today is the development, even if only tentative, of basic descriptive categories in terms of which the basic features of internal war can be identified, in terms of which their nuance and broader features can be depicted in general structural concepts classes.

(or types) constructed and resemblances of cases to one another or to types accurately assessed".¹³ The following section of this article, therefore, makes an attempt to relate the phenomenon of violence with the component and nature of Indian social structure.

VIOLENCE AND INDIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The concept of social structure generally refers to the specific pattern of the arrangement of the inter-personal relation of individuals of a society into status and strata grouping of castes, classes, communities and other types of collectivities. The pattern of arrangement of relations endure and persist under a system of commonly cherished and shared cultural symbols of values and norms. These values and norms accord legitimacy not only to the formations of social grouping in a society but they also generate a whole series of sanctions cementing the relative position of one group in relation to the other. In fact the relative position of one group in relation to other is determined by the relative possession of values such as, property, power, prestige and honour, etc. Some possess more values as opposed to the other. Social groups thus, introduce hierarchy in society. Order and endurance is achieved by a society only after it has arranged the groupings on this essentially inequitarian scale of values, granting access to one group to the majority of values and denying the same to the others.

So long as the regulative norms remain effective on people and groups, legitimacies behind them continue being accepted by the members of society, howsoever oppressive and violent a social structure could be, they have survived in history as an organised society. But when the legitimacies are in shift, are in the process of change, are being questioned for their relevance, for their partisan role in yielding bounties to one and suppressing the other; even snatching away the right to survive, are blamed at, held responsible for injustice by the deprived groups; a social structure howsoever consensual and democratic at the face value it may be, starts suffering from

¹³Harry Eckstein, *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, New York, Free Press of Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London. Glancoe 1964, p. 23.

violence and social disorder. Erosion of faith in the legitimacy of the values and norms which nourish the social structure and accord continuance to it, initiate a process which throws people off their social, cultural and emotional mooring.¹⁴ There appears a whirlwind of conflicting intrests and loyalties of groups, castes, classes, communities and sects, fighting for their own narrow ethnocentric interests and values, and in that process shedding the blood of each other. Civilised, political institutions of democratic and secular methods of sharing of values and interests, of the impersonal system of law enforcing agencies and of the system of justice suffer threats against their survival. Erosion of major political values and of the neutrality of bureaucratic apparatus initiate another retrograde process.

National level leadership in such a situation tends to get replaced by local level elites. A broken social structure, whose major values and norms are under question and scrutiny, and are thrown in the process of decay and degeneration, develops a tendency to breed a whole array of random, atomised and, from a national point of view, disintegrative local ethnocentric and particularised leaders attempt to become the custodians and preservers of the caste, community, sect and regional interests, as if these are their feudalised power island. They capitalise fragmentation of society and bargain for the partisan share in power, often blackmailing the national authority of the state.

When the process of the decline of central political leadership and the rise of local ethnocentric elites is examined in relation to the process of social mobility at national and international levels, to the process of development and economic growth, the situation becomes much more complex. It paves a way for the local partisan elites not only to accumulate power and a capacity to nationalise their ethnocentric interests and demands but it also helps them to further enlarge their demands and interests. Conflicting demands of castes and communities thus become liable to collide. Such collisions are not only nationalised but also inter-nationalised. This tendency is generally noticed in the context of various

¹⁴See, Henry Bienen, *Violence and Social Change*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, and Ted Gur, *Why Men Rebel ?*

types of terrorism operating among contemporary societies world over.

Social structure is, thus, the soil which seeds discontents. Tensions and conflicts are generated by its system of arrangement of relations and, by its distributive system of values in society. A developing democratic system with a continuing history like India is more prone to the threats of violence as its traditional and modern values are yet to be systematised in the contemporary setting. Violence being the consequence of the failure of normative rules to hold people together on a set of major cohesive values, which are in tune with the developmental and modernizing course of our society, is bound to wield more threats of violence in future than is conceivable today. These issues, however, require an intensive study of the nature of social structure at empirical level.

STUDYING VIOLENCE IN INDIA

This article, as suggested earlier, is programmatic and preliminary in nature. It attempted at evolving a qualifying definition of violence into types and categories. Our concern in such an exercise is to relate these typologies of violence with the components of Indian social structure. Such an endeavour is possible only when we are able to establish casual linkages between violence as a phenomenon and its various types with the components of Indian social structure. This casual linkage must be examined on the general paradigm of Time, Space and Social Actors. A tentative procedure in this direction would contain following steps.

Identification of Base Factors

1. Characterization of Indian social structure in the traditional setting. It involves identification of major ethnic and territorial social groupings such as, tribes, caste, communities, religious groupings, etc., and their relationship with each other and with the state of specific period.
2. Placing these groups on the geographical map of India. By doing this, we establish the relationship between man and the space.

32 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

3. The specific form of relationship between man and space at this stage of our research procedure should be qualified by the nature, type, extent, intensity and frequency of violence (types) at any given period of time of groups located on the spatial (regional) distributions on the map of the country.
4. Identification of dominant values and norms commonly shared and upheld by men in space and in time.
5. Relating types of violence with the dominant values of men in time and space.

Intervening Factors

1. Change in the norms and values brought about by the state, ideologies, education and development, among men in space and time or else their absence in time and space.
2. Relative effect of change on groups on the (space) map in time.
3. Decline or rise of violence in general and of a specific type in particular in group in space and time.

If we are able to operationalise these tentative stages of procedure for empirical study and solve the complexities of their conceptual and empirical implications, we could perhaps be able to move out of the pre-theoretical stage of sociology of violence in India. Casual and comparative model of social science research are required to arrive at a theoretical explanation of phenomenon. Such a model, of necessity, includes the variables of time, space and social actors. An attempt to examine the inter-play between these variables, however, involves the need for a macro—all India social science perspective and a condition, that the researcher is trained in interdisciplinary use and handling of national data from Government Reports and from other secondary source of information including data from field investigation.

These secondary informations are to be used in support of primary field data collections. Selection of field can be decided on the basis of a consideration that the nature of field is appropriate for a specific type of information sought for and that the informations sought for are in tune with the

basic proposition of such a study. Crude and tentative as these suggestive observations are, they, however, call for an urgent study of violence in India—at a national level.

Subsidiary, but crucial factors such as, the way people acquire arms and explosive; the spread of the knowledge about the means of violence and destruction, such as the use of chemicals, drugs, explosives, etc., and the state policies towards such factors are to be examined in detail.

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Theories of Collective Violence Reconsidered

Uttam Bhoite

Humanity is not a stranger to collective violence. Human beings have used collective violence to settle their intra-and inter-group conflicts. The war which stands out as a good example of collective violence is as old as the humanity.

In this paper an attempt is made to pin-point the inadequacies in the contemporary theories in explaining a certain type of collective violence and also to suggest an alternate theoretical perspective in the light of some available empirical evidence. The empirical support to the alternate viewpoint put forth here is drawn from three agitations that took place in the Marathwada region of Maharashtra in the recent past.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE DEFINED

Before we proceed further it is necessary to deal with the definitional problems. The term violence in its wider connotation refers to such a variety of acts as arson, looting, destruction of property, injuring, killing, physical and mental torturing, creation of obstacles in public life and the like. When a large number of people are collectively involved in any one or more of such activities, the phenomenon can be called collective violence.

TYPES OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Two major types of collective violence: expressive and instrumental, based on their differing orientation can be identified.

Often collective violence is an expression of heightened emotions and sentiments of the people such as anger, revenge, hatred, frustration, envy and the like. The people in the state of effervescence are also often found indulging in acts of collective violence. Communal and racial riots can be categorised as examples of expressive collective violence. Expressive collective violence is an act of catharsis. In this sense it can also be viewed as a tension management mechanism. A group experiencing emotional strains possibly regain its emotional equilibrium once it gives expression to its strains in terms of violent actions. This is not to deny that there are other ways through which the group can get its tension released.

When a collectivity resorts to violent activities realising its instrumental potency, the violence can be termed as instrumental collective violence. Agreeably, in an empirical situation it is difficult to distinguish between expressive collective violence and the instrumental one. However, this can be certainly done on an analytical level. Often people resort to violent activities with a belief that they can achieve their objectives thereby. Collective violence here is viewed by its perpetrators as means to ends. On the other hand, the expressive violence is an end in itself. Instrumental collective violence is generally directed against decision-making authorities, viz., a university vice-chancellor, a factory owner or the government, to pressurise them to take certain decisions or to refrain from taking certain decisions which have implications for the groups which the perpetrators of the violence represent.

EXISTING THEORIES

Since the 1960s violence in general and collective violence in particular has assumed a great deal of thematic significance for the social scientists and as a result voluminous literature, both empirical and conceptual, has come out. Two broad observations can be made about these writings. One, not enough attention has been paid in them to emphasise the distinction between the expressive and instrumental orientations of collective violence. Two, the explanatory theories,

which the scientists have advanced, are mostly with regard to the expressive violence and relatively less effort has been made to offer explanations keeping in view the instrumental variety of collective violence. This becomes evident if one examines the various theories of collective violence. These theories can be broadly typed as cultural and social-psychological. The main argument in the cultural theories is that there exists a national or subnational culture of violence. The culture of a particular group makes its members prone to violent acts. Examples often given in this respect are of some tribal states or of pre-war Japan. Quite a few authors have identified various traditions of violence in the politics of developing states¹. Explanations are often offered for recurrent violent political turmoils in the Latin American countries in terms of the heritage of Spanish Culture—"the Spanish tendency to dissension and civil war for the sake of dissension and civil war."²

The culture-argument is also put forth in another form, stressing the implications, the child rearing practices in a society have for the emergence of violence-tendency in its members. For example, some authors have tried to link the phenomenon of national violence in Burma with the child rearing practices there.³

Evidently, the culture-argument does not take any cognizance of the instrumental aspect of collective violence. Its main focus is on explaining why men become violent. Moreover, the argument is based on limited and selective empirical evidences. Without any fear of contradiction, one can easily say that collective violence is not an anathema to any society. It is a phenomenon which one notices as prevalent in various societies.

Social-psychological theories of collective violence are the off-shoots at general theory of collective behaviour. Collective violence is often explained in terms of the psychological

¹See, for example, Lucian Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962.

²Salvador de Madariga, *The Fall of Spanish American Empire*, London, Hollis and Carter, 1947, p. 29.

³See, for example, Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-39; and E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1962.

experiences of marginality, alienation, stresses and strains caused to groups of people due to such changes as urbanization, migration, economic crisis and the like. These experiences have disruptive influences on the individuals who have them.⁴ The marginality-alienation-stresses and strains argument emerged mainly in the social science literature on the Ghetto riots in the American cities in 1960s.⁵

One of the "easiest and by far the most popular explanation of social violence"⁶ offered by the scholars who researched the urban collective violence in the USA was in the form of frustration-aggression theory.⁷ The central argument of this theory is that the individual who experiences an acute sense of frustration and anger on account of thwarting of his basic desires is very much likely to react to the situation by resorting to aggressive behaviour directed towards what is perceived as coming in the way of satisfaction of his basic desires. The basic argument of this theory is that the frustration is created when the goal-directed behaviour is blocked and frustration in turn leads to aggressive behaviour which is directed against the frustrating agent. Later research work, however, indicates that besides violence regression, apathy, submission and avoidance are also some other forms of behaviour in which frustration is translated. Those who subscribe to the frustration-aggression view of the genesis of violence suggest that the frustrated individual or group is likely to attack the believed-to-be or real source of the frustration and the aggression is likely to recur till the frustration is not removed. The theory evidently avoids concerning itself with the instrumental aspect of

⁴See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, New York, Free Press, 1963.

⁵See, for example, Morris Janowitz, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence", in H.D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr (eds.), *The History of Violence in America*, New York, Bantam, 1969; and also, H. Edward Ransford, "Isolation, Powerlessness and Violence", in *Racial Violence in the United States*, Chicago, Aldine, 1969.

⁶Leonard Berkowitz, "The Study of Urban Violence", in Louis H. Masotti and Don R. Bowess (eds.), *Riots and Rebellion*, Calif., Sage, 1968, p. 139.

⁷J. Dollard, L. Doob, N. Miller and R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939.

collective violence directly. Such an expressive collective violence as communal violence or Dalit-non-Dalit violence in India can be better comprehended with the frustration, aggression paradigm, but not the collective violence which is used as means in agitations.

There is an allied and equally important theory which makes use of the concept of relative deprivation to explain the phenomenon of collective violence. The basic proposition of the theory is that "the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among the member of a collectivity."⁸ In social life people come to value many things. They also believe that they are rightfully entitled to a few of them. But in actuality they obtain much less than what they expected.⁹ The intensity of deprivation, the people would experience, subjectively will be relative to the 'gap' between what they cherish for and what they actually get. Wider the gap, greater the sense of deprivation relatively. If a group is deprived of the values which it considers as important, its sense of relative deprivation will more intense and in that case its potential for collective violence will also be more. Of course, the equation between the relative deprivation, people have and their involvement in collective violence, is not that direct. It is always compounded by a number of intervening factors.

This theory shares one important weakness with the frustration-aggression theory. In both the theories relation between individual deprivation and collective deprivation is more assumed than explicated and the linkage between collective deprivation or frustration and collective violence remains a weak one in both theories.

Again the relative deprivation theory of collective violence offers an explanation better suited to the expressive collective violence than the instrumental one.

The inadequacies in the existing theories of violence in explaining the instrumental collective violence necessitate a search for an alternate theory. Admittedly, some social scientist have done some efforts in this direction.

But before formulating an alternate argument to explain

⁸T. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 24.

instrumental collective violence we would like to discuss three agitations in the Marathwada region of Maharashtra in which use of collective violence was made predominantly as an instrument. This exercise is done mainly with a view to collect empirical evidence in support of arguments put forth.

MARATHWADA AGITATIONS

Marathwada region of Maharashtra, initial comprising of five districts, was a part of the erstwhile princely state of Hyderabad under the Nizam. It became a part of the bilingual State of Bombay after the Linguistic State Reorganization in 1956. It became a part of Maharashtra when the latter came into existence as a separate unilingual state in 1960.

When it joined Maharashtra, Marathwada was relatively more underdeveloped as compared to the two other main regions of Maharashtra, namely, Vidarbha and western Maharashtra. It was no where on the industrial map of the State. There were only four colleges in the region. The fertile land of the region remained under-utilized because of poor irrigation facilities. The roads which could be used in all the seasons were very few.

Like Vidarbha region, Marathwada did not set any conditions when it was called upon to be an integral part of Maharashtra, mainly because for Marathwada people it was a home coming, a reunion with their linguistic brethren. Y.B. Chavan, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, who hailed from the Western Maharashtra assured the people of Marathwada region that his Government would not spare any efforts to bring about the all-sided development of Marathwada.

But despite the subsequent efforts of the Government, the developmental backlog of Marathwada could not be covered. On the other hand the gap between its development attainments and those of the other regions of the State went on increasing. This caused increased feelings of deprivation in both absolute and relative terms in the minds of Marathwada people.

The pre-merger leadership of Marathwada belonged mainly to the Hyderabad State Congress which was a counterpart of the Indian National Congress in the Hyderabad State. Most of these leaders continued their affiliation with the Congress party after the region's merger with Maharashtra. A few, of course, parted company with the Congress and joined opposition parties. The Congress could retain its hold over the people through these leaders even during the critical period of the statewide agitation started by the opposition political parties for the formation of the unilingual state of Maharashtra. In the general elections held in 1957 the Congress won almost all the seats of the Legislative Assembly (35 out of 47) in the region while it lost heavily in other regions. However, the Congress leaders in Marathwada being the new comers in the arena of the State politics had to enter into relationships with the alliance leaders at the State level as their minor partners.⁹

In the years to come the regional Congress leaders could sense a growing sense of disillusionment among the people with regard to the pace of the region's development. They also feared that the opposition political parties would make an issue of the low level of the government's performance and steal the show. In case that happened the Congress leaders feared that they would fall in the eyes of the State level party bosses. To pre-empt the possible moves of the opposition parties, the leaders of the Congress Party in the region, organized an all party convention at Aurangabad in 1964 to articulate and discuss the developmental needs of the region and to draw the government's attention towards them. Besides, the regional leaders of the Congress Party intended to use this occasion to assert their regional identity and also to make evident their hold on the region to the state leaders with a view to increase their bargaining power with the leaders of intra-party alliances at the state level. The papers pertaining to the developmental needs of the region, specially prepared for this convention were discussed and several

⁹For a detailed account of political development in Marathwada, see S.N. Datye, *Politics in Marathwada: A Study of Political Development from 1948 to 1972*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, submitted to University of Poona, p. 979.

resolutions were passed. Mr. V.P. Naik, the then Chief Minister of the State, was the chief guest of the convention and quite a few of his Cabinet colleagues attended its various sessions. Although various resolutions were passed in the convention, no follow-up actions were taken. The State Government showed a cultivated disinterest which irked not only the people in opposition but also the party members. The latter could not express their frustration and anguish openly because of their party affiliation with the government.

In the years that followed the sense of relative deprivation of the people in the region increased. It expressed itself in the first regionwide agitation that was started by the students for a separate agricultural university for the region.

In mid-1967 when the Government of Maharashtra decided to establish an Agriculture University in the State, the Marathwada people put forth their claim and suggested a site for it also. However, neglecting their claim the State Government established the University at Rahuri in the western Maharashtra. The students in Vidarbha region were angered at this decision and started a violent agitation. Ultimately the Government established a separate University for Vidarbha region and the College of Agriculture at Parbhani in Marathwada was affiliated to it. This added injury to the insult of Marathwada people. But they preferred to bid the time.

In November 1970, in a sports meet organized by the University at Parbhani there were clashes between the Marathwada and Vidarbha students. Subsequently, the students of college at Parbhani demanded a separate University for Marathwada. The demand was firstly voiced in peaceful manner. A number of delegations representing the various sections of people called on the Chief Minister to persuade him to fulfil the demand. The Congress leaders tried to make use of their good offices. However the government did not oblige. The agitating students boycotted the examinations and gave a violent turn to their agitation by setting a state transport bus and several other government vehicles on fire. Similar violent activities were repeated by the students across the region. Under the pressure mounting because of public violence, the government came around and

took a decision to establish a separate Agriculture university for the region. Apparently, the impact of violence on the government was so traumatic that it sanctioned another university to the fourth region in the state, the Konkan, although there was not so a strong demand for the same.

Four important dimensions of the agitation need to be highlighted :

- (i) Due to the agitation, the students across the region developed a sense of shared purpose which transcended the issue of the University. They also felt reassured about their combined strength to influence the decision makers that be.
- (ii) The political leaders of different shades, particularly of those belonging to the Congress party lent their support in various ways to the agitation. Although they were not in it, they were with it. They could successfully create an image that they possessed a remote control with which they could switch-on or off the agitation whenever they liked. This increased their power to bargain with the state leadership.
- (iii) The agitation brought to the forefront a new generation of leaders from amongst the agitating students, with high political aspirations. Incidentally, quite a few of them are presently holding power positions in the government.
- (iv) More importantly, the new leaders and their followers were convinced of the high instrumental potency of collective violence and its capacity to pay back quick and disproportionately large dividends.

The students made a strategic use of collective violence as means again in the second agitation, known locally as the Marathwada Vikas Andolan (Agitation for the Development of Marathwada) which sparked off in February 1974. Two youths died in the police firing which was resorted to quell an unruly mob of youths who were invited for interviews for jobs. What was intended to be a protest against the police atrocities grew up into a region wide agitation for pinpointing and for fulfilment of the various developmental and other

needs of the region. The entire syndrome of collective violence including protest marches, setting public vehicles on fire, etc., re-emerged. Subsequently the government reluctantly came around the discussion table and gave away a package of developmental schemes to the region and also promised to meet the other demands of the agitators. A few political leaders openly said that they could not have got for the region so many gains over the years which the agitation could get within a short time. This was not the only tribute paid to the potency of collective violence.

The third major agitation erupted in the region in July 1978. The immediate cause of the agitation was the resolution passed by the State legislature to rename the Marathwada University at Aurangabad as Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar University. A large section of people in the region opposed the resolution pleading that the word 'Marathwada' in the name of the University symbolized the regional sentiments and aspirations and so any attempt to change the name of the University would mean an insult of their sentiments. It was also argued that why only the Marathwada University was chosen for this purpose when there were other Universities in the State from amongst which any one could have been chosen to honour the memory of Dr. Ambedkar. The people felt humiliated because of the government's decision.

There was an immediate and fiercely violent public reaction to this decision of the government. The entire region suddenly witnessed arsons, mob fury, killings and the like. Within a short period of three days the government administration and the public life became stand-still. The government have had earlier a taste of Marathwada agitations and with a view to avoid further deterioration in the situation, the government declared the suspension of the decision immediately.

In all these three agitations the collective violence involved was more of instrumental nature than of expressive nature. Agreeably, the conventional theories of strains, alienation, relative deprivation and frustration-aggression provide us with better insights in the problem of collective violence. However, these theories tend to be more relevant

to explain the genesis of collective violence of the expressive variety. They avoid taking a cognizance of the fact that the people use collective violence instrumentally also. This theoretic inadequacy necessitates an alternative/additional perspective to explain the phenomenon of collective violence.

It can be recalled that initially the people of Marathwada tried to draw the attention of the government towards their problems by adopting constitutional and civilized means. Their efforts ultimately culminated into the all party convention organized in 1964. They also stacked their claims for an Agricultural University again in a civilized manner. But they realized the inefficacy and slowness of these ways. In their agitation for a separate Agricultural University in 1970-71 they resorted to collective violence with a view to pressurize the government to fulfil their demand and they were successful in doing it. This leads us to believe that it is necessary to view the issue of collective violence within the framework of strategies adopted in agitations, to develop further insight into it.

Turner¹⁰ has advanced a typology of strategies that are adopted in socio-political movements. He suggests that there are three strategic options that are open for the leaders of movements, namely, persuasion, bargaining and coercion.

The agitations differ from the movements in respect of their certain core characteristics. For example, they have relatively shorter life-span than the movements. The movements envisage to bring about certain fundamental and wider changes, and so they have broader ideological spectrums as their bases. The agitation, on the other hand, are oriented towards getting specific issues settled or grievances redressed. People usually plunge into agitations when the decision-making authorities refuse to consider the issues raised by the people positively. Since there exists little interest consciousness between the agitators and the authorities, the agitators do not find persuasion as a promising strategy. For agitators bargaining and coercion are inseparable.

¹⁰R.H. Turner, "Determinants of Social Movement Strategies", in T. Shibutani (ed.), *Human Nature and Collective Behaviour*, New Brunswick, N. J. Transaction Books, 1970.

The agitators do not use coercion, including that in the form of collective violence for its own sake but to multiply their own bargaining power *vis-a-vis* the decision making authorities. A prime concern of public authorities is peace and order and they bargain with the agitators for the same.

Once the people in the Marathwada region were convinced of the instrumental potency of the collective violence they resorted to it repeatedly. They developed an orientation that collective violence was a legitimate and productive way of making demand on the authorities and of getting them fulfilled.

Our attempt in this paper has been to pinpoint the inadequacies in the existing theories of collective violence. We have indicated that they do not take cognizance of a distinct variety of collective violence, namely, instrumental collective violence. We have suggested that people resort to collective violence because it is a strategy or means more promising among those that are available normally. The risks, involved in collective violence, are minimum and the returns are disproportionately larger. So, viewed from their side this is a rational choice. Collective violence gets a legitimation as it is invariably projected as a manifestation of collective will of the people. In that lies an explanation of the vulnerability of the democratic government to collective violence. Moreover a democratic government can not afford to employ coercive measures to meet the challenges of collective violence for obvious reasons. Addedly, even in a democratic state there are always some groups whose faith in the democratic methods of achieving something that they want or of getting their grievances redressed are brittle because they can not cope up with the quickness with which these groups want the results. Even those who have strong moral commitment to the democratic means and methods get frustrated with their slowness. Such people resolve their moral dilemma by opting for such means of proven merit as collective violence.

Discussion

The studies on collective violence as they exist in India are in a pre-theoretic stage. The need for a study of collective violence is an urgent necessity. Violence, in fact, lurks in our mythology as it is a part of our legend. It is one of the parts of the history—perhaps a major part. Sociologists are concerned to understand the nature of relationship with concept of society and the concept of social order. Thomas Hobbes emphasised that society is conquest of violence and that social order should be achieved only after man has ascended from the state of nature where everyone was at war with everyone.

Ascendency of man from the state of nature and that of social order perhaps has not been very smooth because social order itself is based on systematisation of various types of needs and demands. The argument and emphasis on social order and society being really based on conquest of violence, is questioned by another scholar Ortega-Y Gasset. Gasset says that violence is *ultima ratio*—built-in social bases in the nature of social orders, which suggest that justice cannot be realised unless groups and sectors of society resort to violence. This type of violence is none than reason exasperated. Now this type of theoretical exercise in social science or history of social thought assumes a more menacing posture when they lead to the development of what is called 'New Left Philosophy'. 'New Left Philosophy' from Sorel, Sartre to Fanon, along with the emergence of political activists such as Mao, Che Guevara, Giap and Debray—one finds that whole intellectual emphasis of not only of political schools but of academics laying more emphasis on the rule of malice. That what Sartre says that when you kill a European there lies a dead man and a free man. He says that violence is an act by which man creates itself. This type of gradualization of

things which are gruesome—murder being moralised ultimately develops a type of psyche, a type of content in which we find justification, rationalization, a moralisation of things which have been abhorrent for civilised men. So is the case with Fanon.

About political activist, you know Mao's writing. But historically unique importance of such type of exercises in the academics and by the intellectuals is that this type of respectability being attached to violence corresponds with a development of a process by which needs of violence are being met very easily. Weapons for warfare, weapons for continuing violence, various types of knowledge about commitment of violence—these amenities are being very easily made available to persons who believe in the ideology of violence. Means and value—when they overlap upon each other, when there is a moral justification for violence and for means to carry out that violence, then situation becomes very difficult. Now this difficult situation especially in mid-twentieth century has certain social contexts because our situation is ripe with contradictions. We had monarchies, we had races, we had knights, we had priests and at the same time there is emphasis on the concept of freedom, liberty, equality, justice—and all these philosophies co-exist with some of the archaic institutions of human relations. So in such a context with all type of theorisation and theory construction and rationalization for violence, violence is quite natural, because thought systems are reflections of the context in which intellectuals live.

The Indian society, with its peculiar social structure it has, is one which reflects certain built-in contradictions. These oddities of the contemporary period have linkage with the type of art, literature, philosophy, etc. If this contention or hypotheses is accepted then we have reason to believe that the type of social structure we live in, there is a chance, there is a possibility and perhaps a tendency that violence has some sort of linkage with our social structure.

Now if we proceed on this type of logic, we can treat violence as a purposive social act, negatively resorted to realise certain ends or set of ends in violation of social norms. That should be the starting point to arrive at the

concept of violence in India. But before we attempt to develop a proper definition and try to subject the concept of collective violence to certain classification, we examine various types of definitions given to violence, we observe a considerable ambiguity. Rasheeduddin Khan has made a very brilliant exercise on concept of violence. But somehow he has not defined. Collective violence involves generally at least two groups. These two groups are in a concrete (conflict) situation—that one group is trying to detract, deform, destroy the sources of life of another. When we have a conception of group violence, then we rule out personalised violence, which belongs to the category of crime and definitions of crime. Violence can be defined as socially a negative act used to detract, destroy or deform human life or sources on which human life depends. Sociologically, violence is an act which either abolishes others behaviour or disorients them. Such definitions suffer from number of pitfalls. Pitfalls are : (1) that violence has relation with concept of power, that power has a relationship with the concept of a State, that the state has the relationship with concept of legitimacy of power. When we try to relate concept of collective violence with these variables, with concept of power, concept of legitimacy of power, it becomes difficult to discern the whole issue clearly because ultimately the type of political situation, specially democracies or democracies of plural societies if they are based on the majority rule of one community and in that state if there is communal violence, as it happened in Nazi Germany. In Nazi Germany, democracy was at stake and one community tried to commit violence on the other community, and that violence was legitimate violence. That Nuremberg trial was a legitimate trial because it was carried on a vanquished nation. But when atom bomb was dropped in Nagasaki, Hiroshima, there was no legitimacy because it was on the vanquished nation. So the situation is very difficult because, we as teachers, as sociologists, we have to come out, we have to develop a conception which must transcend the immediate contextual legality and if that is so then violence must be related with the concept of morality, whether it is legitimate or illegitimate. If it is moral, then it is illegitimate whether

it is carried out in the name of legitimacy. Perhaps that is the only way perhaps better understanding can be achieved. It is difficult to disengage the concept of legitimate violence and concept of illegitimate violence.

Having such type of definition and applying this definition to varieties of collective violence in India, if we apply certain classifying points or indices, we can develop a typology of violence. Classifying points or classificatory points would be : What are the interests on which people committed violence—one group committed violence on the other group. We must take into account the objectives, the interest, the goals around which two groups entered into that situation of violence. That is one—one reference would be 'Identification of goals and objectives'. Second would be 'who committed violence on whom', *i.e.*, the nature of groups. When we apply the concept of nature of groups, we may arrive at particular community. We may arrive at a particular group—a territorial group, like tribal versus rural population, or rural versus tribal population. Then we can also take into account the extent and degree of violence committed. And when we correlate these three types of groups, then perhaps we may be able to develop a typology. We can develop six types of violence in India : (i) tribal violence, (ii) agrarian violence, (iii) sectarian, (iv) communal, (v) political, and (vi) mixed type—mixed type, *i.e.*, we may have a situation where political and communal factors—the two have been employed or at a certain stage of violence it was merely political and then it became communal. So we have the residual category, the seventh type in which we include overlapping situations. We should try to identify base factor, *i.e.*, what is the nature of violence and if we have a map of India we can distribute various communities on the map. Historically we can examine their nature, their culture, language, traditions and everything. We can take pre-colonial period, or compare it with post-colonial period, or one-decade period with another decade-period. We can map out the type of violence committed, rating that type of violence with particular type of community, and then cartographically we can demonstrate how patterns of violence have been changing in India. By doing so, we can identify the reasons, the causes which are impor-

tant in order to curb or reduce the incidences of violence in India. But still that is in a highly elementary stage and needs concretisation. But it is high time that we have to come out with a macro study of violence in India in order to test whether our definitions are correct or our typologies are workable or not.

In fact, the issue of legitimisation lies wide open on the cult of violence. The concept of violence is elusive, complex and multidimensional. Violence is difficult to define. Violence has been widely regarded as characteristic of a society in a period of social and political transition. A society that is fast changing generates a great deal of violence mainly because of the lack of settled ways of bringing about social change. A contemporary factor that contributes strongly to the revolution of rising expectations is that of a mass-communication media-newspapers, slick magazines, radio and particularly T.V., etc. Indeed, man is the only animal in which acts of violence stem from ideological concerns rather than from basic needs for food and security. Some of the worst excesses of violence in human history, for example, were derived and continue to be derived from religious differences.

We need to discuss an important distinction between formal and substantive concept of violence. That acts which might be formally similar may be substantively different. A judge in sending a man to gallows is formally doing something similar to what the nature...substantially doing something else. This issue may also be linked up with the issue of legitimacy. The importance of precision in the language in discussing this rather very vexing issue of violence is also important.

We need to ponder over as to when a child is being brought up to what extent he is exposed to the non-violent form of upbringing and to what extent he is exposed to the violent form of upbringing ? Automatically during the early childhood he gets exposed to variety of violent methods and the environment around of the grown-up people is generally violence-prone than being non-violence-prone. We can find out empirically how an incident of collective violence took place ? Who were responsible for it ? Whom did it affect ?

What were the underlying socio-economic and political causes for it?, etc. But is it equally important to know how a group managed to break down the barriers against violence imposed on it by socialization and what structural factors in its collective personality encouraged it to do so? India is basically a plural society and a lot of volumes have been written regarding the plural society but the type of relationship that we could establish between plurality of cultures and collective violence. It appears that this particular aspect has not been discussed effectively in the past.

Collective violence must not be seen as just law and order problem. There is need to go beyond the law and order dimension of collective violence, particularly if one wants to conceptualise violence, particularly in order to understand the nature, the cause and manifestations of violence in different parts of the country at different phases of time. Therefore the problem of collective violence does not emerge at the time when law and order is broken and it is re-established at the point when law and order is re-established. All violence certainly cannot be put together. There is differentiated structure dependent on morality. But this raises the question: What is morality? What is legitimacy? There was a need to go much beyond the psychological dimensions of violence and look into economic and political dimensions which do provide some bases for classification of various kinds. In the discussion on violence, we must go from event to structure. Only the structure can tell us the meaning, the implications, the manifestations and the contours. Let us take the phenomenon of collective violence. When we go to structure again it is not just a non-differentiated process not an undifferentiated phenomenon. There would be structures of various kinds. Do we go from the events to the structures of values and stop at that? And there have been large number of discussions and various books have been written on this point and considerable development has taken place. The analysis of structured values possibly will help us to understand the nature, the dimension of collective violence in a very satisfying way. One could argue against it and ask the questions: Where do these values come from? How do values of different communities differ? What is at

the basis of it or whether there is need to go beyond values ? Or, are values manifestations of some other more fundamental processes. One could go beyond values to examine the structure, the economic and political structure of the community which possibly might give us some ideas and some understanding as to why values tend to differ from society to society, from time to time and how conflicts of values really are essentially conflicts of interests ? If you go into the productive process, then a number of questions immediately crop up in your mind. There is need to examine the contradictions that emerge as a consequence of differential of contribution, differential appropriation of the social product in the productive system.

India is a very complex society. Collective violence is much more complex in the situation of India, as a consequence of various layers of contradictions that have developed over time in a particular community. There could be contradictions emerging from the questions of nativity—tribal vs. non-tribal. There could be questions of contradictions emerging as a consequence of language, religion—and to this way it has been added political ideology recently as a consequence of political franchise and things of this particular type. The new economic opportunities opened up for exploitation have themselves led to emergence of contradictions of various kinds. We do find situation of multiplicity of contradictions which all give rise to collective violence. One finds that it is not just a phenomenon of multiplicity of contradictions existing side by side but these contradictions themselves are structured into what is called the structure of dominance. And this structure of dominance is not a constant phenomenon. It keeps on changing over time. At one time one contradiction may be dominant and others may be dominated and this can change as the time is the consequence of various social, economic and social processes. The study of collective violence can be seen in terms of the structure of contradictions that you find in Indian society in different parts of the country. Particular level of violence possibly would be normal, but it would become pathological only when you find it is killing a particular level of violent behaviour particularly in the situation of a country

where you find people become more conscious of their rights, inheriting a very unjust economic, political and social order. People looking more conscious of their rights certainly is bound to lead to more violence. Certain level of violent behaviour particularly collective violent behaviour would exist, but then we must try to ensure that it does not go beyond a particular level.

How far the traditions of a society/group reflect values in terms of non-violence? If we go into the Indian tradition, specially the Hindu tradition, the normative principles support non-violence but at the ethical level and at the behavioural level, there is a complete violation—in fact a deviation from that norm. The most important thing is to go into the point how far the values themselves are formed and what is the relationship between those values and social order. So the question essentially comes to this that what is the kind of social order that we visualised and without having a clear perspective on this issue that is what is our theory of social order? The problem of violence cannot be properly recognised because otherwise we will be either dealing with the events actually in an ad hoc manner in which violence takes place in a society and try to find out ad hoc solutions or temporary solutions, but we will not be dealing with what is called the conceptual issue of violence. In an hierarchical social structure of India, what is the role of violence? If a society is passing from hierarchical social order to the different model of social order then how far the notion of violence is undergoing change in the transitional period. It is a different matter that we may or may not accept that Indian society is a hierarchical society. From a meaningful study of violence, the process and the incidence of solution could be sought. Generally speaking, we can think of social order as a consensual phenomenon, we can think of social order as conflict, reconciliation of interest, we can think of social order as a conflict of interest, we can think of social order as also essentially based on cooperative norm. There are different ways of looking at social order and now what is the social order in India like? What is our model of social order?

Collective action is also important in a society which

teaches us to live more like an Indian, the whole process of production, whole social elements are pushing us towards more individualistic forms, the whole capitalistic mode of production which is a distinctive feature. Now this collective action which emerges sporadically in the form of collective violence, in the form of different patterns that itself needs an examination. Why people become collectivity. A new form is assumed. Why ? This question perhaps has been left to ponder over. There is no question of legitimacy when you are talking only from that point of view in a civilised society so that violence is, sometimes and most of the time, very difficult to justify. But when you are talking in terms of collective action then perhaps it might be easier to justify violent collective action. Why do people form into collectivity ?

The concept of violence can only be defined in the light of the existing demands of the society. May be, Indian Constitution, may be Indian Penal Code and law. The concept of the problem is, we have to take these three very major basic concepts. (1) *Criminal Violence* : I do not say that a criminal violence today is a criminal violence, tomorrow it may be a sacred action. That is what has happened where criminal violence at one stage of history has become virtually the most sacred act today. So criminal violence has to be taken in and for that we have to take into account the existing structure of the law and demands of the Constitution of India. (2) *Non-criminal violence* : which may be a criminal violence tomorrow and that will clarify. And in that light we have another concept which is : (3) *Legitimate Violence*—violence of a State. Violence of a State which is legitimate—today, in the existing circumstances. We have to take these three categories—very specifically criminal violence, non-criminal violence and then legitimate violence, and we categorise them. We need to understand as to how and what type of activities are creating situations of society which are not being tolerated by law and also by society.

We need to bring out the relationship between violence and non-violence in each tradition. The issue is not to say that Hindus are violent or non-violent, but what is the relationship between violence and non-violence in the Hindu

or the Christian or the Sikh or others historically. We have to make differentiation between the situation when the violence is desired and when it is not. Sometimes collective violence is very necessary to defend one's community or one's nationality and then we have to take into consideration : Violence or collective violence is desired even for one's own community or one's own nation and from that point of view as to when the collective violence becomes a social problem for the government, for the administration or for the society.



II : CASTE/CLASS VIOLENCE



Collective Violence of the Working Class—With a Focus on the Collective Criminality of the Urban Surplus Labour

B.B. Pandey

I

Collective actions have always evoked special attention on account of their ability to influence the social situation, both at the physical and non-physical levels. The factor of combination of many individual actions accords to the collectivities or groups a unique ability to produce enormous physical outcomes—destructive as well as constructive. The point of physical level destructive outcomes is well brought home by the shocking instances of mob fury, communal frenzy and other forms of group actions that have become an integral part of the urban scenario today. The enormity of the consequences of such occurrences often leads to equating such incidents with natural calamities or disasters like earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, and devise remedial step like the establishment of disaster centres with a view to effectively coping with such eventualities.¹ This potential of physical level outcome is described by Burke as : “Liberty, when men act in bodies, is power.” The element of power becomes even more

¹The Disaster Research Centre, Ohio State University, Columbus, USA is currently engaged in the study and research concerning all kinds of disasters whether natural (like earthquakes, floods, tornadoes) or man-made (like riots, mob action, etc.).

crucial when the collective action turns violent,² when it becomes associated with diverse patterns of violent behaviour like arson, loot, killing, etc. Under such conditions collective violence becomes directed not only against certain cherished bodily and property interests but also poses a challenge to the social order itself. The element of challenge to the social order relates to the non-physical level outcome of collective action. Thus, collective action, particularly when it involves the participation of a substantial section of the society, poses a challenge to the state and the formal normative system itself. Understood in this sense *each instance of collective action conveys an appeal to the external world, which might immediately or ultimately legitimise the collectivity*, on the one hand, and delegitimise the authority/other target groups, on the other. In this sense collective action becomes a potent tool of political action in any democratic society. Thus, the 'power' and the 'challenge' potential of collective action, particularly where it manifests in violent forms, raise crucial regulation and control demands in every society. These demands can be generalised as follows:

- (a) There always exists a need to regulate and control collective actions through formal as well as informal means in every society.
- (b) Collective violence affecting body, property and public order interests are treated more seriously and invariably subjected to formal means of control.
- (c) Formal means of control relate to a wide range of actions of the authority which includes law and order keeping action of the police and other para-military forces, the preventive action and the punitive action.
- (d) Since the nature, causes and motivations of collective violence may vary from case to case there is always

²Violence here is understood as a neutral, non-pejorative technique of coercions. Something similar to the use of the term by Ted Robert Gurr and H.D. Graham (1969). Since the present paper mainly focuses the violence directed against the State or the ruling social group it should not mean that the author does not subscribe to the possibility of the state violence.

a need to constantly re-examine and apply norms and techniques not only on grounds of justice and morality but also on grounds of effective control and management.

II

The task of examining the social control processes in the context of collective violence requires an understanding of the nature, kinds and functional aspects of collectivities or groups, on the one hand, and the rationale of the authoritative response to collective violence, on the other. Collective violence has been perceived differently by the psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, lawyers, judges and policy planners, depending upon the object and the purpose of their analysis.

The psychological perspective of collective or group behaviour seeks to explain the phenomenon in terms of the psychological characteristics of the members as individual and as a collectivity. There are two line of psychological analysis of collective behaviour. The first assumes collective behaviour, particularly of the crowds as a unconscious or irrational behaviour [see particularly Gustav Lepton (1960), S. Freud (1922), John David and Herbert Harari (1968), H. Edward Ransford (1968), Neil J. Smelsar (1962) and H. Blumer (1969)]. The second line of thinking accepts that there is nothing fundamentally different about cognitive processes in crowds and that crowds and other collectivities are engaged in the task of fulfilling individual and mutual needs [see particularly Richard A. Berk (1974), Howard Raiff (1959, 1970), Herman Chernoff and Sincoln Moses (1959), Robert M. Fogeler (1971), Tom Hyden (1967), Cohn and Murphy (1966)]. Both the aforesaid lines of explanation of collective behaviour perceive the collective behaviour within the social control framework that assumes unquestioned acceptance of a value system that is challenged by the collective behaviour. However, it is possible to view collective behaviour as a problem of social change and assume that at least some instances like the political protests and demonstrations are in conformity

with the values of a competing social group as well.³

The sociological perspective of collective behaviour is equally important for the understanding of the collective violence phenomenon. A collectivity or a group is defined by W.J.H. Sprott (1967) as "a plurality of persons who interact with one another in a given context more than they interact with anyone else." Accordingly the collectivity of individuals should retain the following conditions :

- (a) There should be some kind of symbolic interaction between the members which should influence one another.
- (b) Each member should appreciate himself as a part of the group and conversely the group should also recognise him as a member.
- (c) Members are aware of their roles, duties and obligations resulting from group membership. The sociologists further classify collectivities or groups on the basis of the nature of their relationship as primary (family, clique of friends, gangs, etc.) and secondary (trade unions, religious denominations, professional organisations, etc.). Furthermore, the sociologists display a major concern for face to face collectivities which are more intimately related to social order issues. The sociologists perceive collective behaviour, particularly its violent form, as an instance of societal norm violation, an instance of disorganisation, or disorder. The second way treats collective behaviour as a device of upholding the norms of the sub-group to which the members belong [see Howard Becker (1963), Edwin H. Lemert (1970), George B. Vold (1958), Austin A. Turk (1969), Lewis A. Coser (1966)].

The legal perspective to collective behaviour is essentially a member or individual oriented. The state laws demand universal obedience irrespective of the nature of character of

³Hobsbawm (1959) and (1964) was the first to take this view in the context of the pre-industrial city mobs. The same line of thinking is reflected in the writings of John Phillips Reid (1977) and E.I. Quarantelli and Russel R. Daynes (1970).

the political subordinates like the individuals, groups or other entites. Thus, transgressions of the formal rules by collectivities or groups is considered in no way different from individual transgressions and are understood to be a product of human passions. There are certain special rules of liability that are designed with a view to controlling group behaviours which includes preventive actions in respect of prescribed associations, unlawful assemblies, liability for various levels of participation in group behaviours, etc.

Generally the instances of collective violence are considered on the case to case basis. However, for the purposes of understanding and analysis collective or group violence can be classified into the following broad categories: (a) classification on the basis of the nature of issue involved as in the case of caste collective violence, communal collective violence, linguistic collective violence, regional collective violence, etc.; (b) classification on the basis of the peculiarities of the participants—as in the case of student collective violence, peasant collective violence, Naxalite violence, labour collective violence, etc.; (c) classification on the basis of peculiarities of the behaviour—as in case of spontaneous, mob collective violence, gang or organised collective violence, etc. *One peculiar feature of the traditional classifications is that the instances of collective violence are viewed in a class neutral frame.* Even in the case of labour collective action, the classification is based either on the basis of the type or description of the workers or their legal status as unionised or non-unionised, but not their class identity. The traditional classification inhibits not only a proper understanding of the nature of the particular group but also affects proper societal response to it.

III

The collective violence of the working class would mainly relate to the collective actions of the unionised and non-unionised labour, peasant and the other working groups that qualify to fall within the 'proletariat' category. The present paper would, thus, focus on collective action incidents involving small and large, organised and unorganised sections of

the working class. This would include of collective labour actions like picketing, gherao, demonstrations and spontaneous collective actions like riots, etc., of the urban working class and peasant uprisings and other mass actions of the rural working class. *It is contended that in view of the peculiarities of their socio-economic conditions and limits of choice of action, the collective violence of the working class needs to be appreciated as a distinct category.*

Before examining the working class collective violence phenomenon it would be worthwhile to know something about the existential realities of the working class population in India. According to the official statistics there were 240 million persons in our workforce in 1980. Out of these only 168 million had stable employment, 67.9 million were employed casually and 4.1 million were totally unemployed. In addition to this, approximately 130 million were self-employed.⁴ A large percentage of the working class (approx. 175 million) are still unorganised or non-unionised. Also relevant for our purpose is the statistics relating to persons living below poverty line, which comprises the stock pool out of which the working class population is constantly drawn. According to Adisesiah (1982) "317 million persons live under various levels of poverty. There are the extreme destitutes who are spending between Rs. 0-15 per person per month who are 3.5 million in rural areas and 0.2 million in urban areas. In the next level are 16 million people in rural areas and one million in urban areas who spend Rs. 15-21 per person per month. The third level from the bottom comprises 43 million persons in rural and 5 million persons in urban areas who spend Rs. 21-28 per person per month. The fourth level includes 56 million persons in rural and 26 million in urban areas, spending Rs. 28-34 in rural and 28-43 in urban areas. These four groups of destitutes number less than 200 million and the balance 120 million are poor but not destitute." The urban surplus labour population is drawn from among the urban poor population of approximately 40 million persons. The surplus labour population very well analysed by Karl Marx in terms of its four, namely, 'floating', 'latent', 'stagnant' and 'paupers and criminal' forms.

⁴NSS : 27th Round (1972-73).

IV

The instances of working class collective violence can be put into three major categories as follows :

- A. Working class interest-oriented unionised collective actions of general nature.
- B. Working class interest oriented non-unionised collective actions related to specific grievances.
- C. Instigated working-class collective actions.

The working class collective actions falling in category A would comprise of vast range of Trade Union collective actions. By its very nature this type of collective violence would involve balancing between the freedom of action of the labour and the interest of security. As an instance of organised and unionised working class action it might be possible to deal with this pattern of collective violence through informal/formal labour control devices. However, instances of grave violence to bodily and property interest through collective action can always be subjected to criminal liability.

Category B includes within its ambit the non-unionised specific grievance oriented collective actions of the working class. Generally this category of collective violence would be spontaneous or an outcome of short duration planning. This category of collective violence may be inspired by any of the following administrative actions, namely, eviction from pavements, slums or government lands, action against hawkers and small stall owners, denial of ration-card and consequent entitlement for cheap food grains, etc. Collective violence of this category is best illustrated by the recent *Marina Beach Fishermen's Collective Violence* incident of December 3 and 4, 1985. According to the newspapers⁵ and the Committee Reports⁶ of the Committee (All India Lawyers' Union, Madras District Committee on the Fishermen's Problem and the Police Action in Nadukuppam, 1986), the incident involving the collective violence of the fishermen

⁵*The Hindu* and *The Indian Express*, December 5, 1985.

⁶*Report on the Problems of the Fishermen of Marina and the Police Action in Nadukuppam*. All Indian Lawyers' Union, Madras District, 1985.

was an outcome on several past incidents and the growing attitudinal changes of the participants. The most important past incident was the embarking upon a Marina Beach Beautification Programme early in the month of November 1985. The details of the beautification programme and reaction to it are as follows: Notices were sent by the State Government disclosing their intention of removing the catamarans and boats from the beach, and on November 4 the catamarans and boats were physically removed from the beach. This led to a strike by the fishermen against the removal of catamarans, etc., on November 5. On November, 15, 16, 18 and 19 there was a meeting between the fishermen and the Fisheries Minister, which ended in a deadlock. The Slum Clearance Board sent bills for collection of rent from the fishermen on December 3, 1985. Followed by an altercation and beating of one of the fishermen in the Slum Clearance Board office on December 3, 1985. The agitated fishermen decided in a meeting on December 4 to picket the Slum Clearance Board. The collective violence broke out on the morning of December 4 after an altercation between the Chairman, Slum Board and the group of fishermen. The police joined in to restore the warring factions and also became the target of fishermen collective violence. More details about the exact sequence of events and nature of collective violence would come to light after the official enquiry but even on the basis of existing facts one can appreciate the peculiarities of this instance of collective violence which could be described more as a reaction to the administrative action relating to 'beautification' that left little choice for the large number of fishermen, who acted collectively to defend their traditional, often the only, means of livelihood. Furthermore, they resorted to collective action after more than a month, that too as a last resort.

Unlike the category A and category B collective violence, which centres round general or specific working class interest and is largely a working class affair, the category C relates to those instances of working class collective actions which might have nothing to do with working class interest and may be engineered and instigated, by non-working class forces. In the recent times, particularly after the Bhiwandi

(Bombay) riots (1984), the Delhi riots (November 1984), the Ahmedabad riots (1985) the collective violence of the 'degraded' and the 'contemptible' sections of the urban poor has acquired notoriety. There is enough evidence to establish that the main participants in those major incidents of collective violence were the urbanised and peripheral villagers and the migrant population whose aspirations had far over-run their abilities, available job prospects, housing and other basic civic amenities. The mobs that burnt down the *chawls* along with their inmates in Bhiwandi, those who indulged in loot, arson and killings in Delhi and participated systematic destruction of houses and settlements in the inner city of Ahmedabad belonged to that section of the population which exists in a dehumanized and frustrated state where the finer human sentiments and civilized order values have little place. More important than all this is the fact that in a majority of such cases the class indulging in collective violence is a victim of mechanisations of the political or economic vested interest, who use the working class or surplus labour class collective violence to serve their interests (studies concerning the underlying motivations and economic interests of the Bhiwandi riots, the Delhi riots and the Ahmedabad riots amply illustrate the point). Regarding the collective violence of this category it might not be wrong to make the following generalisations :

1. Such collective actions are largely inspired by the state of stress and frustration arising on account of multiple disabilities they suffer from.
2. Being in a state of stress and frustration makes them an easy prey in the hands of the vested interest class who stand to gain both by their collective action and consequent victimization.
3. The proneness of the working class to collective violence is directly related to their economic condition and the consequence sense of individual worthlessness.
4. The incidents are more like signalling device which sensitise the upper classes to the need for social reconstruction.

Examining the formal system's response to working class

collective violence we see little evidence that there is an adequate appreciation of the different categories of working class collective violence. Particularly the collective violence of the urban surplus labour (those falling in Category C) are for all practical purposes equal with other organised and pre-planned forms of collective violence (the institution of criminal cases against the defenceless slum and Jhuggi-jhompri dwellers in connection with Delhi riots and criminal proceedings against the labour class belonging to the active community in Bhiwandi is an evidence of this kind of formal response). Finally, it could be concluded with an observation of Lewis A. Coser : "often the violent forms a rebellion of labouring poor, the destructiveness of the city mobs, and other forms of popular disturbances which mark English Social History from 1760s to the middle of the nineteenth century helped to educate the governing elite of England—Wongs and Tory alike—to the recognition that they could ignore the plight of the poor only at their own peril." (Lewis A. Coser, 1966).⁷

⁷Similar views are expressed by James S. Campbell, *et al.*, in *Law and Order Reconsidered*, A Staff Report to the National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence, US.

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Socio-psychological Factors in Violence : A Case Study of an Agricultural University

Uday Jain

In a democratic society the modes of operation of different formal organizations and institutions play a vital role in the socio-psychological climate of the country. It is their success which leads a nation on the path of development. Every organization and institution in our country enjoys freedom under the law and exercises its power through hierarchical structure. The dynamics of operation of the power structures is so complex that the social benefits could be usurped/dispersed/diffused/wasted. The interested persons could be of varied shades. In this process of gain and loss various informal and formal groups often emerge in institutions which are largely based on caste, community, region or political affiliations. Indian universities could not be exceptions in this regard. The university authorities, the teachers, the students and other employees within their jurisdiction are organised for their personal benefits. In this game of maximizing gains more often than not conflicts between these groups take the violent turn and functioning of the institutions is disturbed. The analysis of this violence should be made in the context of the total social environment rather than as a separate independent and isolated case (Singh, 1972).

In the literature several theories of aggression and violence have been offered but they lack sufficient empirical support. Recently, a few empirical studies have been carried out in India (e.g., Singh, 1972; Chatterjee, Singh and Rao, 1967;

Sarkar, 1964) and their analysis of violence suggests multiple but uniform pattern of the causes of violence in university and other organizations.

The present paper reports a case study of violence at an agricultural university. This case of violence is unique in the sense that it was a conflict between university authorities and farm labourers rather than the students. A descriptive part of the agitation was published elsewhere (see Iyer, Jain and others, 1978).

The Incident

In the said university for the first time in its history of 18 years the non-teaching employees formed a union and recruited the farm labourers as the members of this union. Subsequently, they placed a six-point charter of demands to the Vice Chancellor (VC). The main demands included the implementation of the Minimum Wages Act and the reduction of working hours from 12 to 8 a day for the security guards, formulation of service rules, medical facilities and recognition of union. The authorities conceded only one demand, *i.e.*, no deduction of payment for housing, electricity and water. A few days later one worker was shot at with a country made pistol by a relative of a farm officer resulting in the loss of one eye. The union went on strike for two days and again placed their demands including the punishment for the criminal act committed by the relative. The agreement between the university and union was brought about by the intervention of the district administration. But instead of implementing the agreement, university services were declared essential and 90 workers of Crop Research Centre, who were active union members, were retrenched. This resulted almost in the stoppage of work by over 400 workers at this unit. Some of these workers were arrested. In protest of their arrest and retrenchment, over 2000 workers from the various parts of the farm presented a peaceful demonstration at the police station. Police arrested 1000 workers and kept them hungry for 24 hrs. and then released them. The university authorities also reinstated all the 90 retrenched workers. Just after a few days the senior research assistants of Crop Research Centre, in contravention to the

agreement signed earlier, tried to force the workers for 12 hrs. work. This follows scuffles between the research assistants and a group of workers. Counter cases were filed by the university and the union. This was the first time that the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) was inducted into the campus. Soon after 17 labourers were arrested and released on bail. They resumed their duties on a day and were sacked on the other day. They were also asked to vacate their huts and to leave the campus. Then union presented a charter of 14 demands and posed a threat to go on strike from a specified date in case the demands were not conceded. The VC gave a written reply to all the 14 demands (see Iyer, Jain and others, 1978), and could not concede any of the demands. These demands included the reinstatement of the 17 workers, withdrawal of PAC from the campus, and withdrawal of the ordinance promulgating Essential Service Act. When their demands were not conceded the union declared strike.

The refusal of VC to negotiate further, his announced threat of disciplinary action, the retrenchment of some labourers and office clerks, the union strike, the scuffles between labourers and PAC at various points in the campus, the raids in the houses of the union leaders and workers, and the arrest of several of them contributed to increase in tension and resulted in a state of confusion. On the 3rd day of the strike, hundreds of labourers were coming to participate in a procession. At the main crossing of the campus the workers were prevented by the PAC. The Union leaders were provoked and instantly they decided on a programme of mass arrest. The PAC opened firing. The official sources declared that 13 persons were killed and 34 were injured. The newspapers and the campus people reported 50 to 100 persons as killed and a few hundred as injured.

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY

To study the precipitating causes of the incident, and its socio-psychological effects upon the residents at the campus, just after four days of this incident, we* interviewed a cross

*The research team consisted of G. Iyer, U. Jain, A. Prakash, A. Mazid, and P. Tripathi.

section of the students, inhabitants, and others who were witness to the scene. These included the university employees, labourers, school teachers, rickshapullers, and shopkeepers. Each investigator visited all the labour colonies, shopping centers, and staff quarters. The effort was made to interview one person at a time but in case of labourers, presence of other labourers could not be avoided. Each person was allowed to speak freely and relevant information was immediately recorded. Part of the information was also collected from the university office.

An interview schedule was prepared for this purpose as a guide to the investigators. This schedule contained questions regarding the history of the agitation, the service and living conditions of the labourers, and other employees, the duration of their stay in the campus, etc. All the participants were asked to evaluate their perceptions and feelings of this incident on five-point rating scale. The reliability of the data was sought out by checking and cross-checking of information from various sources including the university office, photographs taken during the incidents, and inclusion of samples from cross-sections of the campus residents. The collected information was categorised into specific categories. The results appear in Tables 1 to 6.

TABLE 1 THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE THAT SPARKED OFF THE FIRING

	(in percentage)				
	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Clerks and techni- cians</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Caste group</i>	<i>Third party</i>
No cause of firing	60.83	65.51	21.42	—	—
Pre-planned by Uni- versity	13.43	10.34	21.42	—	50
Pre-planned by PAC	17.39	—	28.57	—	—
Class between workers	0.0	6.89	14.28	100	—
No response	8.69	17.24	35.71	—	50

74 *Collective Violence : Genesis and Response*

TABLE 2 WHY DID THE FIRING TOOK PLACE AT
THE PARTICULAR TIME AND PLACE

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Clerks and technicians</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Caste group</i>	<i>Third party</i>
Pre-planned	34.47	31.03	50.00	—	12.5
Caste group wanted to kill	4.34	—	—	—	0.0
Confrontation with PAC	17.39	3.44	28.57	—	37.5
To create terror	8.69	20.68	0.0	—	0.0
No reason	13.04	20.68	14.28	—	—
Violent labourers	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	—
No response	21.73	24.13	7.14	—	50.0

TABLE 3 DID PAC WARNED BEFORE FIRING

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Clerks and technicians</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Caste group</i>	<i>Third party</i>
No measures	86.95	86.20	57.14	—	75.00
Verbal warning	0.0	3.44	0.0	—	12.5
Teargas	8.68	6.89	21.48	—	—
Lathicharge	0.0	0.0	12.48	100	—
No response	3.34	3.4	7.14	—	12.5

TABLE 4 WAS THE FIRING ESSENTIAL ?

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Clerks and technicians</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Caste group</i>	<i>Third party</i>
Not essential	100.00	96.60	92.85	50.0	97.5
Essential	—	—	7.14	50.50	—
Cannot say	—	—	—	—	12.5
No response	—	3.40	—	—	—

TABLE 5 DID THE PROCESSION INDULGED IN ANY
VIOLENCE ?

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Clerks and technicians</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Caste group</i>	<i>Third party</i>
No	95.65	89.65	—	—	87.50
Yes	—	—	—	100	—
Slogans	4.35	—	100	—	12.50
Quarrel over water	—	10.34	—	—	—

TABLE 6 A COMPARATIVE REPRESENTATION OF THE PERCENTAGE OF ATTITUDE SCORES OF EACH ITEM FOR EACH GROUP
(Per cent Scores)

<i>Attitude Items</i>	<i>Clerical staff</i>	<i>Technician staff</i>	<i>Labourers</i>	<i>Students</i>	<i>Third party</i>
How many workers were killed 15-100 ? What is the probability of this number being correct	70	85	82	81	80
Probability that this type of incident will not occur in future ?	57	61	62	47	66
How many of the workers problems would be solved this incident ?	40	46	51	54	40
How far this incident would help reform of the farm management ?	26	38	41	38	40
To what extent the conditions of workers would improve after this incident ?	48	61	54	43	56
How far this movement proved to be careful to the workers ?	45	49	41	44	43
How far it was possible to control the situation without the help of police ?	90	92	88	76	80
How far the union could do for the betterment of workers ?	84	86	65	66	71
How far the demands were genuine ?	93	92	88	77	73
To what extent the 'Farm' was capable of meeting their demands ?	91	83	92	83	74
How far the workers are cooperative ?	97	90	85	78	80
Probability of establishing a better government through this type of movement ?	76	56	67	75	No response
How far the government officers tried to prevent this incident ?	22	20	29	38	30

The main findings can be summarised as follows :

1. More than 60 per cent of the labourers and clerks considered that there was no genuine cause of firing. A few of them including the third party, reported that the firing was pre-planned. Caste group participants perceived the cause of firing due to the clash between workers.
2. The violence at a particular place occurred because it was pre-planned as reported by the majority of the labourers-clerks and students. All the caste-group participants reported the cause to the agitation of workers. Majority of the third party reported confrontation with PAC at the particular place.
3. Most of the participants, except a caste group, reported that warning was not given.
4. Majority of the labourers, clerks, students and even 50 per cent of the caste group participants accepted that firing was not essential.
5. In response to the question whether procession indulged in any violence most of the labourers, clerks, and the third party reported no violence of the procession, whereas students reported that workers were raising slogans. However, the caste group participants reported that workers were violent.
6. All the participants expressed high confidence in guessing the number of persons killed. The reported range of deaths varied from 15 to 100. A majority of the third party, labourers, technical staff felt that the incident may not be repeated in future, whereas a majority of clerks and students felt that the incident may be repeated.

Only 40 to 54 per cent problems were reported to have been solved because of this incident; 26 to 41 per cent feel that this incident will introduce reform in farm management; 43 to 61 per cent improvement was guessed in the condition of the labourers.

Sixtyfive per cent to 86 per cent participants reported confidence in the union. Seventyseven to 93 per cent participants perceived the genuineness of the demands.

Seventyfour to 92 per cent participants viewed that the university was capable of fulfilling the demands of the workers.

Seventyeight to 87 per cent cohesiveness in the workers was guessed by various groups.

Fiftysix per cent to 76 per cent participants reported that reform is possible through this type of movement. Twenty to 38 per cent participants felt that government officials have an important role in checking this incident.

Thirtysix to 53 per cent participants attributed responsibility of the present incident to the farm officer and 20 per cent to 54 per cent (third party) to the government. The students attributed 7 per cent responsibility to union and 9 per cent to (third party) and 28 per cent (lab. tech.) to the police.

Additional Observations

Formation of the union played a catalytic role to aggravate the situation. It is due to the growing frustration that unity amongst labourers is heightened and they accepted the union membership at the first call by ministerial staff of the university. Formation of the union might not have led to this fatal incident if university authorities would not have objected so vigorously to the formation of the union. Secondly, if university authorities would have acted according to the agreement, reached between the university and the union, the trouble might not have taken a serious turn. As is evident from the interviews of labourers, union workers, and students the farm supervisors were engaging these labourers in their domestic work without any payment, the formation of union might have been perceived as an attack by the supervisors on their material benefits and physical comforts. These officers therefore, could persuade the VC to obstruct the formation of the union. Thus the two rival forces emerged for constant conflict. Students and teachers remained neutral to all these developments.

In spite of the long history of oppression of the labourers, the history of their agitation was so short that one may wonder how this fatal incident took place. There were two

sections of the oppressed themselves, viz., leaders belonging to the lower middle class and the followers belonging to the poor class. The ignorance of their demands and the pessimistic views about future was evident in the interviews of the workers (Tables 3, 4, 5, 6). Probably, it is because of this reason that the authorities could take such an extreme step of suppression. To support their actions and to distort reality, farm officials tried to create confusion by raising the caste and regional feelings. (This is evident from the leaflets distributed after the incident). It is probably the power motive intertwined with vested considerations which led these officials to confuse the whole issue for public.

Observation of Table 6 reveals the variations in the perception by various groups supports the contention that vested interests shape the perceptions. The aim of the questionnaire was to ascertain their confidence in future perceived instrumental value of the present incident in the reform of working conditions, etc., and attribution of causality to the present incident. It is evident from Table 6 that all the groups showed high confidence in their guesses of the number of persons killed. The reported number of persons varied from 15-100. The official record showed only 34 deaths but reported number varies considerably. The high confidence and discrepant reports are the results of ambiguity. Labourers, technical staff and third party showed higher probability of the non-occurrence of such incident in future in comparison to clerical staff and students.

Whether this sacrifice will bring solutions to some of their problems? Labourers could hope the solution of 51 per cent problems, students could hope to an extent of 54 per cent but all other groups did not show much hope. Similar trend was observed in the hope of improvement in the working conditions. This shows that all the groups did not perceive this incident as futile. This hope alongwith the students' help, perhaps, motivated them to stay at the campus.

All the groups did not show much hope for the reform in farm conditions. This was, perhaps, because the farm officials were, by and large, belonging to a particular caste group whose role was perceived as dubious during the present, movement.

High hopes from the union were perceived by all the groups. In view of the fact that the union workers and leaders were actively engaged in looking after the victims, in helping the family members to get the compensation, etc., their perception by the workers continued to remain positive.

Everyone reported the genuineness of the demands and perceived the university as quite capable of meeting their demands. Whatever the real economic conditions and limitations of the university may be in acceding to the demands of the union, the perception of the university capacity by the employee is important which motivated them to place their demands.

The efforts of the government officials in controlling this accident was perceived as very limited. Which is obvious from the initial efforts of the government official to bring some agreements between university and union which could not be maintained.

The major responsibility of this incident was attributed to the farm authorities, and to the government. However, the perceived responsibility of PAC was comparatively lower than government and farm officers.

ANALYSIS

The analysis of the data was done in the context of the history of the university, the service conditions, and the living conditions of the labourers, the appointments of the farm officers belonging to a particular caste group to which VC belongs, and the actions of the VC after the union was formed. It can be seen from the data collected that working and living conditions of the labourers remained poor throughout. Because of the insecurity of jobs and poor economic conditions these labourers were helpless. For them, the work on the farm was a must as they came from a different state (Bihar) to earn. The farm officers belonged to a particular caste and were very powerful having the political connections with the state leaders and the VC. These officers could understand the helplessness of the labourers and could exploit them. It is, perhaps, because of this reason that labourers could not demand their rights till the union was not formed. The campus remained silent for 17 years. Here we

can also infer that the university authorities strategically restrain the development of such forces which could oppose them. This inference is evident from the fact that even the students' union was not allowed to take place. Hence the formation of the union by the middle class employees of the university could provide the chance to the labourers to express their resentment.

The glaring example of their exploitation was the fact that these labourers constructed small huts in the fields by the permission of the authorities but the university was charging the house rent and the electricity and water charges from the labourers. However, there was no provision of the electric connections inside these huts. Moreover, if the two or more labourers were sharing any of these huts the house rent was deducted from the payments of all those labourers. Since they were temporary or casual employees they were depending on the mercy of the farm officers who were in the habit of taking extra work on their own fields and in house hold chores. Most of these workers used to remain out of jobs for many days in the year, and used to pull the rickshaw during those day. Most of these workers were living alone without their families as there was no place to keep the families. Hence consistent growing frustrations forced them to express their resentment at the call of the union.

One may ask a question here that why there was no protest in the past ? It can be inferred that gradually the number of the farm officers belonging to a particular caste group increased who could increase the frustration of the workers as a strong group in the university. And somehow the union could not be formed. The caste feelings were so explicit that the students belonging to the same caste group reported the agitation as a creation of the labourers and the union, whereas the other students reported differently but in tune to the other groups. Notwithstanding the fact that the caste lobby was active inside the campus alone but the neighbouring farmers of the same caste groups had linkages with the university authorities as they were deriving some benefits in the purchasing of the seeds from the university farms, getting some labourers at the cheaper rates, etc. However, the caste and class are merged at this university as the farm officers

belonged to the higher caste and higher middle class, whereas, the labourers belonged to the lower-caste and class. Therefore, this agitation can be attributed to the caste-class differences.

The behaviour of the power-class seems to follow a model of suppression of the demands of the powerless class by violent means to protest their own personal gains. The behaviour of the powerless class seems to follow the model of collective protest to safeguard their interests. It is a vicious circle in which behaviours of both the classes are reinforced in the sense that ultimately a few demands of the powerless are accepted, and power-class takes pride of solving the problems. The functioning of power-class in the direction of vested interest has been reported as the most important cause of corruption by the educated class in the Indian society (Jain and Misra, 1985).

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY

It seems that caste, class, community, and political affiliations provide a basis for group formation in the pursuit of their vested interests. People informally organize themselves on this basis in various institutions. Theoretically, social learning approach provides the concept of modelling on the basis of which collective violence can be best understood. As opposed to the Freudian analysis and other drive theories, social learning theory (Bandura, 1973) emphasizes on the external causes of violence. Caste-class or community provide such models through vicarious reinforcement which can easily be acquired by the members in their socialization process. Higher caste-class people who enjoy powers seem to have developed a model in this system that to suppress the voice of lower caste-class people terrorist tactics is the best means. The help of the police is a part of this tactics. It is a psychological finding that large gathering of the people protesting is perceived as aggressively valenced stimuli. Berkowitz (1970, 1972) has pointed out that aggressive responses are automatically and involuntarily elicited by aggressively valued stimuli. Thus on the campus a large number of police and a large number of workers or students if present then

violence is most likely.

In general, despite condemnation of their degrading and exploited conditions of life, comparatively few of the sufferers take active measures to pre-warranted changes. A vast majority of the disadvantaged population do not engage in disruptive public protest. The helplessness of the disadvantaged is evident in one of our studies (Sinha, Jain and Pandey, 1980) where the lower class people even own their failure by attributing the cause of their failure to their bad luck or inability. On the other hand, the higher class people attributed their failure to external factors. The point here is to highlight the fact that higher caste/class people seem to follow a model of running the institutions by ignoring the advantages of the lower caste/class people and by maximising their personal gains at the cost of their social gains. This seems to be a significant cause of the violence in the institutions.

The present analysis implicates that reduction of violence in the institutions and organizations can be attained by safeguarding the justified benefits of the subordinates at the right time. Moreover, the checks of the misuse of powers must be effectively implemented. The power class should not be reinforced for the misuse of powers in any way.

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Discussion

Collective violence implies collective consciousness. In the contemporary society, collective mobilization has become an important instrument of action. As such, in order to find out the legitimacy of collective violence, a distinction should be made between collective action and collective violence. Since the state is considered as a controller of collective violence, therefore, it is necessary to find out who committed violence? Why they committed violence? What are the root causes of violence? In the process of structural change, tensions generated between mores/folkways, traditions/customs, norms/values, etc., need to be understood. Three sharp categories of working class collective violence are :

- (a) Working class interested unionised collective actions of general nature.
- (b) Working class interest oriented non-unionised collective action related to specific grievances.
- (c) Instigated working class collective actions.

There is enough evidence to establish that the main participants in these major incidents of collective violence were the urbanised and peripheral villagers and the migrant population whose aspirations had far over run their abilities, available job prospects, housing and other basic civic amenities. In majority of cases the class indulging in collective violence is a mechanisation of the political or economic vested interest who use the working class. These are situations where there is a kind of total choicelessness by a section of a society. The collective violence emanating from collective action of urban surplus labour. They are doubly victimised, they are implicated, they are used as tools. That is what happened in Bhiwandi. Writings about Bhiwandi killings

indicate that they were all engineered. The studies explain that how the people who engineered all that had never come within the clutches of law or within the clutches of our social understanding. The operators were caught because of their destitution, because of their perpetual uncertainty in a state of the emotions of the stresses are made use of. Same thing happened in Ahmedabad riots. It was the smugglers' lobby that was working. The same kind of analysis come/may come in regard to Punjab. Collective actions are largely initiated in the state of stresses and frustration arising on account of multiple disabilities they suffer from. Being in a state of stress and frustration, makes them an easy prey in the hands of the vested interests, the class which stands to gain both by their collective action and consequent victimisation. Legal action is taken against all those who have been first victims earlier of the system, second victims of the machinery. Thirdly, the provocation of the working class to collective action, collective violence is directly related to their economic conditions and the consequent sense of individual worthlessness. Higher the degree of economic stress, economic compulsions, greater the possibility of resorting or becoming a victim of collective action, *i.e.*, one becomes susceptible. A large number of our brethren—labour population—due to the prevailing conditions in the rural areas, turn out to be vulnerable to external pressures and precipitate in the activities like collective violence. These incidents are more like signalling device which sensitise the upper classes to the need for social reconstruction. We should see these incidences of collective violence as instances that call for social reconstruction, then the limited response, then the kind of response where you strike back because there is no possibility of solving the problems by striking back. The evidence emerges or the understanding of this social phenomenon of collective violence of the urban surplus labour class shows that we have not learnt the lessons. The collective actions of the working class in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries in England were used by the elite class, the rich class which includes the administrators, the policy-planners, the police to reconstruct the society to provide conditions under which this class will not be susceptible to violence.

In the collective violence phenomenon, links between caste-occupation and ritual purity in rural areas are to be understood. In the process of transition from tradition to modernity, a number of factors are causing the weakening of Jajmani system. They are : programme and planned process of socio-economic change, the cooperative movement, easy-credit facility, growth in the circulation of currency, distribution of land to the landless and the process of democratic decentralization. All the factors are in operation in the villages. Conflict between the privileged and unprivileged classes, over the issue of Jajmani system. The village has become an arena for free style wrestling by conflicting interests and also a forum for increased hostility and often violence. In this transitional stage it is perhaps difficult to reconcile the semi-feudal hierarchical values of Jajmani system with the expressed ideas of the Indian leaders for creation of a modern democratic nation and that perhaps the new tensions are part of the birth pangs of a new and more democratic social order. A higher aspiration of a basket maker, and the achievement motivation for his son, led him not to observe traditional obligatory function of Jajmani. This creates annoyance, and conflicting interest and ultimately turned into a violence.

A conflict between university authorities and farm labour, power class and powerless class, may lead to undesirable situations. The power class seems to follow a model of suppression of the demands of the powerless class by violent means to protect their own personal gains. The behaviour of powerless class seems to follow the model of collective protest to safeguard their interest. Caste, class, community and political affiliations provide a basis for group formation in the pursuit of their vested interests. Reduction in the nature of violence in the institutions and organisations can be attained by safeguarding the justified benefits of the subordinates at the right time.

Whether there is or there is no distinction between collective violence and group violence. Whether we have made a proper distinction between these two basic things : Is group violence certainly collective violence but all collective violence will not be group violence. That is one aspect that we will have to think about it and we have not

been able to come to any conclusion about it. These issues have been politicised to such an enormous extent that instead of sort of salvaging the situation or bringing some kind of a healing touch in it, the whole process, the judicial process, police response to it, the reaction from public, what has happened is that it has certainly been politicised. One aspect which we have probably not taken into consideration in our discussions is the fact that to what extent has our politicisation of each and every issue, every little bit of it has accentuated this caste-class differences. How has the situation arisen? How is it that caste system and thinking has grown so deep into our vitals and it is poisoning the entire system of our development, our society and our whole structure. What is it that you have the norms? Everybody has got norms. Now a distinction has also been made between the collective action and collective violence. When does collective action become collective violence? When does it run into this form of collective violence? Is collective action wrong? Everybody has got to protect his interests, if not in groups or society or sections, in all sections of society. Now when these rights are violated, when these people are exploited then what exactly is the solution to the whole problem? How it is that the politicians, the government, the State is not able to do what it should be done?

The group which controls the economic power, or political power or social power would perpetuate violence continuously as a part of the exploitative forces (process) because they want to maintain that kind of an authority or superior position. As long as these differentiations exist this kind of violence in the form of group violence or class violence will continue.

Politicisation has turned out to be a fact in Indian society: Politicisation in universities, politicisation in trade unions, politicisation in agrarian-agriculturur labour, politicisation among fishermen, etc. This has become a sort of a factor which has to be reckoned with, and if we have some objective analysis we cannot close our eyes to it—particularly it is a fact that violence for many political leaderships has become a sort of yardstick for their success—a political leader in a university or a political leader on the Malabar Beach would be considered to be a success only when he is able to do some

violence or attract some violence.

In a country like ours with a democratic framework, the State and the instrument of the State, namely, the administration ought to develop ways and means of dealing with citizens in such a manner that there is no reason or there is no occasion for the exercise of collective violence on either side. Situations are bound to arise in a society where there is deprivation in a group of people or a group of citizens either because of their feeling of social discrimination or the fact of social discrimination or economic exploitation. Now the State, such as ours, is based on the principle that it would provide justice—social, political and whatever our Constitution says—and therefore it is the duty of administration to deal with this case of social discrimination or economic exploitation. It is not a legitimate use of the word ‘social discrimination’ and ‘economic exploitation’ is itself as a physical or structural violence. The use of the term ‘violence’ for these processes may not enable us to deal properly with the phenomenon of violence. “Social discrimination and economic exploitation” should be described as such and should not be described as cases of structural violence. ‘Violence’ should be defined as a term where there is a misuse of physical or coercive force particularly one which is likely to cause bodily injury to an individual or a group of individuals. Where there is social discrimination and economic exploitation, collective action, by those who are discriminated or those who are exploited, is in modern times a phenomenon which is bound to be considered as legitimate. We are living in a world of organisation and if the socially discriminated or economically exploited both organise then what is the hope for this. And, therefore, such collective action is to be considered legitimate. But what is not legitimate is collective violence as a form of collective action. That is not legitimate. Some people may say that this is revolutionary violence, therefore, it is desirable. This is the rule of the game of our society. Where this rule of the game is not followed, collective action may take the form of collective violence. If collective action turns into collective violence for two reasons: First because no matter what collective action is taken, the State is indifferent, the authorities are indifferent and those

exploited find that there is no way except to resort to violence. This is one case where collective action may lead to collective violence. The other case where it may so lead is where the State is very weak. Either the State is indifferent or the State is very weak. If the State is weak everybody thinks that he can take the law in his own hands and coerce the State or compel the authorities to make all kinds of concessions where the demand by that particular group even though it is inconsistent with general good, however defined, is conceded, in which case every group of people try to use political action or whatever it is to convert the collective action into collective violence. The State should be very much aware of grievances wherever they arise and try every possible means of dealing with these grievances so that people do not feel that violence alone will get them everything. Nor should the State be so weak that any demand, provided it raises trouble, would be conceded. Whether we shall have such a State or such an administration which is both responsive, considerate and firm. How can we have such an administration? The answer may lie in the tradition of the people.

There are certain people whose traditions are that social problems are dealt with through discussion and through legitimate means and through sensitivity and response and consideration and some practical rules of the game. There are other societies and people who are habitually sane in dealing with problems as they exist. And this ought to be reflected in the attitudes of our State as well as the attitude of our people and their collective action. And, therefore, it was said Indian people believe in Karma and they do not take any kind of aggression, whosoever may be the aggressor and they are otherwise spiritual. This reality continues because of a long tradition.

In understanding the phenomenon of collective action or collective violence, the overall societal interests are also to be kept in view. We may scrutinize as to whether with the increase in autonomy or independence, is there a corresponding decrease in the nature of exploitation, repression, and collective or structural violence?

What we need is to understand structure of contradiction in Indian society. We know that Indian society used to lead

a corporate life, although, by and large, there were incongruities, there were class divisions within the corporate caste groups, but supremacy was of this corporate life, by and large, over the economic distinctions or the class-like divisions within this corporate group or the caste group. Now if one looks at this phenomenon and the change that has been taking place in the structure of the corporate life over the years then probably one may work out the levels of change. There has been emergence of 'individualism' which has attacked the corporate nature of Indian society, which, in turn, may explain the phenomenon of violence, exploitation, collective violence, violence of one group caste or class against another group caste and class—if at all there is collective violence. There is no uniform nature of caste and class consciousness, caste and class violence or collective violence, particularly in the country-side.

There are some common attributes which are found in regard to all the communities in the village, but at the same time different caste groups have different attributes, and there are differences in terms of socialisation of the members of the different caste groups, and one should go into those aspects of socialisation what we call—the personality formation. The personality of a Rajput is different from that of a Jat—the kind of socialisation in the formation or of a Brahmin and a Vaishya—the distinction one could find—may be that ultimately both become school teachers or college lecturers. But even then the orientation, the world view, the kind of relations they have in their village community, the attitudes they develop, the notions about caste, distance, etc. The two one could relate and understand what we call the collective violence or what we can say exploitation.

Violence is a symptom of an unorganised situation. Violence is much later at the level of social consciousness. However, violence is nurtured and grows in the process of social organization. Collective violence does not take place in isolation but is a product of social transformation. Violence has delayed and retarded revolution. Revolution is the effective violence. The phenomenon of violence can be analysed in the process of social change. This type of analysis would highlight the social roots of violence. For example,

collective violence could be related to the economic and social process of change of tradition to modern system of society. This explains change in the property system.

If we look at history, there had been periods pregnant with both explicit as well as implicit violence of an unprecedented kind which has not been stated earlier. And that is what should be India's transition and India's process of transformation as also its pattern of violence. One has, therefore, a duty as a social scientist to explore what are the social roots for violence? What are the sources of violence? The change from the traditional system to the modern system brought about a tremendous change in the property structure, and it was about the transfer of property from one class to another class. And that is what Marx called the processes of 'capital accumulation'.

The process of transfer of property from the class of traditional owners and the traditional peasants to the new classes which were more dynamic classes in the context of movement and that was a tremendous violence even by itself. Even in our context, someone should analyse the processes of agrarian change, the changes in the land system taking place in India itself and the process of change in property, land as property, land grabbing—a kind of violence that is associated with it. A lot of violence in the country side today is associated with land and the changes in the land system, the transfer of land, land regulation, alienation and the processes of this kind. In fact, one of the most classic documents to bring it to light as a source of violence was in the late sixties or the early seventies—a document which came out from the Research and Policy Wing of the Home Ministry, which was called "The Agrarian Tension in the Indian Countryside" and it tried to give a certain kind of warning to the administrators as to what kind of a situation they are in. And the coming in of new technologies has intensified that. In the process of commercialisation—when land becomes marketable commodity, and bought and sold in the market, it changes hands from the traditional type of people who had control on the land and it goes to the kind of people affecting the lives of millions. Then the coming in of modern technology which tremendously enhances

the land value and make control of land high and up. It is in this context where land alienation comes about. The process of caste and class is in a way connected with some of these kinds of changes or commercialisation as well as of technological change affecting the rural areas. It is in this context that land transfer and land alienation and land savings have acquired a tremendous kind of importance. Therefore, it is in this kind of a situation in which the affected classes, particularly from the deprived sections of society—because their livelihood, their social and economic opportunities are connected with it—resist this kind of changes. Certain kinds of collective actions are even called there. In the beginning when the peasantry was disorganised—the peasantry was largely scattered, etc.—they did not always take the form of very organised collective action. They took the form of spontaneous outbursts, protests, etc.

Violence is a symptom of a very unorganised movement. The moment a movement becomes organised and when it can negotiate on its own terms, that class—in fact the Marxists and the Leninists have always taken up that position that violence is much greater at lower levels of social consciousness and lower levels of organisation, then even the deprived classes consider not the system as their enemy but the individual persons and individual landlords or a money-lender or a trader, they think that these persons are oppressive and not the system as oppressive. Therefore any kind of transformation and a kind of qualitative transformation of concept that is involved in realising that the roots of your exploitation and oppression are systems and they are not there in a particular individual landlord—you may kill an individual land-owner or you may kill an individual trader or an individual landlord or even they may be replaced by another person sometimes more aggressive and more exploitative than him but the system does not change. Therefore, the art and science of revolution or social change lies in changing the system rather than directing your wrath against individual representatives of that system, who fail to exercise, become the perpetrators of oppression and all that.

The analysis of collective violence to be linked with the

economic and social processes of change associated with the transition from a traditional economy to a modern economy, a traditional polity to a modern polity, a traditional social system to a modern social system. Economics bring about a tremendous changes—old ways of livelihood, old securities are destroyed and new do not take place because the disintegration of the traditional economic order takes place at a much faster rate than the emergence of a new economic order to take its place. And in the intervening period, which is the situation fraught with tremendous uncertainties, anxieties, unrest, insecurity. Therefore, there is the prospect for violence. It is one thing to put the doctrine of equality as the legitimisation ideology of the system, but between the legitimisation of ideology of system and the actual practice of the society as a whole, there is a lot of gap. Therefore, the deprived classes see it every day. The deprived people find the pace of change so slow and find the gap between profession and practice, but the old masters of the system find that it is such a catalytic change. Lots of conflicting perceptions are involved. This is the situation which is wrought with considerable kind of potential for violence.

Sometimes the dividing line between collective action and collective violence is very thin, in the sense that the people who feel older classes find it difficult to reconcile themselves to the changes which the time is bringing, and the deprived classes find the pace of change too slow to make them receptive. Therefore, both are racing against each other. And in this kind of a system, it depends upon how a mature leadership arises—the natural social forces arise—the more guided, the more planned, the more these transitions are, the less there would be violence. If a revolutionary change which has become inevitable and legitimate if it is thwarted, delayed and resisted then it creates much potential for violence. Lasky says that to an irresistible appeal of a bloody revolution there is only one convincing answer—the faith in the possibility of legally, legitimately, planned transition through. . . . If you feel that a peaceful transition is possible in a Constitution, the possibility of a constitutional change to bring about the necessary changes

that are required, if that faith is not eroded, then it will be a less violent and more peaceful. But if that faith is eroded even the constitutional provisions would be violated. The ruling classes have never surrendered either privileges, resource or power without there being some kind of a revolution of the affected people from below. If this is the kind of a thing which gets into the minds of the people—Indian transition is based on this. Such things are constitutionally possible and not only possible but also desirable. There is the need for a social, scientific insight into this that what are the roots involved and what are the issues involved.

III: INTER-COMMUNITY/SECTORAL VIOLENCE



Changing Urban Ethos : Some Reflections on Hindu-Muslim Riots

A. R. Saiyed

I

Those of us who had witnessed the bloodshed around partition days had fondly hoped, that, with the attainment of freedom the demon of communal violence would be laid to rest. We could not realise, especially in the days following the Mahatma's tragic assassination, that this phenomenon would assume a different texture and would refuse to be wiped out. The resurgence of Hindu and Muslim fundamentalism has further added to the fire of communal riots. The rioters appear to be in a constant state of readiness, which reflects careful planning, hence the consequences are widespread. The area of operation has also extended. In addition to the chronic spots in UP and Bihar, noble Shivaji's Maharashtra and pacifistic Gandhiji's Gujarat too have become theatres of merciless massacres of innocent citizens. The cancer has even spread to southern states like Karnataka and Kerala, which had remained untouched by the flames that had engulfed the northern states at the time of partition. Ironically, these massive killings and wanton destruction of property have flourished alongside our leaders' declarations that ours is a 'positive' secularism, whatever this may mean. If a tolerant ethos is capable of allowing collective violence of such proportions, it is to be wondered what future awaits us if by some chance cyclonic waves of religious fundamentalism, which are currently sweeping the country, engulf us.

Hindu-Muslim riots in this country have a history of more than two centuries. Coincidentally enough, the first riot for which authentic records are available occurred in 1730 in the very city which has become the major theatre of communal conflagrations in present times...Ahmedabad. However, up to the first quarter of the present century Hindu-Muslim riots were few and far between, and generally were not expressions of organized violence. Following the deterioration in communal relations in the 1920s, after the collapse of the ephemeral Hindu-Muslim unity generated during Gandhi's civil disobedience, a qualitative change occurred in communal conflicts, and riots not only began to occur with increasing frequency and intermity. Thus in the five-year period, 1922-27, there were over 450 deaths and some 5000 injuries. Thereafter, communal riots became a permanent feature of Indian life. They had now come to reflect the concerns and fears of the two communities, and there are struggles for economic, political and cultural supremacy. For obvious reasons these struggles were more characteristic of north India, and the southern parts of the country remained virtually riot free. Then, as is happening now, the divisive role of various socio-religious organizations made it easy to poison the atmosphere and mobilize members of one community against those of the other group. Cow slaughter and music before mosques were the two favourite excuses used to trigger off the killings. Of course, behind the facade of these excuses there lay the real reason, namely, the desire and the struggle to prove, or to gain, superiority by one community over the other. Since there existed the fear of being subordinated by the other community, these struggles tended to become 'conflicts of destiny'. The recurrent collisions, especially engineered on the occasion of festivals and other religious events, also provided opportunities to inflame the passions of gullible masses and promote communal bitterness. Tragically, the instigators and mischief-makers were not the illiterate and ignorant masses but 'educated' individuals, who perceived in these riots a mechanism for promoting political mobilization, through which intra-group solidarity and sense of group identity were heightened. Both these, more often than not, were then negatively utilized to prevent any demands

of the other group from being granted. Assisted partly by British indifference and partly by their active connivance. Hindu-Muslim riots in less than two decades became an integral part of our national life. The acme of rioting was reached in August, 1946, in Calcutta, when the Muslim League observed a 'Direct Action Day'. Bombay followed the suit in the following month and gradually, thereafter, the entire country got engulfed, with the result that the edifice of our Independence was erected on hundreds and thousands of corpses of innocent children, women and men. Our much vaunted non-violent struggle largely remained confined against the foreign colonial power only.

The assassination of the Mahatma gave the country a shock which perhaps the mass killings of 1946-47 had failed to do. Both Hindu and Muslim communal parties were banned. The appeal of secularism, at least as an ideal to be achieved, spread rapidly among the educated middle class, and in the decade following Independence it appeared that the fire of communal passions had been largely extinguished, we did not even care to see if any embers had remained. The country embarked upon the Five Year Plans and along with the Nehruvian era of national reconstruction, the decade of communal peace had also dawned. Besides relative economic and political stability, Nehru's steadfast commitment to secularism substantially contributed to the emergence of a new era of relative communal harmony—though riots like the one at Jabalpur were there to provide rude shocks.

The passing away of Nehru in 1964, followed by deterioration in economic and political conditions, brought about a resurrection of communal violence and the late 1960s and early 1970s were again characterized by large-scale rioting in Ahmedabad, Baroda, Ranchi, Jamshedpur, etc. The conflagrations in industrial townships like Ranchi gave the leftist-oriented intellectuals a great jolt inasmuch as all the romanticized visions of workers' unity had proved to be a delusion. In Bhiwandi, which saw its first carnage in the summer of 1969, the leftists were again in for a rude shock. The grassroot movement among the handloom workers fostered in the township by a band of committed communists, was unable to stem the onslaught of communal violence.

From Bhiwandi the scene shifted to Ahmedabad. Here, behind the proximate cause of insults to holy scriptures and sacred cows, some analysts saw the mischievous hand of Indira Gandhi's adversaries, who were opposed to the 1969 political upheavals within the Congress and her consequent adoption of left-oriented policies. These developments provided, for the first time, some signals that in the post-partition period Hindu-Muslim riots were not solely due to communal antagonisms, and that, such violence was in fact a camouflage for certain other tensions and tussles that were supra-community in nature. Behind the superficially visible 'micro' factors, there lurked, it was suggested, more deep and real causes, the 'macro' factors, which had roots in the developmental process of an economically backward society.

The mid-seventies brought some respite, partly due to Indira Gandhi's Emergency, and, partly because the motley crowd which passed off as the 'Janata Government' had aroused the hopes of both Hindu and Muslim communalists. The RSS and the Jamat-e-Islami, it was reported, had for the first time realized, through incarceration during the Emergency, "that there was no conflict between them" and that being birds of the same feathers they could co-exist. Unfortunately, for all concerned, the antics of the Janata leaders did not give this communal honeymoon a long lease of life, and we were denied the pleasure of witnessing whether an era of communal peace would dawn through the 'cooperation' of communal and revivalist organizations.

The past six years of the present decade have witnessed an upward incline in the riot graph. In tune with the general complexity of modern life, Hindu-Muslim conflagrations also have assumed complex dimensions. While a burgeoning population has aggravated several socio-economic problems, old religious animosities have received fresh shots in the arm and queered the secular pitch of our society. As if this was not enough, power struggles between politicians are fuelling these riots. Smugglers and other nefarious characters of the underworld too have found an avenue in communal violence to settle their personal scores. The diversity of the etiology and prognosis of this malady defies description and analysis. In brief, then, this particular manifestation of collective violence

has become today a very complex and multi-layered phenomenon which creates issues for analysis.

The preceding brief sketch has attempted to show that there has been a sort of an evolution in the career of communal riots, and that today a large array of factors are involved in them. Patient investigations by concerned scholars, journalists and other citizens have brought to light several relevant factors. Nevertheless, a theoretically rigorous analysis at this point of time is still difficult. Ironically even as various investigations are successfully exposing the multiple factors that contribute to Hindu-Muslim riots, these conflagrations are gaining in frequency and ferocity.

II

The systematic study of collective violence in India had until recently not received the attention it deserved. To a large extent, we had depended on the 'instant analysis' of journalists. Recently, however, some painstaking and insightful investigations have been undertaken by social scientists. These provide rich data on the micro factors behind communal riots, and also suggest some macro-level generalizations. Prominent among these are the efforts of Asghar Ali Engineer, who has conducted a large number of case-studies of Hindu-Muslim riots and has deduced some explanations on the basis of empirical data.

Engineer's main thrust is towards providing an economic explanation as being the leading macro cause of Hindu-Muslim riots. Much of his explanation is couched in an ideological framework. The sum and substance of his argument is that riots are an inevitable concomitant of the development process currently in progress in the country, and it is the underdeveloped nature of Indian capitalism that facilitates the bourgeoisie to divert a class struggle into a caste/communal conflict, and thus weaken the solidarity of the proletariat. Further, recognizing that changing economic conditions have altered caste dynamics, Engineer has also perceptively pointed out that in today's India, the middle and backward castes have acquired greater political and economic clout and are consequently asserting themselves. The major

political parties are therefore seeking the support of these castes and pampering them. Many communal riots occur because of the conflict of interest which has begun to surface between Muslims and such castes over economic considerations. His illustrative case studies are the riots of Bihar Sharif and Bhiwandi. Moin Shakir, another leftist oriented analyst, in an interesting analysis, has pointed out that at least in one of the Hyderabad riots, it was electoral politics which determined the objectives and direction of communal violence. Shakir has shown that such violence is one of the strategies employed by the Congress, BJP and Mujlis-e-Ittehaadul-Muslimin for political gains. This point has been reiterated by many other investigators also. Communal disturbances in Delhi in August-September, 1986, have similarly been explained as skirmishes that aimed to influence the Municipal Corporation elections, that were expected to be imminent.

While the importance of economic and political factors as important sources of riots in an underdeveloped situation can not be overemphasized, it is difficult to accept these as deterministic explanations. Notwithstanding their relevance, they cannot be held to be 'necessary and sufficient' conditions for collective violence of the communal variety. As a matter of fact, interested individuals and groups often seize the opportunity to derive economic gains *after* riots have begun. This is not the same as economic interest causing riots. Yet numerous *ex post facto* analyses tend to postulate consequent conditions as antecedent. Moreover, universal referents are also lacking in support of such formulations. For example, in Godhra, Hindu Sindhis, who were refugees from Pakistan, had given competition to the original Hindu merchants, but, riots have frequently erupted between Sindhis and Muslims. Similarly, as Saberwal and Hasan have pointed out, Ramgarhia and other Sikhs in Punjab have out-paced Hindu Khatri in industry for several years, but no riots occurred as a consequences of this competitiveness. In Kerala, Syrian Christians are reported to be heavily purchasing plantation lands, and out-doing their rivals the Nairs. No riots occur between the Nairs and the competitive Syrian Christians. In Bombay, the Shiv Sena originally attacked South Indian

businessmen but has now turned its fury upon Muslims, even though no strong clash of interest exists in the city in the economic sphere between Muslims and Marathas. Indeed, the economic challenge comes from the Goan Christians, the Punjabis, the Upians, as well as the South Indians. It is also interesting to note that in the Nasik riots of 1986 summer, even though there was no economic rivalry, Muslims were attacked by Shiv Sainiks on the occasion of the Shivaji Jayanti procession, which significantly enough the Muslims had welcomed.

Finally, the present unfortunate Punjab tragedy, is also instructive and provides insight into the especial character of Hindu-Muslim riots. The Punjab killings indulged in by the terrorists, while arousing Hindu ire are, by and large, not considered to be the demonic acts of the entire Sikh community. In spite of the serious proportions assumed by the violence perpetrated by the terrorists, the majority community has shown exemplary patience and understanding (barring the period following Mrs. Gandhi's assassination ; but here too notwithstanding Mrs. Gandhi's all-India stature, the reaction was localized to Delhi and some places in U.P.), the violent acts against Hindus are *rightly* attributed to the terrorists alone, and the entire Sikh community, *correctly*, is not held to ransom. This 'concession' Muslims do not enjoy. Thus a rumour of cow slaughter, or of elopement of a Hindu girl by a Muslim youth are avidly believed. It evokes immediate reaction of the dominant community and indiscriminate killings even of the innocents ensues. These illustrations indicate that in the case of Hindu-Muslim riots our search for causative factors cannot be simply confined to developmental competitiveness ; at best, it is a contributory factor.

The inadequacy of the economic explanation has been pointed out by Esman, according to whom :

Even where economic growth produces widely shared material satisfactions and opportunities, and this reduces propensities for conflict, it can not deal with such problems as language, political participation, status rewards, and similar intense but non-economic issues. Economic growth thus cannot be the universal solvent of social conflict.

Esman has further stated that in a *divided* (emphasis added) society both growth as well as absence of growth may aggravate communal conflict. The point of relevance to note here is the existence of divisiveness in society. It is this that facilitates conflict due to the interplay of economic and political factors in situations of growth as well as absence of growth.

Yet another non-economic point of view comes from the sociologist Ratna Naidu, who gives primacy to the social-psychological variable. According to her:

It seems clear that the position that the Muslims occupy in the economy and in the corridors of power in India is trivial and the conflicts arising from these cannot explain the scale of carnage and destruction which take place during most communal riots, nor the vindictiveness with which the communities seek to crush each other.

In fact she challenges the economic and political explanations by observing, "An economic or a political issue is simply the excuse for the pleasurable regression into a world of fantasy where the drama of historical antagonisms find pathological release".

The American sociologist, Neil Smelser, also feels that hostile inter-group outbursts may be generated not only by conflict of economic interests but may also arise out of normative mal-integration, differences in values, as well as other kinds of strain. It is relevant in this context to note that violent reactions to the conversion of Harijans have occurred not in Meenakshipuram, the scene of the conversions, but in other distant places, where emotions were artificially whipped up. The success of Hindu revivalists in this endeavour in Solapur, a town far away from Meenakshipuram, is indicative of the mal-integration of inter-community life.

It would seem, then, that the existing analyses of the macro and micro factors need to be supplemented by including the role of prejudice and mal-integration, born partly out of historical and partly sociological reasons, that have contributed to the rising frequency of riots in the country. Negligence of these factors has prevented a proper appreciation of

the divisive tendencies and forces at work in our society. Consequently, much of our thinking and analysis concerning communal riots suffers from lack of realism.

A survey of the scanty literature available, shows that few sociological discussions exist to explain the roots of dissociative and divisive processes in our society. Apart from ideological analysis, Muslim invasions and Muslim (mis) rule are the only factors that are held to be relevant. In the present paper an effort has been made to unravel some of the more specific sociological factors that contribute to and facilitate communal dissociation, which in turn leads to prejudice and inter-communal violence.

The lead for the present analysis has been taken from the fact that Hindu-Muslim riots in recent decades have mostly been characteristic of medium sized towns/cities and the walled sections of large cities. In the former category there are chronic trouble spots like Meerut, Aligarh, Moradabad, Allahabad, Pune, Jalgaon and Aurangabad. In the latter, we have Delhi, Ahmedabad and Hyderabad. (It is significant to remember here that our rural areas have been generally, free from riots even though clash of economic interests between Hindus and Muslims is not entirely absent there).

Accordingly, it is proposed to examine some sociological characteristics of the medium-sized towns/cities which facilitate communal outbursts. In doing so there will be an unavoidable accentuation of the dissociative/divisive processes operating in our urban areas. This accentuation does not imply that all or most medium-sized towns/cities are necessarily battle-grounds for settling Hindu-Muslim destinies. Rather, the attempt is simply to show that in such places certain facilitative social conditions are encouraging inter-group prejudice and mal-integration, which in conjunction with economic or political pressures are leading to frequent riots. This intensification of the dissociative forces in our urban areas is facilitated by certain structural, ecological and demographic factors, and tends to be more critical in certain towns/cities due to which these centres have become more riot prone. Interested groups, parties and individuals are able to successfully manipulate the greater vulnerability of these centres, and each outburst prepares the ground for future riots. While

the majority of the people in each community do not wish to kill or loot, yet anti-social elements of each community temporarily succeed in disseminating hatred and madness. Fortunately, one of the great blessings of our national life is that no riot has ever been between all Hindus and all Muslims of a given area. Indeed, no riot has been without a number of good samaritans. Neighbours and even strangers have risked their lives to protect fellow beings, even though of another community. However, as their recurrence increases, Hindu-Muslim riots have begun to take a psychological toll of the sanity of many citizens, and all sections of people in both communities are becoming victims of the communal poison. Bells are tolling in the distance to faintly announce the demise of secularism. This recent development makes the control of communal riots an urgent and critical necessity.

III

Sociologically speaking, locality of residence and occupation are two crucial elements of a community's social structure. Important social and socio-psychological consequences emanate from both these elements. For present purposes, it would be worth examining how dissociative/disintegrative processes have been generated in recent decades, at the inter-community level, by residential and occupational patterns in our middle sized urban centres.

As is well-known, residence in urban India is generally segregated on the basis of community and caste. This segregation has been a modified extension of rural residential patterns. But since the functional interdependence and primary contacts characteristic of rural communities have been largely missing in the medium sized towns/cities, the segregated ecological concentration of communities and castes has adversely affected the social integration of these groups.

Community based segregated residential areas, in the urban context, almost entirely preclude informal social contacts with members of other communities. The intimate experiences of life are confined to members of one's own community only. Cosmopolitanism is virtually unknown, and one tends to look at those who are not a part of the in-group mostly in terms of

stereotypes, which generally are negative. These negative images, coupled with the normal fear of an out-group, since it is an unknown entity, create feelings of hostility which remain latent and dormant until aroused by precipitating factors.

Ecological concentration alone does not contribute to the social distance between communities. In the Indian situation, civic groups such as youth clubs, welfare associations, etc., which serve as integrative mechanisms are virtually non-existent in the medium-sized towns; the few that exist do not operate on inter-community basis. Indeed, even our educational institutions, which should have been important agencies for promoting inter-group integration are ridden with sectarian bias, with the result that when riots erupt various colleges and schools, too, often exacerbate rather than mitigate tensions. Having come into existence on the crest of Islamic, Arya, Sanatan Dharm, and Khalsa passions, these 'educational' institutions, keep the flag of separatism fluttering high. Not surprisingly, Saberwal, and Hasan during their Moradabad investigations "met articulate college teachers, but often heard only a communal view from them". In fine, in our towns, these institutions often reinforce the divisiveness that is inherent in non-integrated living.

Further, life in segregated localities is inevitably more 'collectivity' than 'individualistic' or 'self' oriented. This fact has an important bearing on friction and violence. Gary Marx has observed that when contenders are collectivity oriented, rather than self-oriented, conflicts tend to be more intense and violent inasmuch as the contenders look upon their struggle as a matter for supra-individual ends; member of the collectivity perceive themselves as fighting for a *cause* rather than for themselves. Such contenders, he further points out, tend to be more radical and merciless than those who fight for personal advantages. Hindu-Muslim riots have increasingly tended to assume the complexion of a 'cause'. For example, in one of the hand-bills distributed in 1969 in the Ahmedabad riots a call for *dharma yudha* was given by Hindu militants. In recent riots, too, similar handbills and slogans have played important roles. Such slogan-mongering is particularly effective where the social distance between communi-

ties is great. It is little wonder, then, that present-day riots have become more vicious and gory than ever before.

Residential segregation also facilitates organized violence against minorities. In the context of Negro-White riots in USA, Smelser has stated, "The forms of hostility in racial outbursts depend on the location and accessibility of objects of attack". Non-mixed localities are more vulnerable to mob action, especially when the police remain silent spectators. Processions too generate mob violence because of the existence of segregated localities; and, today, it is processions rather than real or fictitious cases of cow slaughter or rapes that trigger collective violence in the riot prone areas. More strict enforcement of curfew against any one community only, and house searches and molestations can be more easily carried out in areas exclusively inhabited by a single community, usually the minority community. Such partisan actions, in turn, increase bitterness and generate attitudes of revengefulness.

To aggravate matters, segregation, as Allport has pointed out, "markedly enhances the visibility of a group. It makes it seem larger and more menacing than it really is". The constant perception of a segregated minority as a 'menace' is conducive to various suspicions. It is due to these suspicions that there is easy and instantaneous acceptance of rumours of 'atrocities' supposedly perpetrated by the inimical community. Given segregation, there is no way of counteracting inflammatory rumours.

Another important consequence of segregated living is that it precludes multiple affiliations with various groups on a cross-community basis. Such affiliations, in a wide variety of professional, civic, and social groups, foster inter-community understanding and integration. Where multiple affiliations exist, individuals who are antagonists in one social context become allies in another. According to Coser, "Multiple conflicts, in which allies and antagonists keep changing, are likely to criss-cross and thus cancel out cleavages along one exist only". In the medium-sized towns/cities segregated living of Hindus and Muslims, by preventing multiple alliances, has led to the creation of a single axis cleavage. This cleavage, in turn, has dichotomized urban life into two irreconcilable camps,

and whenever situations of friction develop, this dichotomy serves to fuel hostility. To compound this situation, in most of the riot-prone areas, there are virtually only two communities, Hindus and Muslims; hence bitterness and hatred do not get dispersed upon different groups and, instead, converge on one group only. It is a sociological axiom that such convergence facilitates more intense antagonisms and frequent outbursts of violence.

Considering now the other element of social structure, namely, occupation, it can be easily realized that in most of the towns, from Malegaon to Moradabad, the newly emerging pattern of economic activities and opportunities has given further salience to collectivity orientation, as well as to close in-group loyalties.

With the onset of modernization, traditional structures of functional interdependence between various castes and communities, are undergoing disintegration and, instead, are being replaced by competitive patterns. In the medium sized towns/cities members of the working class are being divided on communal lines, which forecloses for them any realization of their being exploited by a common enemy, namely, the capitalist employer. Since the level of economic development in such towns has not reached the point where a true industrial proletariat could emerge, and operate as a class 'for itself', the consciousness of these workers is steeped in communal rather than class considerations.

This characteristic becomes functional for both Hindu and Muslims bourgeoisie, whenever they are interested in promoting strife. They have at their disposal a religiously charged and emotionally mobilized force willing to risk its life on behalf of, and for the benefit of, their 'master', with whom they identify themselves on grounds of religious affinity.

The situation of the educated middle class professionals is even more tragic. In a pluralistic set-up like ours, such professionals, due to their expertise, can serve as bridges between the various communities, particularly between Hindus and Muslims. In pre-partition times there existed, particularly in north Indian towns, a number of Muslim doctors, lawyers, and other professionals who, in addition to being patronized by their co-religionists, also attracted Hindu clients; corres-

pondingly, Hindu professionals were, of course, patronized by Muslim clients. This situation was functional in various ways. First, it developed common bonds, between professionals and their clients on an inter-communal basis. This mutual dependence generated structural assimilation. Second, common concerns brought qualified Hindus and Muslims together, and thus were created (notwithstanding professional rivalries) common networks, and opportunities for fraternization. Further, the existence of a fair number of Muslim professionals, administrators, judges and other well-educated individuals, created a positive image of the Muslims. But due to large-scale migrations of Muslim professionals after partition, these advantages have vanished. Additionally, this vacuum has generated and reinforced Hindu prejudice that the Muslims are inferior.

As regards other trade and business activities, entrepreneurship too has also become Hinduized. This monopoly did not create any communal friction till Muslim entrepreneurs, following the set-back of the post-partition years, were absent. In fact, a sort of functional inter-dependence between Hindu employers and Muslim artisans had developed. But with the recent emergence of Muslim manufacturers and exporters the hitherto existing asymmetry has become destabilized. Expression of the majority community's resentment against the minority group acquiring some competitive capability has been legitimized by facts and fiction of Arab money, etc. Due to these realities a situation of pure economic competitiveness has been converted into one of religious threat. The channelling of some of this affluence in the construction or renovation of mosques or more lavish celebrations of festivals has added fuel to the fire of inter-communal jealousies, suspicions and hatred. An unsavoury mix of religion and economics has resulted.

Barring metropolitan cities, most Indian urban areas are characterised by a relative lack of welfare-oriented voluntary groups or associations. Community activities are generally initiated and organized by religio-political organizations which, whether Hindu or Muslim, basically have communal orientations. Apart from their exclusiveness, the political aspirations of such organizations encourages them to keep

alive the embers of past communal conflicts, and historical antagonisms. Various enquiry commissions and independent researchers have found that during periods of tension and friction such organizations play a crucial role in arousing and aggravating emotions and passions. These organizations receive strong support from communal-minded 'ideologues,' who are well known in their respective towns. Typically, these are lawyers, teachers or journalists who have their own notions of Indian history and culture, of the 'disloyalty' of minority groups, etc. These 'intellectuals' transform what Gary Marx has called 'conflict of interests' into 'conflict of ideas' and thus help publicly provide ideological justification for communal conflicts. The local vernacular press works overtime during riot/tension days to give currency to the theses that these ideologues propound. The purveyors of this poisonous propaganda usually go scot-free and are thus encouraged to continue their activities. Tragically, such ideologues are a social necessity in our towns. They provide excitement in a drab and humdrum existence.

The theories spun out by these 'intellectuals' and 'ideologues' find easy circulation due to the 'closed circuit' communication that prevails in the medium-sized towns and walled cities. The less sensational national press, and the virtually non-credible government media, are not potent enough to combat the influence of the informal channels of communication, which reach particularly frenzied peaks in riot situations, which overflow with uncritical and exaggerated news in riot situations.

Ironically, riots provide an opportunity for the very groups that promote them to further entrench and strengthen their position through 'relief' work. One never hears of succour being provided to riot victims by secular and inter-communal welfare agencies. One searches in vain for the efforts of various Gandhian groups or trade unions in this regard. Thus, in a sense, every riot is a windfall for the militant, communal and fundamentalist groups. The 'relief camps' for the riot victims provide them with opportunities to disseminate their separatist and hostility ideologies among the masses. The success of their efforts is assured since in these camps, riot victims are particularly vulnerable to the propaganda of the hate-vendors.

IV

Earlier, it had been clarified that for purposes of present analysis, there would be an emphasis on some of the social structural elements that contribute to dissociative and mal-integrative tendencies in inter-group interaction in urban areas. This emphasis, however, does not imply the total absence or ineffectiveness of associative mechanisms and processes. To be sure, these too are present; in fact, it is the integrative mechanisms that have for centuries allowed various religious communities to exist in peace. Their detailed discussion would be out of place here; what is relevant, instead, is to recognize that the onset of modernization has destabilized the inter-group integration that had evolved over the centuries in our society. For example, with modernization, unanticipatedly, has come fundamentalism and affected both eclectic Hinduism and syncretic Islam. Both these had been the corner stones of our composite culture and traditional tolerance. The movement away from Hindustani as a *lingua franca* in the north, and the adoption of Urdu by the Muslims in the south, has affected our cultural integration. The declining importance of *dargahs*, *urs* and *melas*, and other jointly shared events, that used to help inter-communal fraternization have created a chasm of ignorance between Hindus and Muslims. Further, a relatively stable population had helped to maintain the traditional division of labour, and had thus prevented the rise of economic tensions and conflicts. These, and similar integrating and stabilizing forces, are no longer in existence; worse, alternatives are, as yet, nowhere in sight. On the other hand, the traditional social structure of the medium sized towns and cities has been profoundly affected by two important developments. The first of these is population change, and the second is the changing dynamics of caste relationships.

In recent decades, there has been an unending ingress of the landless into the urban centres of the country. Many of these impoverished migrants are Muslims who are pouring into places like Ahmedabad, Bhiwandi, Pune and the metropolitan cities. Both Hindu and Muslim migrations have affected the urban demographic composition. For the first

time since Independence, Muslims have become 'visible' to the Hindus' in many towns and cities. Partly, stronger ethnic consciousness and identification are also responsible for this visibility. As a result of both factors, the overflowing mosques for congregational prayers on Fridays or festival days has important psychological implications concerning the 'explosion' of Muslim numbers and Muslim 'solidarity', about which preconceived notions exist in any case; Hindu anxieties, if not actual fears or a siege mentality, are being easily aroused. Furthermore, the Muslim influx into urban centres (along with similar migrations of Hindus) from the countryside has unsettled the traditional network of Hindu-Muslim urban relationships. Migrants tend to have less stakes in their new habitations. They are unaware and unmindful of traditional patterns of cooperation and harmony, and are not particularly disturbed if such places become theatres of conflict and violence. (Strangely enough, adequate attention has not been paid to the linkage between the demographic factor and collective violence, be it caste, communal or linguistic).

Reference may now be made to yet another structural element, namely, caste ; here, more appropriately, the changes in caste dynamics. The field investigations of Asghar Ali Engineer (Bihar Sharif riots) and Rajiv Tiwari (Meerut and Baroda riots) have illustrated that a newly emerging dimension in the relationship between upper castes and scheduled castes in urban India is contributing to Hindu-Muslim violence. Their investigations have shown that the scheduled and backward castes are now increasingly aligning themselves with upper castes and are calling the shots against the Muslims. The new founded willingness of the former to serve the interests of the latter castes emanates, according to Tiwari, from the fact that the newly emerging Hindu ethic has become more tolerant towards the hitherto underprivileged and exploited castes. Currently, these groups are enjoying cooption in the Hindu mainstream. Having now been granted avenues for upward social mobility, the scheduled and backward castes are willing to oblige by serving as the storm troopers of the upper castes. In this context, it is noteworthy, that Tiwari too refers to the importance of residential patterning by observing that, "the sociological

reality of Muslims living in close proximity to the scheduled castes eminently suits the designs of Hindu communal forces". Having done the underprivileged groups a favour the elite castes have, for the time being at least, won a reprieve for themselves in the urban areas. The impending storm of caste conflict has been transformed into one of communal conflict. To be sure, Muslims who were not, and till now are not completely a monolithic group are also becoming solidified. These intensified solidarities are contributing to Hindu-Muslim polarization.

The social structure of metropolitan and large industrial centres like Bombay, Ahmedabad, and Baroda has been undergoing change due to large scale urbanization and industrialization. In the initial years of Independence, it had been envisaged that such changes would automatically lead to greater secularization and class consciousness of the proletariat. The future struggles, it was speculated at that time, were not to be vulgar communal riots but ideologically and morally inspired conflicts between the haves and have-nots. Various socio-economic and socio-political distortions in the country's progress towards modernization have for the present, at least, prevented the crystallization of a strong class oriented movement that could dissolve caste and communal cleavages. In the past two years cosmopolitan Bombay, now swiftly regressing into parochial Mumbai, has been the scene of recurring Hindu-Muslim violence. For several decades, Bombay had been characterized by a fair degree of integration of its multi-religious and multi-language inhabitants. As the country's leading industrial centre, this city has had a dynamic economic growth in which competitiveness need not necessarily have degenerated into conflict. Similarly, Ahmedabad, Baroda, and Hyderabad too, are industrially vibrant cities where the inexorable march of modern technological development should have triumphed over narrow particularistic considerations of caste, community and language. Obviously, certain social structural developments have caused interference.

Around the early 1960s, cities like Ahmedabad and Baroda came to be afflicted by a well-organized underworld. Bombay saw a further intensification of this phenomenon. The large-

scale migrations to these cities, along with the absence of commensurate employment opportunities, began to provide recruits to this underworld. Thus, an explosive population situation, acute economic distress and psychological uprootedness jointly provided a rich mix against the maintenance of law and order. There is little need to emphasize that goondaism is an inevitable correlate of large-scale urbanization. But it is not always recognized that goondaism is also related to communal riots. Richard Lambert, who had made the first systematic study of communal riots in India, found that in general "goondas made up a mercenary adjunct to communal organizations and as private striking arms, assembled by wealthy individuals". Lambert has also stated that goondas from one community have historically been used against another and were often employed to operate after a riot had begun. In present day riots too, goondas have a role to play. Seated in their homes in front of the idiot box, many middle and upper class Hindus and Muslims are tending to become emotional over communal outbursts, without realizing that those actually responsible for the slaughter of human beings and loot of property are without any religion. Other support structures exacerbate collective violence everywhere.

Investigations have adequately revealed that leading smugglers and 'dons' of the urban underworld, are finding the riots functional to project themselves as champions of their respective communities. They are said to distribute arms and ammunition to keep their community members in readiness against attack from the other side. It is also rumoured that they act as "good samaritans" and distribute money and material among those affected in the riots. Such 'good' deeds are compensated by the creation of a halo of sympathy and support which stands in good stead if these individuals are to be (ever) arrested. Indeed, it is now in the interests of these 'community leaders' to promote communal riots so as to earn legitimacy for their nefarious activities. It should also be recognized that smugglers and their gangs have already brutalized urban life, so much, that violence has ceased to be shocking to urban dwellers. As such, communal rioting no longer disturbs urban conscience.

For this regrettable state of affairs, in which anti-social elements are considered to be saviours, the blame must squarely lie upon the shoulders of the administrative machinery. One may console oneself that this situation is not peculiar to India alone. Indeed, it is a sociological truism that in situations of inter-group conflict there is little sympathy on the part of authorities for minorities. Even in USA, as Smelser has pointed out, official approval for violence in the lower ranks of constituted authorities tends to be open and unabashed. There are sociological reasons to explain why this is so. These, however, need not detain us here.

In big cities, the political stakes also are big. Consequently, every riot also involves a political calculation for politicians who are opposed to one another. The Hindi film 'Sookha' vividly brought out how differences between a Chief Minister and his colleague, the Home Minister, could be resolved only after a communal riot was artificially created. While 'Sookha' was not based on any true story yet it was not entirely apocryphal; the film's proximity to the observation just made is more than remarkable. Empirical investigations by Sujata Patel, Engineer and Tiwari have amply shown that political machinations and power struggles play a key role in promoting riots. Like our secularism, our democracy too has undergone distortions and is a victim of unscrupulous politicians.

To strike the last nail in the coffin of our secularism there are the various militant senas; which have made 'valuable' contributions to riots in Maharashtra, Assam, etc. It is an irony of political life that democracies are indulgent towards fascist organizations and their fascistic leader. The administrative machinery, as yet has found no way of dealing with such organizations. Countless Hindu-Muslim riots have occurred because after showing initial resistance, administration eventually yields to the pressure of militant organizations and allows processions, etc., which it had initially refused. Indeed to what extent organized militancy has eroded the effectiveness of the administrative machinery can be realized from the ridiculous but successful declaration of an 'unofficial' curfew (after the official curfew) hours were over, in the recent Ahmedabad riots. What hope can there be, if the very legitimacy of the administrative machinery has been challenged ?

V

In the light of what has been discussed above, it may be reintegrated that Hindu-Muslim riots are a very complex phenomenon involving myriad combinations of economic, political, social and socio-psychological factors. *A priori* imposition of any particular theoretical framework or mono-causal explanations simply hide the complexity of the social reality. In the present paper an attempt was made to more specifically analyse the role of some relevant correlates of urban social structure, and large-scale urbanization, both of which have a role to play in the social distantiation of Hindus and Muslims. This social distance is furthering prejudice and group antagonisms, which, in their turn, are facilitating the riots. Indeed, it may well be said that in their absence it would have been very difficult for interested manipulators to so easily convert primarily economic and political rivalries into organized killings.

By overemphasizing the fact that it is simply the process of development, or political machinations, that are the root cause of riots, we have, firstly, tended to create the impression that riots are inevitable, and, secondly, we have tended to neglect the important sociological reality of "generalized hostile beliefs", towards which Smelser has drawn attention in the context of collective violence. It is, therefore, essential to recognize that due to the distortions attendant upon unplanned and unbridled urban growth, the modern urban ethos, especially in multiethnic situations, is perched atop a volcano of hostile attitudes against various out-groups, be they religious or linguistic or the some other ethnic category. In our urban areas (medium-sized and large) teeming millions lead an insecure and frustrated existence for whose tolerance scapegoats are needed; these scapegoats are best perceived in those whom we dislike and hate.

Unfortunately, the history of our country provides enough scope for distortions and promotion of dissociative and disintegrative passions by malcontents. It is for this reason that in urban Maharashtra, the name of a noble and just leader like Shivaji is invoked to generate hatred and perpetrate inter-group violence against innocent people. It is

forgotten that Shivaji had fought against injustice, not innocence. Similarly, it has been reported that, women in the cities of Gujarat are reputed to have performed 'victory' dances (*garbas*) in celebration of the demolition of places of worship of another community. Indeed, even educated urbanites, today, are regressing to a point where not only they do not condemn communal violence but are becoming the cheerleaders of communal and other anti-social forces. Too, the law and order machinery is in the grips of bias and partiality. Communal prejudice, like any other prejudice, is an insatiable fire, with the result that dissemination of inter-group hatred is increasingly becoming a part and parcel of socialization at all levels, in our society.

Given, then, a vast reservoir of overt and covert "generalized hostile beliefs", it is little wonder that both macro and micro tensions and frictions degenerate into collective violence. In the existing scheme of things we perhaps cannot alter the path of development that we have chosen, but we certainly can fight against the negative passions and consequent violence which this development is believed to generate. Shibboleths of 'false consciousness' or a mistaken faith in our own brand of secularism, and the like, only serve to cloud our vision and prevent us from tackling the menace, "we fall over a precipice", Pascal had warned, "after putting something before our eyes to prevent our seeing it". It is time we see the truth of this maxim. Let there be an end to our blindness; we are perilously close to the edge of a precipice.

In the present paper an attempt has been made to suggest that inter-group prejudice and hostility have an important role to play in fomenting communal tensions and riots. Certain correlates of the urban social structure and the changing urban ethos are aggravating this prejudice and hostility. Given the multiethnic diversity and complexity, of the Indian society, inter-group integration remains problematic; consequently, forces of divisiveness and dissociation, need to be tackled on various fronts and in various ways. One of these is to consciously and deliberately nurture secularism. The cultural ethos and the psycho-social environment of a society, such as ours, cannot be automatically changed. Deliberate and energetic efforts like, for example, China's "New Life

Movement" (in the early years of communist rule), need to be promoted. If collective violence between Hindus and Muslims has to be contained for the development and prosperity of our society, the establishment of secularism in our thoughts and actions is an essential, though, of course, not the only requirement.

Police Violence

T. Ananthachari

During the last few years (particularly the recent months), there have been numerous 'exposures' of police violence and excesses in almost all the states. It has provoked indignation, ridicule and sorrow among wide section of the public. Recently a cartoon in the *Times of India* conveyed that the police should be withdrawn from the 'scene' to restore law and order. An issue of the *Illustrated Weekly* had a majority of photographs depicting the outcome of 'Police violence' in a collection on 'sad-events'. The recent happenings in the different parts of the country have caused such widespread concern that they have led to numerous editorials besides articles written by distinguished journalists. Such exposures tend to influence a very large section of the public even if they do not come into contact with the police directly and individually. It is high time that there is an attempt made to have an organised and non-partisan thinking and discussion on the subject not only by policemen but also by members drawn from various sections of the society.

This paper has not been written either as a defence or as a criticism of the working of the Indian police. As a policeman with considerable years of policing experience, I feel that we in the force have reached a stage, in view of the current uproar against police working that we should look at the matter both as responsible professionals as well as citizens concerned with the well-being of our own society. In doing so, it would be advantage to have deep look at the observations made by people in different parts of the world about policemen and their behaviour particularly in the context of violence. It is precisely for this reason that I have made an

attempt in this paper to bring together in one place conclusions reached by eminent men on the basis of deep and thorough research, supported or backed by instances which have come to my notice over the years. These are not light hearted statements made for the purpose of sensationalism but are pointers to behavioural attitudes of policemen in their own respective countries. It seems appropriate therefore, that we should analyse these viewpoints relating to the subject of police violence as to find out if they have any applicability to the working of our police system, here in India. Such analysis I am sure will bring out a clearer picture of the operation of the various forces on policemen and will provide a guide to the better understanding of the force and help in reform, if need be.

POLICE POWERS

The term police is now used to denote a body of people organised to maintain civil order and to investigate breaches of the law. The police function is universal in society, for which full-time officials are appointed with special police responsibilities regulated by law. We can easily see that police functions primarily relate to maintaining 'civil order' in societies whether in terms of handling disturbances or investigating specific criminal violations. For enabling them to discharge these responsibilities, in all modern democracies, including India, police have been vested with an unquestioned and legitimate right to use force against any civilian in specified, legal ways. It should not escape our notice that police possess a monopoly of this right and it is in the exercise of this monopolistic responsibility that the problem of police violence surfaces and often raises controversies. Society, having authorised the police to use force for its own preservation, is justifiably zealous to guard itself against any action of the police which may indeed even destroy it.

POLICE VIOLENCE : CAUSES

The problem of use of force by the police, including violence, is not new nor is it peculiar to India. This seems to have come to notice in various countries, though the circumstances pertaining to the use of violence, the affected parties, methodology and degree of violence may differ in space and frames. However, on the basis of studies conducted on issues concerning use of violence by the police in India and elsewhere, certain broad conclusions may be drawn. There are numerous causes which offer plausible explanation for the phenomenon of police violence. Broadly speaking, these causes arise out of :

1. Structure and functioning of the police organisation; and
2. political and social history of the country.

In other words, the causes are both internal and external to the working of the police forces. A detailed analysis of numerous incidents attended with violence by police would suggest the following being among the most important factors causing/leading to police violence.

Internal Factors

Police is perhaps unique among the civilian branches of administration. Rigid hierarchical structure, organised and professional training, close supervision, demanding accountability procedures—both legal and administrative, strict discipline, etc., characterise the police. How then can there be internal aspects leading to 'violence' among policemen? The following may help to answer the question:

1. All the world over, studies have revealed that the attitude and orientation of policemen are influenced by the internal styles of management of the police force as well as the inter-personal behavioural and attitudes of the superiors towards their subordinates. Forces in which subordinates are treated with lack of concern for their self respect and well being, harsh and un-

ethical methods are used against them and fairplay and justice take a back seat in dealing with them, its members are likely to divert all their pent up feelings and wrath against the public, whenever they get a chance to do so.

2. Even in the best of police forces, individual policemen are known to be sometimes uncivilised and indisciplined.
3. A police which has not developed into a professional body, is likely to be engaged in arbitrary acts, including violence.
4. Violence is more likely to flare up within an organisation that has a tradition of being indisciplined, ill-equipped, understaffed and poorly trained and has a long history of being so. These shortcomings tend to become "further exaggerated at times of police crisis". Such personnel tend to be academically and technically illprepared leading to violent reaction to situations faced by them.
5. The author has spoken to many policemen who used force and violence beyond the required limit and on many an occasion they confessed that they did so only because they felt insecure and that they were going to be outnumbered and over-powered. I have often heard complaints from the force that adequate number was not being deployed or sent on patrols. There have been many occasions when patrolmen in riot affected areas were deployed armed both with a rifle and a lathi—though it is difficult to imagine the same constable using one or the other at a time.
6. When policemen are killed in action, particularly in situations of civil disorder, there is considerable scope for the rest of the police to retaliate leading to violence.
7. There are instances in which failings by police were ultimately traced to their attempts to hide their involvement in criminal and other anti-social activities, or to afford protection (obviously for a consideration) to "contractors and suppliers among marginal sectors". It is relevant to observe here that this action

of the police is not necessarily dependent on political and social support.

8. A strong sense of professional duty and little faith in the judicial system has sometimes led the police to take justice in their own hands and to do away with as many common criminals as possible. Further, unrealistic expectations of law may lead to the belief that "violence is the only way to obtain confession" from certain types of criminals. This is further compounded by the fact that "professional criminals are becoming more aware of the limitations of the police and the criminal justice system".
9. Where police leadership suffers from lack of elan and crisis of authority in internal management, etc. It is likely that police authorities may become passive in stopping violence by the police.
10. When the idea that we are experiencing a revolution and, therefore, that authority and its agent need not preoccupy themselves within the limitations of the law in their activities; gets firmly rooted in their minds, many a police force has been known to resort to violence.

External Factors

Police work impinges upon almost the entire cross-section of the society. Therefore, many an external factor affects and influences their conduct and behaviour. I have listed out a few of the more important external factors which have a decisive impact on the overall police behaviour:

1. A police, which is too much subjected to 'civilian' and 'administrative' fiat has the potential to lead to a 'police state'. In such a case, police is more likely to practise violence, which would be suffered, tolerated or justified depending upon the degree of violence and the administrative/political expediency to do so.
2. Police being the most expressing organ of government, there is a tendency on the part of the police to get firmly identified with government policies. This is all the more so, when a Government's 'perception' of the

"seriousness of threats to social order grows". This is further compounded when the police personnel comprehend their indispensability and use it as a lever for bargaining because of the dependence of the ruling party on the police to settle inter-party or intra-party issues. Such a relationship between the police and its political masters arises out of political tension in society.

3. Where a police force is partisan, there are greater chances of its resorting to violence which would vary according to "particular political influence and government objectives".
4. Where police get involved in partisan politics the 'boundaries' of tolerance of the officialdom get expanded for police violence "in times of acute political tension and social disruption". This is all the more so when "traditional mechanisms of social controls" are destroyed as a result of rapid social changes. In such circumstances, Violence beyond accepted limits, may be resorted to both by the society as well as police. Such transgressions of limit have come to notice even in habitually violent societies.
5. 'Tumultuous politics' often provides a screen for police misconduct, including violence. This is noticed more so when political stability of a government gets mixed up with the issues of survival of society itself. There will then be a tendency to overlook rising police violence and there will be no attempt to set it right. In such circumstances, intensification of violence, which would amount to over stepping the bounds of what is usually acceptable, "gets filled in the space created by the extension of those very boundaries".

INDIAN EXPERIENCE

With particular reference to India it is perhaps not correct to say that violence of all kinds attracts widespread attention and adverse notice. Apart from the recognition of the inherent coercive powers of the police, which to some extent

may extend to physical action, many influential and thinking sections of the society have often tended to support the police resorting to physical coercion in dealing with certain category of organised, professional and die-hard criminals. In fact, on many an occasion, police have been criticised for being soft and not being sufficiently tough. There are some recorded evidence to support this view. A number of senior seasoned administrators of UP had strongly advocated before the UP Police Commission of 1971, that in India, police can not be effective and control crime unless they resorted to 'third degree' methods. Newspaper reports indicate that recently many a legislator, though mostly belonging to the ruling party of a particular state, while considering the police budget vied with each other in their attempt to justify (and not deny, mind you) instances of police violence. In yet another State Assembly, there was near unanimous demand to encourage officers who were named and against whom there were judicial enquiries ordered on more than one occasion to face charges of very serious violence against innocent people. It appears that partisan politics often affect the value judgement passed on instances of police violence. Neither the public nor the politician is guilty of consistency in this regard. Politicians in power and position, as a rule support and defended police against accusations of excesses, etc. Whereas the same persons, when out of office view the same situation differently and are among the strongest critics of the police and defenders of 'the public interest'.

Attitude of Police Professionals

Police professionals on their part are often indifferent. However, strongly one may feel individually, collectively and as a department, they have not been known to take a non-partisan view of police violence because of the current and cross currents within police organisations which make it extremely difficult to them to do so. There is also the widely prevalent nexus between individual or group of policemen and the local politician. This tie-up is often so strong that even departmental views tend to be overlooked or suppressed.

Pressure Groups

Why is it then that we hear so much about police violence? It would appear that police involvement in violence gets publicised where the interest of influential pressure groups are affected. These groups comprise, *inter alia*, ideological groups (like Naxalites, extremists, etc.), groups with sociological overtones (like Sarvodaya, Reservationists, anti-reservationists, etc.), political power blocks, dominant linguistic and cultural groups, students and youth fronts, religious minorities, press and the media, etc. This is not to say that sensationalism does not figure vis-a-vis violence—after all sections of media consider sensationalism as a birth right, particularly where sensitive issues like crime, violence, etc., are concerned.

False Encounters

Let us take the example of the much discussed 'false encounters' attributed to the police. It is perhaps safe to presume that similar allegations would have been justified even at the time of the *Thugs and Pindaries*. But it is mainly through the Naxalites and extremists, particularly in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, that this matter has got highlighted. There was no organised effort to focus public attention when it was suspected that many an individual criminal or dacoit was done away with through 'encounters'.

Women

There have been numerous agitations in which women have been in the forefront, labour management, price rise, etc., but very few in the past got the same prominence as in the recent Gujarat agitations vis-a-vis violence against women. Is it because of the sociological importance of this pressure group and not merely because of 'police highhandedness against women'?

Undertrials

The problem of undertrials is fairly well known even though there has not been much improvement in their lot. This problem got prominent focus when a few years ago, some politicians were kept in various jails. When these very

politicians had a chance to bring about reform in this area, they failed to rise up to the occasion. It is a few years now since all these hit the head-lines but there does not appear to be any more public concern for it. At the same time, with almost predictable regularity, one reads in one magazine or the other about the plight of the under trials of one particular southern state. In fact, in the recent Assembly proceedings of that state, speakers went to the extent of highlighting the violence used by the police on these persons through telling statistics that a large number of undertrials are received in jails in none too good a physical shape and that more undertrials died in that state while in jail custody than regular convicts. Is it because that the Bihar undertrials are hapless ordinary criminals and the latter are members of an ideological group?

SUMMING UP

What passes off for violence by police is the outcome of a series of complicated factors. The manner in which a police organisation is set up and managed and the circumstances and manner of evolution of the police in a society, are important factors which affect the issue of police violence. Not less important are factors which directly concern the members of the society themselves. The socio-political situation and the social ethics of society influence the police conduct in a major way. Police after all are affected by society and in turn affect the goings on in the society. Unless the members of a society are zealous to guard their rights, illegal instructions and exceptional conduct of the police will continue. In doing so, their objective should be consistent and impartial or they will inadvertently give avoidable scope for police violence. In other words, unless there is influential and impartial public opinion acting as a watch dog, both internal as well as external factors affecting police performance, may turn the police to be unnecessarily violent and justify it by means of expediency. Where the police has evolved out of society's needs, scope for complaints of police violence is insignificant. In sheer contrast, such complaints multiply in societies where police has acquired the characteristics of a

'ruler oriented' one.

It is dangerous to justify and rationalise widespread and repeated violence by the police. In fact, a large body of policemen themselves may not approve of it, not to say, they would like it. Problem of police violence cannot be dealt with merely by educating the public or policemen. These are very important steps indeed.

But by themselves they cannot give a proper and lasting solution. We have to go in detail into the various factors that contribute to police violence including the structure, accountability mechanism, legal inadequacies, internal management styles only to name a few, if we were to make an attempt to find a solution to the problem.

A degree of 'controlled violence' is essential for any government, which relies upon 'the ultimate sanction of violence' (by the state machinery) as 'the only certain means of preventing anarchy'. Without this, it is not possible to uphold 'basic freedoms' including right to dissent and all that goes with expression of political views. This is, however, based on true and proper accountability of the police. Because of this understanding that society consciously accepts the use of violence by police to some extent and does not always protest against it. The problem arises when police violence exceeds the limits of acceptance and becomes controversial because of partisan conduct and also when it affects the interests of influential pressure groups.

Unless a society demands and gets non-partisan police, there will always be room for the police to exceed the acceptable limits of violence. Non-partisan police is possible only when police is functionally free from executive fiat and non-professional overlordship and is accountable to institutions and not individuals.

Secondly, police resources will have to be increased "beyond the minimum though appropriate to maintain a reasonable degree of public confidence".

Apart from physical and technological resources, there has to be sincere and all out attempts to make the 'policy effective' by increasing the powers of the police under the law. Along with this, there has to be significant reform in the overall attitude and functioning of the Criminal Justice

System, including the judiciary.

Whatever we do, it should aim at discouraging (and in fact, make it unnecessary) the police from resorting to the use of 'excessive violence' to achieve the objectives of a government. The consequences of not doing so are not far to seek. Experience in different countries, including India, shows that use of 'excessive violence' by the police more so if it is with the implied or tacit approval of the government, tends to "go far to help the militants to achieve their aims or allow them a degree of public sympathy or support, which they would not otherwise receive".

All these will be of no avail, if the police leadership does not play its role sincerely and with commitment. To this extent, its role will be even more crucial than all the reforms which have been referred to in the earlier paragraphs. Education and orientation of all the ranks is extremely important. But unless this is matched by bold and enlightened leadership, it will all end as an exercise in futility.

Discussion

Inter-community violence is a distinct aspect of violence, different from collective violence, which is directed entirely and primarily against the State. This distinction has to be made because while the collective violence which is directed against the State for a particular objective—political objective or political goal—is entirely different from inter-community or intra-community conflict, and the hostility and antagonism which are generated in the normal day-to-day interactions of these sections of society. Since society consists of a number of communities, these communities are expected to live in harmony, because inter-community conflict weakens and it destroys the credibility of the State. In the long run, if the inter-community conflict is not controlled or eliminated, the State is in a grave danger and the possibility of this conflict degenerating into an attack on the State itself.

We have witnessed during the last thirty years, a periodic eruption of inter-community conflict or violence. These have been erupting periodically in an intensifying manner. Sometimes the complexion and the magnitude of this problem has gone to such wide proportions which are very awesome. The first point that we may like to discuss, with our concept of secular democracy, we have not been able to contain this kind of conflicts. Possibly a distortion in our democratic polity or the patterns of our democratic society have themselves enhanced and intensified this phenomenon. The incidents, instead of decreasing have increased. Why is it? Is it the distortion of the democratic polity or is it the weakness of the administrative structure? These are the aspects that need to be discussed in relation to the inter-community conflicts. By and large, we have been able to contain this inter-community conflict. But at what cost? Certain wounds have been made and it is generally taking a long time to heal them.

But while we take an overall perspective, we have been able to contain them. But whether we will be able to do so in the coming years is a moot question.

Peculiar aspect of this inter-community conflict is the fact that people rationalise their criminal acts. A large number of our citizens who do not think in terms of violence, become violent and rationalise their violence when caught in inter-community conflicts. Why is this happening? Is there any means, any method, any technique whereby this kind of involvement of individuals and rationalization of their criminal activities can be reduced?

We need to ponder over as to whether any particular religion has greater or higher or lower potential for non-violence or violence. Even religion is being confused with the ritual, traditions, superstitions and practices. Some of these things are being dubbed under the head 'religion'. Traditional habit or traditional practice which is being attacked becomes a focal point of the conflict. An environment and a climate has been generated in which you see each community looks upon the other community with a certain amount of suspicion. If a Hindu fights a Hindu, nothing happens: if a Muslim fights a Muslim nothing happens. A small incident can be magnified into a big one, and then the whole thing can get into a confrontation. Finally, we have to think of the administrative capacity to deal with this situation.

When we talk of Hindu-Muslim riots somehow or other an impression gets through as if all Hindus are fighting all Muslims and all Muslims are fighting all Hindus. This probably is not the position. Increasingly the riots are tending to become riots between anti-social elements of the two communities, and particularly when we look at the riots of Bombay, Baroda and Ahmedabad this point will come out more clearly.

When you look at the rural people in India, there is no difference over there, no communal difference over there, no communal disharmony over there, there is a great deal of integration. And when you look at the urban and the rural people—be they Hindus and be they Muslims—this is the rural people who are more religious than the urban people, and yet

in terms of religious differences, the rural people do not cry over each other's throats in the name of religion as the urban people are doing. And all the literature that one can scrutinise on Hindu-Muslim riots—it is not as though there are no Hindu-Muslim riots in the rural areas—there are a few, but only those riots are also triggered or engineered by urbanites. Left to themselves, the rural people perhaps would not have entered into these riots. Therefore, the thinking is that practically all these riots have an urban character. Therefore, we have to examine something about the form, the structure, the content or urban life which, somehow or the other, seems to facilitate the riots.

Every town seems to have its own culture and we find that there are certain towns that have developed a culture of violence. In fact, it is very interesting that Lucknow has Shia-Sunni riots not Hindu-Muslim riots whereas other towns have other kind of riots. The other thing that we noticed as a result of these riots is that these riots tended to be more mostly in medium-sized towns. Aligarh, Meerut and Ferozabad, the North Indian towns, Malagaon and Jalagaon in Maharashtra—these are the medium-sized towns, which have got in-between them—they neither have a kind of a declining economy. Ferozabad is a case different from this. But the others, there are towns where they have got a situation where the economy influencing riot situation. A kind of a nascent Muslim entrepreneurship has come into existence and therefore there is a lot of economic competitiveness between the existing Hindu entrepreneurs and the petty bourgeoisie that has emerged among the Muslims, and as a result of this economic competitiveness, a large number of riots have occurred because of certain competitive conditions that have arisen when the Muslims began to compete in Moradabad. Particularly, this fact was very well brought out by all the reports that have appeared on Moradabad. As a result of this, what happened is that much of the reporting, much of the literature that exists today, tends to point out that there is a sort of an economic dimension underneath to these riots. While over-emphasising the economic aspect of riots, we have tended to overlook some of the social and sectoral aspects of these riots.

The existing literature has talked of the medium-sized

towns. When we look at Bombay—which has been relatively free from riots since Independence—after about 1947-48, there has not been any major riots in Bombay. Until last two years Bombay was relatively riot-free, Calcutta has been relatively riot-free, Delhi has been relatively riot-free. Therefore, if once you take the economic line of argument, the argument has been that these are large heterogeneous cities, secularisation has set in over there, there is a great deal of economic opportunities and a working class loyalty or unity of some kind. It tended to somehow or other square itself with the leftist model that these large industrial towns have developed an industrial ethos—a kind of a class unity. But now Bombay and Ahmedabad have belied that model. Baroda, even though it is not a large metropolitan city like Bombay or Ahmedabad, still in terms of population and in terms of its industrial growth, one can lump Bombay, Ahmedabad and Baroda together and put forward the leftist argument that it is only the economic competitiveness that has been responsible for these riots.

A third element we find is about the riots in Hyderabad. In these riots it has been shown that the three major rioting-parties, the Congress party, the BJP and the Itihad-ul-Musalmin, apart from the masses, there are certain political gains. There are certain political reasons behind these riots. When one looks at smaller towns, like Aurangabad, Jalgaon, Pune, one finds that it was not economic competitiveness that brought about these riots or caused riots because the Muslims have not done well over there, they are not emerging as competitors as they are doing in Ahmedabad, Meerut or Aligarh, and therefore the riots have different reasons in these medium-sized towns.

There are distortions in our system which have led to communal conflict. Whether we can succeed or devise a programme which would enable us to deal with the complexities and difficulties of conflicts? In medieval India there was no real way of getting your grievances redressed. You may go to the castle and ring the bell but there is only one ruler who responded. You may try to organise dissent and only you could organise it when every single person in the community was troubled by famine, drought or outrage and then you

find that there was a riot and a response from the ruler. Are we basing our politics on that? The Muslims first adopted this technique and they got results which they found very unexpected and even undesirable. That is the creation of Pakistan. That has been followed by several other groups, the Harijans, and the Sikhs, and now every person thinks that if I want power or I want redressal of grievances, I must organise a riot as quickly as possible. Is that the way our politicians are leading? If so, is it the duty of a group like yours or ours to discuss its implications and to see how we should fashion our politics so that mob fury does not influence our decisions? In a democracy, the worst type of decisions are taken under the duress of mob fury. Whether the ability to ventilate the grievances in legislatures will mean less of mob action because basically all these riots are only man standing up and saying: "Take notice of me: I have something to say". And if our systems can devise or guide people in such a way that there is a voice that will always be heard. This is the purpose of the media in a democracy. What is the business of legislature? To bring to the surface all the traumas, all the suspicions, all the injustices that is present in a society. If we allow democracy to function in the correct way and not subdue opposition, if we allow dissent to appear, if we allow the voice of the man who is the most, who has the most sufference and the most injustice to be heard, you will have less and less of the type of troubles that we have had in the last few years.

Probably, today the rioting which can present a bigger problem to us in every sphere, political and administrative, is Harijans' conflicts. Here the main point is that the communal riots of Hindu-Muslims may have an economic base, may have the other reasons like segregated living, integrated mechanisms lacking, small town collective orientation and so on. But here there may be genuine grievances which have lived below the surface for centuries. Here there may be poverty of an undescrivable nature, discrimination of a type that is very staggering. If we are to look at problems on the collective violence side, probably the most important are those concerning the Harijans. In all the conflicts the upper class who form the sort of administrative structure of a

village want to keep out, they want to allow the thing to go on because in a subtle way it strengthens their position.

Our gravest national maladies today are the violence on the campus, the frustration in the thinking community of the land. There were words used like alienation, isolation, frustration, and what is significant is that this campus violence is destroying the very roots of education, it is damaging the very idea of education, it is creating problems which will retard our footsteps for years to come. We notice that population which is the cause of great unrest in the universities because the numbers are very large, you cannot provide for all the needs in the shape of education, in the shape of teachers, in the shape of classrooms, even chairs to sit on. Over and above this is unemployment and a bleak future for the students.

The subject of police violence from the point of view of administration is a very important subject which has wide ramifications and great effect on the life of the people. In their attempt to keep things going, the police are doing what is wrong, the police have been encouraged to do what is wrong and all this will damage the fabric of society a great deal. We hear about third degree or various types of oppression, insults, humiliation and the worst possible cause of it and probably the most understandable is that nobody is prepared to punish the criminals in the sense that there is such tremendous congestion in courts that police officers feel that there will be a breakdown of law and order if they did not resort to methods which are improper or illegal.

The university campus is not one homogeneous community, and one section of this community is committed to educational process. It is in minority. There are three victims in the university process : (1) the student who wants to study, (2) the teacher who wants to teach, and (3) who wants to gather knowledge. There are four types of pressure groups amongst students : (a) Minority student who is frustrated due to the prevailing and other subjective and objective considerations; (b) the groups of student-politicians who have close links with the local politicians or police officers; (c) the group of defeatist students, who are calculatively indifferent towards education but they have got to be inside the

institution ; and (d) the large majority of unworthy persons who are infiltrating in the educational system. Situations may be created by any group where collective violence is a tool to get the satisfaction of some of the non-negotiable needs in the university. How can university teacher negotiate with students whose demands are like higher politics ? They put demand for non-negotiable needs because they know that they will fail and the confrontation will continue. Now these politically motivated students—and quite a good number of these politically motivated students have also managed degrees and they are now teachers in the universities. These teachers appear to be more functional in the type of system that we are developing and can very easily handle these situations. There are multitude interests inside the university. A real student who wants to study and is committed to the process of examination is being affected.

Communal violence has its genesis in thinking which is communal. It is not to refer to any individual as such but to bring out what is so common amongst all of us. Reference was made regarding culture of mob fury which influences decisions. This was first resorted to by Muslims in India. Some Muslims did resort to it. Some Hindus may have resorted to it and some Sikhs may also have resorted to it. The mode of communication and the type of language that they use facilitate the furtherance of the idea that they intend to fight against. This may lead to segregation which may lead to the segregation of the minds. Part of segregation existed throughout the human history. It is a process that has to be seen like that. The language, the thought process and the mode of action result in communal outbursts. We should examine the inter-relationship phenomenon rather than emphasising about one point or the other. It is not to emphasise that inter-relationship should mean to indicate that all sectors being equal. The problem of communalism would not be solved as long as we do not have a correct attitude towards that position. It was a failure on our part and our polity to accommodate diverse religious, linguistic and other cultural traditions. It is not a question of politics or economics, but the question of the leadership trying to be able to build a certain atmosphere in which, even if certain immediate pro-

blems are not solved, but the hope of solving them through the polity that we have, does exist. Unfortunately, this aspect is not attracting adequate attention.

Student violence must be seen as a part of the violence in the larger system. Any effort to delineate a couple of points would lead to difficulties because the causes may lie outside the university system. It may be little difficult to generalise. We know that there are what we call most conspicuous factors leading to violence, chief cooperating factor leading to violence, minor aggravating factor leading to violence and factor which is present but apparently inoperative. All these four factors are there which lead to violence. One acts as a chief cooperating factor in one situation, but not in other situation, one acts as the most conspicuous factor in one situation and not in other situations.

We should attempt to analyse what are the factors which are responsible for initiation of the violence by the small frustrated group because the bigger group is equally frustrated. But it is not they who initiate it. It is the smaller group. Sometimes it is the anti-social elements who initiate violence. There are groups within the minority that resort to agitational tactics while others do not. We have to genetimize as to what are those factors that lead to mal-integration of one minority but not other minorities. We have to be very specific in analysing these factors. In individual violence, it is generally a specific person who becomes a victim of violence. Except in very few cases, in India, by and large, as far as student violence is concerned, it is not society-oriented, it is mostly campus-oriented. In the society the violences are increasing but in the campuses comparatively there has been no such increase. Even in the campus violence, attention should be paid to those students who initiate the violence. They are the students who may not be committed to values of our society, may not have respect for the teachers, may not be attached to the property of the institutions, may not be involved in the pursuit of knowledge.

Indian society, traditionally had various loyalties, particularities, identities and after the Independence, we find that many new political, economic and other opportunities and gates have been opened up for all these sections. So it should

be seen in the first place as a normal process that these earlier loyalties and particularities whether they are because of communal or whatever nature, they will be taken recourse to for achieving the new goals and for capturing the new opportunities. From that point of view we should not read too much in the kind of protests or violence because there is a new framework of relationship among these different social collectivities which have existed for centuries in our society. The only question to resolve is that how can we avoid or stall this trend or contradiction which has been called 'contradiction' and how we could open up new opportunities, how we can change this thing. Because of this kind of violence that can only be seen as syndrome or manifestations of this unrest at the national level, at the regional level, that is only peculiar manifestation and local manifestations, and local causes should not be given too much of credence. If we really are to tackle the situation in proper perspective then we have to be watchful or careful of the tendencies of unrest or violence at the national level rather than at the local level. We have to take a little broader view also, though specific factors may be important.

Now Pakistan has been described as an irritant—a constant—one of the irritants in Hindu-Muslim relations. One can make a guess, hazardous guess, that how far today Pakistan serves as a reference group for Indian Muslims? So many events have occurred in both the countries. In Pakistan itself the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971 and all that. Whether these events and the emotional linkages which were fresh in the minds of the Indian Muslims in the beginning, whether they still hold true? The reference group factor could be resolved or could be discussed at least to find out how far it is still in the picture or even still will take shape.

Another thing that needs to be mentioned is the talk of secularism and nationalism. Whether we can rise above all this and talk of nationalism as such which was the dominant and diffused issue before Independence? After Independence, we have probably lost sense of nationalism and we are talking only in terms of nationalism *vs.* secularism or in terms of castes and communities and all that.

Police violence should be regarded as a part of State

violence, where the state itself is not neutral, it is partisan. It reflects certain interests or some groups are not represented. Then it is very natural to expect that there would be—and police being an organised part of the state—violence against such groups which are not a part of the State and then we find that events—which have happened in rural areas of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh—would get explained by this aspect of the state power structure. Moreover, as police is a part of the society, therefore whatever prejudices and biases exist in the society would obviously be a part of the police psychological make-up. It ought to reflect the prejudices that exist in the society.

Police would tend to take "first-look-approach" to violence, that is whoever throws the first stone is responsible for starting violence. So it is the behavioural attitude rather than the sectional attitude that the police takes and therefore all such groups which are powerless or which tend to agitate to get more power, the police violence would be against them. There appears to be a very big gap between formal powers of the police and the informal powers of the police. Formally, we do not even permit police—a statement made before the police is not admissible in law—but informally we have given the powers to kill to police. Everyone knows what happens in encounters.

Whether communal violence is an irrational activity or is it a goal-oriented activity? We generally regard other forms of violence, that is terrorism or agrarian violence, political violence as goal-oriented activities because we find that some groups are going to gain out of such forms of agitation. But when it comes to communal violence we all tend to regard this as an irrational activity because apparently no one gains because the status of Muslims or the status of all Hindus vis-a-vis the Muslims in the last thirty years has not changed. So we always tend to find and try to discover either economic structures or anti-social elements or politicians, which we are looking for the genesis of violence outside the power structure of the two groups because we feel that nothing has changed. The groups themselves are not responsible or, in other words, it is not a goal-oriented activity. In the last hundred years, the two groups—the Hindu elite and the Muslim elite—they

have been following diametrically opposite norms both in ideology and in power in the sense that most of the Hindus would regard assimilation as the desirable goal in politics. As a good ideology they would define unity as a society in which religion plays no role at all, whereas Muslims would regard pluralism as a desirable goal—whereas everyone gets according to percentage of population. If there are 15 per cent Muslims then to them justice would demand, fairplay would demand, that everyone gets 15 per cent at all levels whether in administration or in politics because after Independence the rules of the game have changed in politics and the Muslims are the only well defined or identifiable group which cannot convert their cultural identity into a pressure group in the sense that if we have 8 to 9 per cent Muslim MPs but they do not represent Muslim population. Each Muslim MP gets elected because of the sizable Hindu vote that he gets. Therefore, this is the unrepresentative nature of politics in the eyes of the Muslims, which may lead Muslims to violence. The threat to violence comes from Muslims because of their perceived powerlessness, their feelings of frustration or feelings of deprivation because they feel that they cannot have separate electorates, they cannot have proportionate representation, they cannot have 10 per cent officers at administrative level in administration, etc. And so, it is this feeling of powerlessness which they wish to change through starting violence and also when violence comes from Hindus and actual violence, whatever it is, it is the fact that Hindus want to tell the Muslims that look, nothing will change for you, the society will remain as such. And, therefore, if the Hindus feel that the government is going to grant something to Muslims there is more violence. So this aspect of violence being goal-oriented activity should be kept in mind.

It would be a better strategy to locate the pockets in which atrocities are committed more on Harijans or scheduled castes, and also the reasons behind these atrocities are not universally the same. They also differ from area to area and region to region. For example, in the Eastern parts of UP refusal by the Harijans against the lifting of dead animals from caste Hindus' houses, refusal to carry manure as the head load, and

not attending the job of the midwife by the females of the Harijans—these did not lead to any atrocities on them. But identical factors in Bihar or some other regions might have led to atrocities on Harijans.

Where there is an established set of values, there is no confusion or ambivalence about the relationship between various groups. This is in this case between groups of society belonging to one community as against another, or the higher caste as compared with the lower caste or between the students and teachers, between policemen and the society. All these relationships are governed by the established set of values, and where those values fail or break down, the relationship gets strained, and where the relationship gets strained, the organizations which back up those values they also get weakened, and therefore violence is the result. In the case of the relationship between Hindus and Muslims, there was the acceptance of composite culture in our religions (villages) where Muslims lived as Muslims, Hindus lived as Hindus, Brahmins lived as Brahmins and the Harijans lived as Harijans, and there they had their ways of life and the relationships. Because all these values were established they were related to each other accordingly. And the organization of the society ensured that such values and such mutual behaviour would be something which would be accepted and against which there would be no violence. Now each one of these relationships is getting obliterated. While the composite society with a number of communities co-existing has been given up, there is no replacement of that by the values of secularism. Secularism will be a proper replacement of co-existence. Co-existence as a value is given up but secularism as the new value has not come in. Similarly, in the olden days Harijans were there and they accepted that Harijans also had some kind of a place in the society—whether in marriages or elsewhere. The whole social structure seemed to support the hierarchical relationship. That appears to have broken down. The Harijans are rightly asserting their claims and yet the ambivalence remains. Therefore this phenomenon is leading to violence.

Now the students should study and the teacher should teach. The discipline must be enforced by the teachers. These are the old values and the relationships based on them. But

today it is not accepted and teachers do not teach and the students do not study and the relationship is distorted, balance is tilted, and violence is the result. Today people seem to think that presence of police is not the presence of authority. People think that they are the authority. Old values are in a state of flux, relationships which are based on these old values are under question. There is, therefore, normlessness. The organization which is there to support the structure of values and the relationship has got weakened and therefore violence is emerging in all forms.

We have to see which violence is the most crucial at a particular time. Communal and caste violence is something that threatens today the very fabric of society. We will cease to exist as a nation if we allow it to continue. And, therefore, it is not a question merely of enumerating factors which lie behind it. It is a question of addressing ourselves to the task of whether we want to live and survive as a nation or we are going to submit ourselves to this growing communalisation through the process of violence. Inter-community violence is not a spontaneous phenomenon, it is not the natural result of our historical development, it is not the rational outcome of our ecological or economic existence. It may be difficult to agree that communal violence is a residue of our feudal past or it is the result barely of economic competition because there is a very massive example before us in Punjab. There is no such thing as economic competition between Hindus and Sikhs, as probably there might be some kind of economic competition between Hindus and Muslims in Moradabad or Meerut or Aligarh for that matter. Communal entities are getting crystalised in our system. It is the distortion of the democratic system that we have adopted, and distortion not in terms of articulating interests in terms of secular needs of society but articulating interests alternatively in terms of communal entities. We have almost come to accept that Hindus have separate interests/conflict identifiably different from those of Sikhs or Muslims or other minorities. There is something wrong in the process of what we call national integration. We have come to accept, perhaps predominantly, that the dominant religious community has the right to accept from others that they must conform to its norms, its rituals, its


ethos. And therefore, national integration would mean the non-dominant sections, that is the minorities, assimilating themselves or approximating to what is called the ethos of the majority. It appears to be a basic flaw in our concept of national integration. The second basic flaw and distortion is that whereas we call ourselves a democratic, secular, socialist republic, we immediately begin to think as if that is an accomplished fact and nothing needs to be done to make society secular, to make society democratic, to make society socialist. We immediately turn round and say if our personal law has not been secularised, if our habits have not been secularised, if we have not given up religious totems, taboos, ritual rights, superstitions, we are, therefore, bound to clash with each other. We have to make a distinction between social reform, between secularisation and national integration, because communalism and communal conflict is in contradiction to nation as a whole. It is not in contradiction to religion. When we say the set of values that have been given up as religious co-existence, it may not be a fact. It appears that we are still clinging to them because we have not been able to evolve a national ethos. Do the programmes on our TV and our Radio project what we would call unsecular aspects of our social values? And the rationale given is if we do not do that our audience will get alienated. Now, we have to think about this.

We have never thought whether in society there are any elements which have ever tried to combat those who are accentuating communal divisions. If there are any such elements why they have not succeeded? Our political culture today is what brings immediate gain is good, what may be a long-term gain but an immediate loss is evil. Therefore we have not encouraged any kind of social activity which can bring various communities together, which can make society aware of the evil elements that base themselves on such instincts. We have not encouraged common platform for leaders of various religions who should come together and tell people that human co existence requires some common requirements like food, water, electricity, forests and clean neighbourhood, education, and therefore all religions should jointly issue edicts that society should jointly make endeavours for these

things. Religion has more been used to create distinctive identities, it has not been used to create common identities. Religion should also be used for creating common identities, which aspect of religion is being projected both by religious and non-religious people. The transient aspect of religion, the agitative aspect of religion, the discriminating or distinctive aspect of religion, but the comprehensive, the spiritual, the combining, the uniting aspect of religion, the human aspect of religion, that has been neglected. Therefore, we have to make recommendations to the society and leaders of society that they may contemplate how to stop this process of crystalising separate religious, communal, caste, linguistic identities and how to give them a sense of purpose so that these identities may feel like merging into a single identity called 'nation'. This is the basic problem. Once you give an inspiring ideal to the nation, the contradictions between teachers and students would disappear, the contradictions between castes would be easier to overcome, the contradictions between communities, in my opinion, will disappear sooner than any other contradictions because none of these communities has a prospect of living outside the nation. All want to live within the nation. But they are trying to assert their separate rights. If rights could be ensured before they are violently demanded, there would be less communal violence.



IV : POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS



Policy and Administrative Implications of Collective Violence

J.N. Chaturvedi

*Facts take their revenge
if we ignore them too long.*

—SARDAR PATEL

If large numbers applaud the patently illegal blinding of criminals in Bhagalpur and a Station House Officer in UP is lynched and his body dismembered by a yelling mob within yards of his police station because he insists on executing a court's order; if an engineer and his son are killed for refusing to award a contract against rules; if gun-trotting bands of hoodlums overrun polling booths at the instigation of persons in responsible positions; if even school examinations cannot be conducted without the presence of the armed police; if large groups incensed by a Supreme Court judgment go on the rampage; if legislators threaten to gherao the Governor to prevent him from addressing the budget session and if mobs storm a legislature building, it is time for all Indians to sit up and ponder.

In a somewhat similar erosion of respect for law and constitutionally established institutions on the eve of the World War II, France had a rash of what was described as 'gimmes' (give me this, give me that). Their frequency and dimensions eroded both the stability and the economy of France with the result that the country collapsed at the first breath of aggression. Anarchy is tapping at our doorway. "We can afford to ignore (France's) lesson at our own peril, for history has an uncanny way of repeating itself."

The increasing resort to 'lynch law' in many parts of the

country when anti-social elements are set upon by the people, is only the other side of the coin. A survey in West Bengal alone revealed that the incidents in which the public took law into its own hands had risen alarmingly over the last few years. Over 630 persons fell victims to mob violence between 1982 and 1984, many of them, criminals caught committing offences.

The circumstances and the proximate causative factors may differ in each case, but there are some basic underlying patterns discernible in most such happenings. In most cases, it is the erosion of faith in the rule of law. In many other cases, it is downright contempt for it. What has led to this ?

These flare-ups are unmistakable symptoms of the decay of the system. Let us admit that none of the organs created by the Constitution or law has been functioning normally. At the rate at which disorder crops up in one part of the country after another, we may soon have at hand, a situation in which no order can be maintained without a battalion of troops. In his book, *Terrorism, History and Facets in the World and in India*, Shri N.S. Saksena, a distinguished administrator, has rightly observed that "the militarization of law and order is like the use of narcotics, the dosage has to be continuously increased". Militarized law and order administration and a government run in accordance with a democratic Constitution cannot co-exist for long. Iran and former East Pakistan and, in recent years, Sri Lanka are amongst the many examples. Let us remember what Socrates once said, "those who learn from the experiences of others alone are wise". A people, specially so disparate as ours—economically, socially and politically can be held together only by an abiding faith in the rule of law. Such faith cannot be enforced. It has to be generated.

A three-way test for whether there is rule of law is:

- (a) Do the government and the people alike have respect for the law of the land ?
- (b) Is the government of the country conducted in accordance with the law which we have given to ourselves ?
- (c) Have the various organs created by the Constitution

themselves observed certain minimum standards in matters of both substance and procedure?

Read together, these would mean that rule of law transcends the narrow principle of strict legality. Let even the legitimately enacted laws become oppressive or discriminatory, the Constitution framers made the citizens' several rights inviolable. The framers of the Constitution knew that the only way 'unequals' could be persuaded to play the game was to assure them that it would be played according to the agreed rules and that those rules would never be manipulated to the undue advantage of the 'more equal'. Just one example will be enough.

In the thick of the national upsurge as an aftermath of the Watergate scandal, President Nixon had claimed immunity against a court's order to produce certain tapes. The Supreme Court rejected his plea. It held that the claim of Presidential Privilege had to be considered "in the light of our commitment to rule of law". It added, "the generalised assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial". Watergate eventually swept away the strongest Chief Executive of the world.

If we witness in our country the disruption of 'the game' every now and then, the principal reason is that we have subjected the rules of the game to remorseless battering. And hardly anyone who exercised authority of any kind since independence can escape the blame. The institutions which the Constitution created were intended to be the umbrellas for ensuring protection to the weak and the needy against abuse of authority by those in power. All umbrellas would look alike in good weather. The real test of their dependability is during a downpour. Our country's short history since we gave "Ourselves this Constitution" is replete with evidence of the pathetic brittleness of all our major institutions, whether it be the political parties swearing by democracy without holding party poll; legislatures, more in news for their bedlams than for seeking consensus on resolving a State's problems; the executive (including the pliant services and the police) or the educational institutions, where young-men are trained in success through shortcuts.

Pampering by politicians in power had made these criminals even more defiant. Assured of a political *quid pro quo*, these gangs went so far as to set up their own courts and administered "cheap and speedy justice". For people suffering at their hands, both the police stations and the courts had become irrelevant. Scores would be settled either on the spot or in these "new courts of justice".

An example of how influential gangsters manipulated with politicians to neutralise measures to weaken their hold on encroached land, comes from Nainital district of UP. The scramble for this fertile Terai land degenerated into its virtual loot. Very soon, might become right, compounded by the acquiescence of the frightened or corrupt local forest, irrigation, revenue and police officials. Manipulated land records were totally at variance with the position on the ground. Murders, riots and even arson had become a frequent occurrence by 1971. Soon, Naxalites stepped in on the side of the weak tribals and began "administering ready justice". It was then suggested to that Government that a large scale survey followed by consolidation of land holdings under the supervision of officers of known reputation and competence alone could retrieve the situation. Even as riots and murders became more frequent, the Home Minister's anxiety was to somehow win the 1974 elections. As N.S. Saksena has observed, "If investigations, arrests and prosecutions are all to be guided by an assessment of vote banks for the ruling party, the very basis of combating Terrorism is destroyed".

The politicians' anxiety to somehow stay in power has made the *mafias* even bolder. Backed up by this support, many of them have enlarged their areas of operation and have organised themselves into private armies, largely made up of those who despairing of the local administration and unable to get any assurance of protection from them, the helpless victims turned to these new leaders for alternative backing. Writing on Bihar the *Pioneer*, dated November 25, 1986 said:

... Private armies (senas) are proliferating in Bihar with the growing militancy of the landless. There are at least nine such private armies in the State, most of them organised

on caste lines by landlords and some by the landless demanding land reforms, implementation of minimum wage acts, freeing of bonded labour and provision of house sites.

The strength of these civil armies could be judged from the fact that the exchange of gun fire between them would last hours. These 'armies' are well organised and, in some cases, have the backing of even police officials. As a result of the running battles, land had remained uncultivated and Bihar's economy was shattered. Those who support the raising of these armies rationalise their existence on the ground of a total and prolonged collapse of the criminal justice system. Migration to the urban areas and brisk business in illicit fire arms have followed as two major corollaries of the development.

How have the police reacted to these developments? With their political clout and official connections at high levels known, policemen have preferred to co-exist with them. Only sometimes, under the weight of popular criticism and political compulsions the police have retaliated by engineering 'encounters' as proof of their effectiveness. They have often been forced to resort to illegal killings by over-zealous politicians in authority. The temptation of an appreciative pat on the back from a superior has often been too strong to resist. The same technique had soon become an accepted strategy for dealing with dacoits. N.S. Saksena puts it succinctly in an article in *The Times of India* as follows:

In sharp contrast to what Col. Sleeman did, (to liquidate thugs), the Police Force in India now devote a major part of their time and energy in small things dear to politicians. Therefore, they have just no time for worthwhile investigation This led to a vicious circle of encounters and revenge murders As soon as the fake-encounters declined (in UP), the revenge murders dropped dramatically.

Panic improvisations through illegal shortcuts have, almost, invariably, led to equally violent reprisals. A credibility gap generated a feeling even amongst policemen that

Government's loud expression of faith in the rule of law is only an opportunistic ploy. All this is true not only of UP, but even more of Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. Recent write-ups in journals about Punjab, occasionally make disturbing reading. "An administration which wants quick results for political propaganda, will employ, as it is doing now, methods which are likely to aggravate the problem Such methods have only driven groups or movements underground from where they would resurface." The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka is the latest example, we must heed.

Nearer home in Meerut, a district headquarter in Western UP, policemen probably seeped in the new philosophy propounded by the State Home Minister in 1980 that law does not have adequate answer to the problem of crimes and general lawlessness, killed one Ishwar Singh Tyagi in a fake encounter and molested his wife Maya Tyagi at Baghpatt Police Station. When there was a public furore, the government had to order CID enquiry into the allegation that Tyagi had been done to death in cold blood and his wife was raped. Efforts were made at high levels to get the CID investigation doctored. A mass agitation, partly violent, followed. As many as 22000 people courted arrest. Eventually, government were compelled to order a judicial enquiry. As a result, murder cases had to be registered against several police officers. Government could have saved themselves of a wholly avoidable embarrassment if they had just allowed the law to take its course.

Shahdara in Delhi in 1973 and earlier, Kanpur in 1958 remained under curfew for days on only because of the administration's anxiety to varnish grave crimes of its functionaries. But their worst fall-out was the total erosion of government's credibility. The erosion was most in the minds of the poor and the weak, and ironically, it is they who needed to be reassured about the government's adherence to the rule of law.

Like the judiciary, people also had faith in the impartiality and objectivity of the CBI and the State CID. Over the years, a feeling has been strengthened that pressures are built up to get their (CID's) findings tailored. Firstly, since their reputation for objectivity is their principal strength, any

decline in their credibility is found to lead to confrontation in the streets. Secondly, a government that destroys its instruments, would be left with nothing else to apprise it of the truth. Nothing is so suicidal as self-delusion.

Half-baked laws to which large segments of the people are opposed, have also generated violent reactions. It ought to be an accepted norm in a democracy to throw up every proposed social and economic legislation for public debate. The legislature is then armed with as complete data as can be. The government too acquires the necessary moral authority to enforce a legislation, backed up by such a consensus and opposition to such a measure is considerably blunted. These simple facts have been often ignored, leading to needless post-legislation tension. Worse, that a measure should have to be watered down or withdrawn in the wake of such violence. Amongst the laws that have led to a lot of violence are those relating to ownership of immovable property and trespass. Only if the government had the will and the mechanism to remove unrealistic legislations from the Statute Book, a lot of tension could be relieved. The need of such a mechanism is even greater in a society in transition, like ours. Transforming an essentially feudal order into a democracy is a trying exercise. The pace has to be measured and constantly monitored. Again, for a society like ours still seeking its equilibrium, agitations, demonstrations and rallies are a common feature. A sympathetic and sensitive administration at the State as well as the local level could channelise it into an orderly expression of protest; an insensitive one would lead to confrontations. One of the largest rallies in the Capital in recent decades was held in December 1978, ostensibly to celebrate the birthday of an important political leader. Considering the foul mood of the supporters of that leader (who, they believed, had been unjustly ousted from a high position in the government) the residents of the Capital trembled in fear. Lakhs of determined, emotionally charged persons could have held the city to ransom and a bloodbath was the most likely consequence. However, the Delhi Police managed, by a combination of firmness and objectivity, to convince the organisers that while the latter would be free to assemble for felicitating their leader and to express their

grievances, the legal consequences of any violations of law would follow. At the end of it, the Delhi Police had earned the gratitude of the organisers of the rally despite large scale prosecutions for traffic violations as also the appreciation of apprehensive citizens of Delhi. The government too was relieved that a potentially explosive situation had been defused.

While there is need to ensure to the policeman, and, indeed, to all those charged with the responsibility of enforcing law, a certain degree of cover against vexatious legal action, too much of it has tended to make them less responsive and circumspect. In Britain, no such protection is available. Yet, that has not driven the policeman into his shell. Quite the contrary. In fact, this had made the British policeman responsive and circumspect, and a model for policemen the world over. There is no reason why we should not fall in line. A policeman who knows that he cannot get away with his illegal actions under cover of his official obligations, will be less tempted to pander to the illegal orders of his superiors. Additionally, had this country possessed and developed a jurisprudence on torts as the West, perhaps, fewer people would have taken to the streets. But closely linked with it is the vexed question of making justice cheap as well as speedy. Otherwise, as the distinguished British Judge Darling once cynically observed, "the judiciary like the Ritz Hotel (of London) is open to everyone" and, yet, is so distant.

Much of the erosion of faith in our institutions has come from the scant respect shown to them by persons in high positions. The worst examples have been set by ministers who have openly criticised and even imputed motives to judges whose judgments, they did not like. One important political leader has gone to the extent of calling for the dismissal of such judges. The Speaker of a Legislative Assembly decided to 'set aside' a High Court judgment, because "the legislature is the repository of the peoples will"! Little wonder that organised violence should have followed one judgment of the Supreme Court.

Vacillation in the handling of an organised agitation has been a common feature of most state governments. The invariable drill, which most rabble rousers have now come to

believe as normal, is that whatever may be legitimacy of a demand, a government's reactions would be halting and largely evasive. If the agitators remain firm in their resolve, the government declares the proposed strike or agitation illegal. The district authorities are told to deal with the situation with firmness.

Neither the agitators nor the district authorities, wiser with precedents, do really take the government at its word. As a routine, cases are registered and arrests made. Behind this facade of firmness is often a sponge soft administration. Agitators know that all that they need is patience and determination. Soon, the inevitable truce is announced, followed by directions from a 'generous' government that arrested persons should be released and cases dropped. If there has been use of force to contain violence, judicial enquiry is announced and police officers concerned transferred. Even *ex gratia* payments for dead and injured amongst the law-breakers would be announced. An impression has been created during the years that agitations are profitable business.

There would be many instances to substantiate this conclusion, but the UP electrical engineers' strike of 1973 could take the cake for gross mishandling. It assumes importance because that was the precursor of the mutiny of PAC and policemen who too had been nursing grievances for years, but would not be heeded because (so they believed) they could not agitate.

It all began in January 1973 with the hunger strike by a few engineers. The government responded firmly. In a long press note government informed the people of how much it had already conceded, whatever else was being considered by a Commission and yet, how 'unreasonable' were the engineers. Citizens were bravely assured that alternative arrangements had been made and the engineers would not be allowed blackmail, the people and the government. The engineers ignored the warnings and went on the planned strike a week later. When there were cases of sabotage, the much trumpeted alternative arrangements went 'haywire'. For a while, the government, possibly ignorant of the real situation continued to put up a show of firmness. Instructions went to the district magistrates and police that the law should take its course. A little

latter another set of instructions from the government were truly amazing. District authorities were told that legal proceedings against the engineers should *not* be carried to their logical conclusion!

In the mean time, nearly 150 senior engineers had been arrested. The services of several others had been terminated. When that led to a near total power break-down, the government were under pressure to negotiate. Emboldened, even the engineers of other departments threatened to make common cause with the Electricity Board Engineers. The government eventually yielded. Possibly as part of the deal, the Chairman and the Secretary of the State Electricity Board were transferred, arrested persons released and criminal cases were withdrawn. Despite several acts of sabotage and violence, the agitating engineers were able to muster considerable support because several of their, wholly legitimate grievances had remained unattended due to the government's smugness and indecision. But under pressure, the authorities were willing to condone even the anti-social and criminal activities of the striking engineers.

Had the legitimate grievances of the UP Electricity Board engineers' and doctors' strike (that followed) been promptly attended to and then the government had firmly dealt with the agitators according to the law, the PAC and Police mutiny could have been averted. The clumsy, indecisive way in which the government had dealt with those various agitations, left few in doubt that even legitimate grievances might not be redressed except under threat of agitation while even wholly untenable demands were achievable if those could be backed by organised defiance. In the case of the Police and the PAC, nothing would be more apt than to recall what the Prime Minister said soon after assuming office—"We have ignored our Police for long". Governments have often ignored the well-known principle of administration that nothing is more dangerous than unresolved issues over which large segments of the population are agitated. It was worse because policemen who had been called upon to handle the agitators could not have missed to learn the tempting lesson that the only way they could make their voices heard was to go to the engineers' and doctors' way.

As if to compound the mismanagement of the two agitations, the State Government took another suicidal decision. In order to earn cheap popularity, they countermanded a very sensible and firm decision of the previous ministry to make student unions optional in the State. After the Unions had been made optional in early 1970, the professional politicians amongst the students lost all their clout and the State had, for once, enjoyed an uninterrupted academic session. Seldom are consequences of releasing a frankenstein faced so soon. These student politicians, inebriated by their success in getting the previous decision revoked, held the Lucknow University to ransom. By a strange quirk of circumstances, the striking students and agitating policemen, who had met each other only in adversary situations came together to become the principal cause of the ouster of the ministry in June 1973.

There was another fallout of this tragic episode. After it was decided to invoke Article 311 2(c) to summarily dismiss the Police and PAC activists, the authorities again developed cold feet. A generous view was sought to be taken on the ground that if too many were dismissed, they might take to crime and their families would starve. Many of them were, in fact, taken back into the service. In order to achieve the short-term objective of "peace for the time being". It was forgotten that public interest would have been served much better had the same concern and generosity been displayed for the half fed, half clad families of those who had served the State with dedication, discipline and integrity. One of the tragic consequence of this lopsided approach of the administration has been that the loyal and the law abiding seem to have gone out of the reckoning while the rabble-rousers corner attention.

An important factor in ensuring adherence to the rule of law in the law enforcement agency and the citizens alike is the choice of the State's Police Chief.

Only an officer of high integrity, vision and competence is able to earn the respect of the men and the public. Quite often, such an officer is unwelcome because he would not be a party to the advancement of narrow partisan objectives of questionable legal validity. Perhaps, the PAC mutiny of

1973 would have been averted if the State Government of that time had not committed the shortsighted folly of replacing a very respected and competent State Police Chief by another of a questionable past only because the government looked for a pliant person. But seldom had nemesis overtaken the wrong-doer so soon as in this case. In just two years, that State ministry was swept away by the forces of indiscipline and disorder it had itself, possibly unwittingly, unleashed. Extra organisational pressures has considerably damaged the control system and weakened the normal chain of command. This, as the National Police Commission have said, "resulted in the atrophy of the supervisory structure". Once damaged, it takes years to repair. Its scars stay for decades. Even the best of systems entrusted to soiled or incompetent hands will soon be rushed and disfigured.

Another lesson that must be learnt—sooner or later—is that governmental terror can never be an answer to the enlarging shadows of collective defiance of law. The only way it can be handled is to end the dichotomy between loud professions of attachment to rule of law and private encouragement to illegal shortcuts.

It is a problem, every Indian must face and help to resolve. One possible solution may lie in a national round table such as one which preceded the passage of the Parliament Act of 1911 in Britain. Corrupt practices in national elections, then became a genuine national concern because those threatened to fragment and destroy the nation. Wise counsels prevailed. All political parties sat around the table to vow outlawing corrupt practices during elections. It shows that nation's vitality that once they decided to shun corrupt practices till 1977 at least, there had been no election petition on these grounds. A similar display of maturity is called for.

Collective Violence: Policy and Administrative Implications

S. Venugopal Rao

Much has been written and said about collective violence and the socio-political and economic environment which breeds it, but enough thought does not appear to have been given to the administrative and policy implications of the impact of collective violence on society. It has often been left to the bureaucratic structure to deal with violence in whatever form it manifests, and this is invariably attempted on the basis of exigencies of the situations and ad hoc decisions. In this paper, an attempt is made to project the impact of collective violence on the institutions which are designed to contain it.

All forms of violence, including collective violence, have to be perceived by the state as a challenge to its authority and primary responsibility to maintain social harmony. In respect of individual violence, the problem is comparatively easy, since it is limited to a formal confrontation between the state and the individual in isolation. The problem of determining the degree of violence and dealing with the individual involved in it as a perpetrator is no more than adjudication and punishment which constitutes the judicial process. Decision-making in this regard follows a pre-determined pattern within a rigid framework of rules and has therefore the requisite element of social acceptability. On the other hand, collective violence involves large groups and sections of people who nurse a deep sense of deprivation and are dissatisfied with the state and its policies. The state is required to deal with them with all the resources that it can

command and put down collective violence firmly and promptly albeit within the framework of law. But by the very nature of strategies and operations involved, a qualitative change in the organization becomes inescapable, and the institutions response to collective violence degenerates into soulless performance and brutality.

The police, as the state's major instrument of social regulation comes into a head-on confrontation with collective violence, and the usual response to it is counter-violence. It has also to be noted that collective violence is associated with some degree of social support. Over the years, we have witnessed a steady and progressive trend of acceptance of large groups embarking on the path of agitation leading to violence at some stage. This element of social support to collective violence directly or indirectly has also contributed to an unprecedented degree of denigration of the police system, since it is only through an erosion of the impact and effectiveness of the control system that the political objectives groups indulging in violence can be achieved. Thus, contrary to the general impressions, the visibility of police violence becomes higher and at times even exaggerated and distorted. This is not to say that the police do not overreact in some situations, but our own experience has shown that in all instances of countering collective violence, there continue to be relentless efforts on the part of some sections of the community to project the police in an unseemly light—a trend which has its own impact on the organization's performance.

Accepting that collective violence emerges from time to time due to a variety of tensions in society over which the police have no say whatever, the state has given legal and resource support to the police to counter it. Police is thus an organization which can be considered as violence-oriented. It is also a part of the police philosophy and administrative strategy that while using violence to counter violence, it considers it justifiable to adopt questionable means to attain a desirable objective, viz., social harmony. Therefore, while authorizing the use of force, the emphasis is laid on minimizing it. Indeed, this continues to be the sheet-anchor of our law to support state violence against collective violence of

anti-social groups and sections.

While our law, which restricts or minimizes the use of force is laudable, we must take into account that any assumption that police violence will be curbed by mere rules and laws may not be valid as it ignores the pressures and motives which come into play in dealing with violence on a large scale. What actually occurs in the field is that while the organization is governed by a set of laws for minimization of violence, other forces arise from the situation in which a higher degree of violence is provoked.

When the police used violence to counter violence, we must also take into account the potential for excessive violence by the police themselves. At the same time, monitoring such potential carries a number of problems. Restrictions and instructions regarding handling of violence, restrictions have to be necessarily vague due to the difficulties in visualizing and spelling out the situations in which counter violence may have to be used or in which it can be avoided. All administrative structures empowered to use violence to control aggressive and agitational situations are aware of the concept of minimal force, but in practice, find it difficult to determine what is the minimum for a given situation. No one can say except the man on the spot, what type of force has to be used, when and how it has to be regulated. We must implicitly accept that no law can prescribe these parameters and inhibit the freedom of action and judgement of those entrusted with such a difficult task. This leads to the second stage of our conceptualization, *viz.*, that given the generality of most restrictive rules, the legitimacy of violence has to be ascertained after the event. The author is aware that there is a general opposition to the judicial enquiries which are ordered after eruptions of violence and police responses thereto, but such fact-finding efforts are necessary in the long run to lend support and strength to the enforcement system working under enormous pressures and tensions.

The above observation supports the view that organizational survival of the police depends upon managing not only primary collective violence from groups and sections pitted against the state, but also on secondary violence, *viz.*, violence arising from the organization's counter-violence. In

the long run, the latter may be more likely than primary violence to reduce community acceptance, staff morale, and to distort citizens' perception of the police. It is not as hard to cope with conflict as with the escalation of conflict. By counter-violence, the police may keep peace and pursue its goals, but inevitably, new problems are created. This is what has happened in recent times in some parts of the country, and deserves to be given due attention.

It has been mentioned earlier that there are situations and circumstances when it is not only justifiable for the state to use force, but when it becomes obligatory and inescapable. Each of us has a clear obligation to defend and uphold the Constitution and enforce the laws. A particular group may feel aggrieved with the state or have acute differences with it, but in a liberal state, there must be ways and means of settling them without recourse to force. While our position is quite clear in the case of an external attack, the responsibility for tasks relating to internal security has become a matter of serious controversy in recent years. Questions may arise whether the civil police can take up these tasks as a natural extension of their enforcement function or should the responsibility be shared by the police and para-military forces or even by the Army. Whatever may be the agencies which are called upon to deal with such highly sensitive situations, there are some basic principles to be kept in view. First and foremost, the security agencies must operate entirely within the framework of law. If the existing laws are ineffective or inadequate to deal with violent eruptions, the democratic pattern of society must have in-built reserves to strengthen the laws to deal with such situations in an effective manner and to prevent escalation of violence. The use of extra legal powers or circumventions of the law has generally aggravated tensions.

This problem has arisen particularly in regard to terrorism and extremist activities. It is difficult to view these two forms of violence as collective violence, since by and large, they are hit-and-run crimes committed not in groups, but individually and in places where such aggressions are least expected. All the same, they have to be perceived as part of collective violence as they are committed and facilitated by the support

which they get from the public, either on account of ideological fervour or naked fear. Terrorist activities viewed in this light represent a form of collective violence, although they do not always manifest in group violence. From the very nature of this kind of violence, it becomes necessary to adopt new strategies and techniques of dealing with them.

The reason why this aspect has been raised is whether in the light of our concepts of use of minimum force while containing violence there is sufficient minimal force at the command of the state to contain really serious threats to its stability. Recent experience shows that the police are clearly unable to cope with the emerging situation. This may be due to lack of political will or organizational efficiency or both. The recent events also project the unpleasant fact that unless the police are well-trained and equipped and have the necessary resources, the chances of maintaining stability in our conflict-ridden society would become vastly difficult. In short, while the doctrine of minimal force is a sensible one for a democracy, we should constantly re-examine the level of force required to cope with the changing threats and rising levels of violence in our society. There is no room for any complacency in this regard. Another related matter which requires to be constantly kept in view is, the extent the security agencies themselves are vulnerable to subversion. Terrorist activities have the capacity to infiltrate into the best of security systems as we have witnessed in recent times. The administrative policy in regard to this extremely delicate and sensitive facet of law enforcement and control of violence must be cognizant of this harsh reality, however unpalatable it may be.

The state has also to cope regularly with collective violence emerging from communal and caste conflicts. Communal violence is not pitted against the state but represents an ugly and menacing form of inter-sectional animosities which flare up without notice and, at times, on trivial issues. The frenzy of communal conflagrations converts normally law-abiding persons of a society into irrational groups which take violence to unprecedented levels of brutality and inhumanity. Although we have experienced such incidents repeatedly, there is a tendency to repeat the same

administrative errors and failures. How can we deal with such manifestations of violence except through impartial, prompt and ruthless exercise of force at the very initial stages ? It is because the running sores of the communal virus are not perceived in time, and the requisite element of force is not used in time, that much damage has been done. Quite often, dilatoriness, partisanship, hesitancy, lack of initiative and political intervention have contributed to enormous loss of life and property. Do we have any administrative policy in this regard ? The National Police Commission has no doubt spelt out the administrative and organizational steps which can be implemented in dealing with communal violence. But we still need a clear-cut policy, uninhibited by political considerations. Collective violence on account of this particular facet of our social life can be controlled to a remarkable extent if the administration is not only geared for such eventualities, but, allowed to act with determination, independence, and purpose.

In examining collective violence, the most familiar theoretical concept is that of sub-cultural violence propounded by Wolfgang and Ferracuti in 1967. It conceives groups which encourage and rationalize violent responses towards other groups in certain situations. While such sub-groups of violence can exist for long in social harmony, they can turn violent at critical points of time due to changes in perception. This contingency is ever present in a society which has widespread cultural diversity, despite a facade of unity. Thus, socio-cultural developments and the play of power among such groups can create conflicts. This is, in short, a form of large-scale alienation which creates a sense of deprivation and hostility among large sections of people. So long as this alienation is confined to individuals, our normal administrative and regulatory processes can contain them, but when this alienation becomes widespread and encompasses large groups, the capacity of the regulatory system is perilously eroded. The manner of containing collective violence arising from such factors must transcend the normal administrative postures and to be strong and vibrant enough. It is, therefore, of paramount importance to ensure that the polity in a multifaceted cultural system as ours must be in a

position to anticipate such cracks and devise the national policy, unfettered by narrow political and transcient goals. This requires statesmanship of high order; and from this point of view, the problems of collective violence have to be handled not merely in an impersonal fashion, but in relation to higher political goals and national security.

What has been said about the larger socio-cultural groups in a society is also applicable to the composite organizations which are entrusted with the task of containing culture conflicts and consequential collective violence. Here again, any regulatory agency like the police consists of people drawn from different sub-cultures and value-systems based upon religion, caste, community, language, region, etc. A nation of the size and diversity as India has to ensure that the regulatory system is not weakened by alienated individuals or groups within it. The need for higher levels of recruitment and training, to instil the sense of togetherness and commonality of purpose cannot be over-emphasized. The occasional deviances in such organizations have to be carefully analyzed and corrective steps taken before it is too late.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that we should examine the administrative and criminal justice machinery not in isolation, but in the context of the state of our society, the values of which we are trying to protect and the escalation of violence which may be anticipated in frightening proportions in the near future on account of sub-cultural violence. It should be clear to the policy-makers that the progressive increase of collective violence in the country may not be amenable for effective treatment within the four corners of our criminal justice system as it is structured today. Our concern for the system is rational in relation to our principles and values, but it is also equally necessary that it should not be allowed to be exploited by a few to subvert and destroy the very institutions which we are trying to preserve. The escalation of collective violence demands a fresh look at the existing justice machinery which should be oriented towards protection of democratic values and human rights of the victimized majority, whereas it is presently poised heavily on the side of those who have little or no respect for our democratic aspirations. It is also of equal importance that the institutions designed to achieve this objective are managed in an efficient and objective manner to command the respect for the rule of law.

Discussion

The government's own lack of faith and the administration's lack of faith in the rule of law and their anxiety to keep the letter of the law intact and at the same time destroy its spirit, which has itself been the major cause of lot of collective violence that you see in the country. The difficulty that the nation is facing is that we are worried about the crisis management. And the crisis at the moment engulfs a large sector of society, particularly those who are in power. When one is in power, may be at the ministerial level or at the level of police or at the level of ministry or other, one finds that it is a feudal attitude which tries to run a democratic system. The feudal attitude by itself is a problem because we start behaving like a Maharaja when we are in power and arbitrariness is part of our approach and that is why we act as Maharajas, as Governors and we, therefore, issue the type of orders that may be contrary to the spirit of the Rule of Law. The difficulty at the moment is that governments are composed of two components—the political aspect and the other of bureaucratic. Now we have done enough in this country to harm each other. The political wing has done a lot to undermine its faith in the bureaucracy and bureaucracy in its turn, has paid back the compliment.

Our concern for the system is rational in relation to our principles and values, but it is also equally necessary that it should not be allowed to be exploited by a few to subvert and destroy the very institutions which we are trying to preserve. Administrative and other policies of the government which contribute to collective violence—we see wrong policies being pursued, policies of self-aggrandisement, policies for gaining short-term political benefits, policies of appeasement, which result sooner or later in collective violence. Also these wrong policies of the government have the effect

of eroding the strength of the state apparatus for dealing with such violence, the apparatus for maintaining law and order, the apparatus for dispensing justice.

The adherence or violation of the concept of Rule of Law is being reflected in the form of collective violence which is seen so often in our country. The enactment of half baked laws which are seldom thrown for public debates lead to controversies and degeneration of law and order. In order to appreciate the "rule of law" the following points could be highlighted :

1. Do the government and people alike have respect for the law of the land ?
2. Is the government of the country conducting itself in accordance with the law which we have given to ourselves ?
3. Have the various organisations created by the constitution themselves observed certain minimum standards in matters of both substance and procedure ?

The willingness to amend law at the very first provocation makes laws very weak. Breakdown of rule of law generates a collective display of contempt for law. Quite often, it is the policies of the government which are the direct cause of collective upsurge and violence, often these have tended to encourage collective defiance. Tardy enforcement of law encourages violence, so does implementation of laws which do not have wide social acceptance. Governmental terror can never be an answer to the enlarging collective defiance of law. Organs created by the Constitution or law have not been functioning effectively. At times even the government machinery may perform in such a way that they may attempt to meet their own goals through short-cut methods. Justice must come in time without any delay and without any illegal short-cuts. Governmental terror can never be an answer to the enlarging shadow of collective defiance of law. The only way to deal with the problem is to end the dichotomy between professions of adherence to rule of law and resort to illegal short-cuts in practice.

Are our legal weapons adequate enough to deal with the

challenge thrown by the collective violence? It is the primary responsibility of the state to maintain social harmony. Collective violence involves large groups and sections of people who nurse a deep sense of deprivation and are dissatisfied with the state and its policies.

Police is an organisation which can be considered as violence-oriented but the concept of using minimum force for obtaining social harmony is part of the police philosophy. This leads to questions like who has to decide about using force and at what stage and with what measures. While the doctrine of minimal force is a sensible thing for a democracy we should constantly re-examine the level of force required to cope with the changing threats and rising levels of violence in the society.

It is necessary for organisational survival of the police to manage both—primary and secondary violence. The whole range of collective violence whether political, communal, etc., have to be dealt with by the police in right manners. This certainly involves a clear understanding of the administrative structures empowered to use violence to control aggressive and agitational situations. However, these should not be examined in isolation but with reference to various factors such as sub-culture, value systems, caste-groups, religion of the country.

The most familiar theoretical concept while examining collective violence is sub-cultural violence. We should examine the administrative and criminal justice system in the context of the state of our society, the values of which we are trying to protect and the escalation of violence which may be anticipated in frightening proportions in the near future on account of sub-cultural violence. Time has come to re-design the system. This should be oriented towards democratic aspirations so that it could command the respect of the rule of law.

The need of higher levels of recruitment, training of the regulatory agencies are essential inputs to an efficient and effective functioning. The atmosphere must be created to command the respect for the rule of law.

The paradoxes inherent in political system and social system create conflicting situation in the society. The entire

democratic processes are prone to generate collective violence if not pursued in proper perspective. The country's social structure has an in-built make-up to generate imbalance due to cultural, regional and social factors. Superficially the role of law and order administration seems to begin only when violence erupts in the society. But it is not true. The role must be seen by an agency which not only prevents and quells the acts of collective violence but which does not allow the situation to be aggravated by its partisan behaviour. Preventive measures did not come under the political or partisan considerations. In order to perform this role the police should take help of specialised agencies such as Intelligence Bureau and CID. The police should also be trained to collect information regarding the causative factors behind any incidence of the collective violence. Therefore, this aspect of police work is vital and needs more emphasis.

It is a fact that collective violence, no matter how much it is decried, no matter how much it is criticised, has resulted time and again in changing the policy of the government. Collective violence has achieved results which were not achieved when same demands were being voiced in a peaceful, constitutional and lawful manner. This of course results in the wrong lesson going home, namely, that if you want to achieve anything with the type of governments that we have, resort to violence and chances are that you will get away with something being conceded. Also, in the aftermath of collective violence, certain steps are taken which amount to violating the very basic concept of the rule of law and equal justice to all citizens. There are also quite often administrative compromises which cause demoralisation of the administration, and decisions forced by collective violence have resulted sometimes in changing the history of that part of the country. The question arises : should collective violence be allowed to reap dividends which would not have accrued by normal lawful and peaceful methods, or should a premium be put at collective violence by the administration as well as by the policies which are pursued by the government in the wake of such violence ? Obviously, the answer is: This is not how it should be. Unfortunately, this is how it does take place more often than not. Now, this being the

state of affairs and this having been highlighted in sufficient details by the speakers who have read out their papers, what should be the response ?

It is widely known as well as accepted at all hands that the government should be sensitive to the simmering grievances and also take steps for prompt redressal of legitimate grievances. It is accepted by everyone that a firm stand should be adopted after exhausting all avenues of redressal of the legitimate grievances by negotiations, by compromise, etc. It is also accepted that once you adopt a firm stance, that should not be compromised no matter what sorts of pressures has been built up. It is also accepted by everyone that enforcement by law should be consistently firm and fair, it is also unexceptional that unwanted interference in the process of law enforcement and dispensation of justice should be avoided. More basically, looking beyond the immediate dealing of the collective violence, there should be a greater concern for the weaker sections, the deprived sections, the oppressed sections of society because it is these strains caused by deprivation, caused by oppression which, at some stage, rupture the social fabric of the society. Now all these unexceptionable responses are known to senior politicians and the bureaucrats manning senior positions. They are all aware of what the correct response ought to be, and yet the unfortunate fact is that at the end of nearly three decades of Independence, we are farther away from a civilised society solving their problems in peaceful manner, the collective violence, the ugly monster of ugly violence is raising its head.

Number of commissions have been appointed. They have made excellent suggestions. They made recommendations which, if fulfilled, if implemented would have given tremendous relief in all these cases. Lots of seminars of this type have been held and yet we are farther away from finding the right solution than we were at the time when we became independent. The contradiction is that our rulers want to have the prestige of democracy and reap the benefits of feudalism. Now, understandably, it is the politics of protest which manifests itself in violence and escalating violence. We go on emphasising that we should do the right thing for

the under-dog, and when it comes to doing how much we fall short of the expectations. We have aroused in that poor man who, until 1947, had resigned himself to the fate that it was all ordained by God and he had no hand in making our un-making the situation. Having made him believe that he is an equal partner in this great adventure of nation-building, having given him the political power, when we deny him economic opportunities, then the trouble begins. As long as there is a gap in the promise and the performance of the government, we must expect violence. Social change is bound to evoke a certain amount of resistance. We have not done anything to match the consequences, the follow-up of the change, to match that with adequate infrastructural institutions. Unless and until we mean what we want to do, honestly, sincerely and do it with a view to arrive at the results that were intended, we will have violence, we should have violence.

What is the meaning of rule of law ? Because, even when effort is made to enforce rule of law there is serious collective violence. Is the concept something which is static or by rule of law we mean something which is progressive in concept ? Should the rule of law not go on changing according to the perceptions that go on changing in society ? The rule of law should change whenever there are changes in the economic and social perceptions, and these perceptions go on changing. The rule of law should be in tune with these changes. Should not the rulers of the political leaders respond to those changes which are taking place and because of which the discontent is coming ? Perhaps some agitations are taking place because the masters are not responding to the changes which should take place in social and economic structure in order to meet the aspirations of the people.

The collective action with genuine grievance has got to be supported, has got to be legitimised and it has got to be made a part of our whole social process. Viewing collective action, including collective violence, as every time destructive, non-functional, is, sometimes, missing the point. Group action or collective action need not be collective violence and even without violence. Force can also be without violence and group action can be definitely without violence. Collective

violence does take place and gets accentuated and repeated because we have disparity between professions and practice of the policymakers. This can be corrected in two ways. Either we give up the professions of being pro-poor or we give up the practice of being pro-rich. This can be corrected in one way that is we actually become in practice pro-poor and profess also continuously being pro-poor, then there will be less of collective violence.

In recent years we are attempting and bringing the professions towards the practice, and that will only be postponing collective violence and not otherwise. There are forces outside the political leadership also which make them bend which prompt them to take action in favour of the people surrounding them. It is not only the political representatives but there are other interest groups who constitute a significant part of the larger society, as a whole. If government machinery permits continuance of exploitation, then we will have the same problem because exploitation will continue and people will not accept that position.

Whatever we may perceive of the violence, we may keep in mind the fact that we are not in a static state of affairs. We are a very large state as a nation because we are in the process of 'nation-state-formation', and three decades in the process of nation-state-formation is not a long time. Nation-state-formation is not a long time. Nation-state-formation as a concept is basically linked with the industrial revolution and development. The induction of industrial revolution and development by itself recreates new social relationship, upset some relationships, generates new relationships, both vertically and horizontally. Now this generates protests. Those who are losing, they protest. Those who are not getting enough, they raise protests. In the formation of nation-state those identities—smaller minority, we may call them religious or whatever, they feel very insecure. Their insecurity is also expression of themselves in this situation. Whenever a nation as a whole is in a ferment and is trying to bring about readjustment with new realities and situation, these aspects cannot be viewed only in terms of violence and non-violence. These who are for the *status quo* they are makers of the law. Therefore, those who want to regulate the process of

change in their own light are also the law-givers. That is where the protest movement take birth. And that is where the protest movement, the dissent movements should not be viewed in the same way as we view common criminals.

The difficulty comes in when you have a police angle, there is hardly a distinction between the movement of dissent and the movement of protests and the common criminality. That is also a fact that the political failure is that the situations which can be and should be resolved politically are not resolved politically. Punjab and Assam are both examples of this, that basically a problem is political, has been sought to be dealt with via police methods. We have failed both politically as a result and via police methods also.

It is not a question of whether a policeman is good or not. It is a question basically that what type of organizational structure of the police can fit in with the new process of change. Is it good? Unless you have a cosmopolitan character of the police in a cosmopolitan city, you cannot adequately deal with the situations emanating in a cosmopolitan city. Limitations come in, prejudices come in, our own inclinations come in. Whatever the reports may have come in up till now, it has not been adequately spelt out the type of reforms that are required except the discussion on facilities. They are two distinct things. We should extend facilities to the low-paid policemen, but we should also clear the structural reforms. When we are thinking and dealing with the situation, we must keep in mind the fact that violence is something which is generating violence. Police violence has been talked of at many forums. But this is not the way. Handling the situation tactfully is something different than only coming straight to violence. Feudal attitudes refer to the arbitrary attitudes. Arbitrary attitudes create more problems because when we are in power we think differently. The state has also to think that the collective violence of the state against the citizens boomerangs and creates new situations.

V: DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE

Development, Change and Collective Violence

*N.C. Saxena**

The phenomenon of collective violence can be studied from several perspectives. The pacifist is concerned with the moral and philosophical underpinnings of violence and appropriate conditions for its use. He may argue that in a liberal democracy which allows its citizens ample opportunity for peaceful change, a citizen is never justified in using violence. The lawyer is concerned with the legality or illegality of violence and disorder. To him it is a constitutional problem. He may argue that agitations may be tolerated as long as these do not become violent.

But law and morality are by their very nature partisan and partial towards what already exists. Such approaches would always tend to blame those who start violence. Thus it is the worker and not the economic system, the poor and not the unjust social order, the frustrated and not the unkind authority structure who would be blamed for violence. To equate the first act of aggression with the cause is to arrest a long chain of social causation arbitrarily and conveniently at a point where the blame can be shifted from the system to its victims.

A social scientist is not so much concerned with the morality or legality of violence as with the social and cultural conditions which give rise to and sustain collective violence. He is more interested in questions like, what conditions give rise to different forms of political protest? Are these conditions

*Views expressed are personal and do not bind the Organisation for which the author works or has worked in the past.

economic, political, social or psychological in nature ? What forms does protest assume once it has arisen ? What is the social composition of violent crowds ? What ideologies do these groups adopt, profess and propagate ? What is the pattern of leadership ? Does economic development exacerbate or mitigate social violence ? What are the major directions and targets of their action ? I am sure these are the issues we would be confronted with in the Seminar, rather than with the ethical or legal aspect of violence.

Collective violence is a crude way of communication. Sometimes it communicates rage, anger and frustration, on other occasions it reflects deep lamented desire to bring in radical changes in social order. It may be used to extract concessions from the authorities or it may be designed to overthrow the established political order.

There could be two extreme forms of collective violence. In one form the disorderly activity takes place without preparation or organisation. For instance, in Calcutta in 1958, the Fire Brigade advertised for candidates for 100 Firemen's jobs. At the time of interview 20,000 candidates turned up which frightened the authorities and they closed recruitment for the day. The crowd exploded and started destroying whatever came in their way. The immediate event may be insignificant but it is seen as an unendurable irritant leading to eruption of violence. This reflects deep seated frustration and dissatisfaction with the existing social order, which is perceived as incapable of change through organised activity. We may term such violence as 'violence of despair'.

In other pattern, the participants possess leadership and organisational capacity to articulate a grievance, to mobilise human and financial resources and to command a following. Violence may not be openly organised by the group but the events leading to it are generally organised. The prelude to violence is visible, it has a clear beginning in terms of publicly taken decision or action. Violence as seen in Assam and Punjab in recent years would fall in this category. It is certainly a goal directed activity. The agitators realized that there is a certain scale of violence which if reached would force the Government in taking a decision in their favour.

Agitational politics in India is always perceived to be more

effective. Unfortunately, Government also judges the intensity of popular feeling on any subject by the number of bunds and riots it has evoked. It disregards all demands which are not coupled with a threat to public order as not having public sanction behind them. The test for gaining attention from the government becomes therefore the size of crowd and the amount of disorder which a particular demand can generate. Even within the Assembly, the Opposition Members often resort to violence in order to attract attention. Politics in India has, therefore, become more a matter of mass mobilisation in the streets rather than a matter of accommodation and discussion in the legislatures.

Factors which are responsible for growth of collective violence in society may be economic, political, social or psychological.

There appears to be no agreement as to what kinds of economic conditions lead to collective violence. Marxists point to a gradual economic decline and depression, accompanied by increasing impoverishment of the masses. Slow economic progress which creates expectations from new population groups that the economy is unable to fulfil can also produce social protest. On the other hand, rapid economic growth, like in Iran, may cause social dislocation and the resulting alienation may increase violent behaviour.

Conflicts over power are more fundamental than over material goods. Therefore, study of political conditions would generally be a good pointer to conditions which sustain violence. Loss of power by a group, whether based on religion, region, language, class or caste, is rarely tolerated without a fight and therefore imbalance in existing power structure could lead to collective violence. Moreover certain organised groups in a society like urban groups, students, political parties, etc., have greater threatening power and if their aspirations are not satisfied, they may take to violence.

According to the social approach, modernisation produces a mass society in which social bonds become loose and people develop deep rooted feelings of insecurity. Often development leads to inconsistency between the existing and the normative order. Inequalities may be considered unjust in a modernising society but they do exist and sometimes in a

more acute form—thus leading to anomaly between what exists and what is considered desirable. Development also leads to disequilibrium in the ranks of the people—some may be educated but not rich, some may be rich but not accepted as elite and so on. Such widespread dissatisfaction often breeds violence.

According to the psychological theory, a necessary prerequisite for violence is relative deprivation as perceived by the people as discrepancy between the value expectations and value capabilities of the environment. More severe is relative deprivation, the greater is the likelihood and intensity of violence.

A purely structural or unidimensional theory may be difficult to sustain as so many different and sometime contradictory objective social conditions seem capable of generating violence. In some situations the most manifest cause of violence seems to be violence itself, one instance following another, often without a recurrence of the conditions that led the original event. Violence is thus self-perpetuating. This is often true of communal violence.

Having covered the subject from a theoretical perspective, we would now discuss to what extent modernisation and economic development has affected two forms of violence in India—Hindu-Muslim violence and agrarian violence.

Hindu-Muslim violence started becoming an endemic feature of Indian public life from the early twentieth century. Riots on the occasion of religious festivals took place in those districts of North India where social and political activity on the part of organised groups like the Arya Samaj, Muslim League, Indian National Congress, etc., was prominent. There appears to be a positive correlation between periods of intense rioting and deterioration of relations between the top political leaders of the two communities. The peak of communal frenzy was reached in 1946-48, during which political activity and political mobilisation of the two communities against each other was also at its peak.

After Independence riots have taken place in urban areas with a substantial Muslim population, ranging between 20 to 40 per cent, especially in such towns where Muslim artisans have done quite well in the last 10 years. Within Uttar Pradesh,

western Uttar Pradesh seems to be more riot-prone than eastern Uttar Pradesh. The percentage of immigrant Muslims from Central Asia and converts from high Hindu castes is also higher in western Uttar Pradesh than in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

Many writers have tried to find economic factors behind such riots. Economic argument may be expressed in a number of ways. First, it is asserted that most of the employers, industrialists and middlemen are Hindus whereas most of the employees, workers and artisans are Muslims. Therefore, communal riots are a distorted form of class-conflict. Second, it is hypothesised that there is a competitive conflict of interests within the middle class and the self-employed people over access to a given array of opportunities like government jobs, export contracts, market share, etc. Since identities of groups have already been formed on religious lines which are time-resistant in nature, group clashes occur along communal lines just as in Bihar where there is a clash of interests between caste groups like Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumihars and Kayasthas. Third, it is alleged that communal clashes are deliberately supplanted over the social fabric in order to ensure that the formation of identities on class lines does not take place. Exponents of this explanation find a strong correlation between periods of economic slump in traditional artisan-based activities and periods of communal clashes. Fourth, it is asserted that continued economic crises in our society and persistence of scarcity conditions have led to brutalization of everyday existence leading not only to communal violence but also increased atrocities on women, scheduled castes and members of the weaker sections of the society. In a stagnant economy there would always be greater danger of violence against such members of the society whose existence is marginal, who are not regarded as full members of the society, and who are living beyond the pale of legitimacy in the eyes of the majority group.

It is possible to get evidence in support of each of the above theories from micro-level data. The Moplah riots in Kerala during the period 1836-1921 had a strong component of class conflict as land was owned by Hindus but was cultivated by Moplah Muslims. Ferozabad riots of 1952 also exhibited strong sense of insecurity among the Muslim artisans

as well as desire on the part of Hindu industrialists to take action against their recalcitrant workers.

However, the basic cause behind Hindu-Muslim antagonism of the last 100 years has not been economic, it is rather political in nature. The two groups have never been able to come to an agreement on the nature of an ideal society. The Hindus who would like to define an ideal society as one in which all citizens participate freely in all forms of social interaction with no concern for communal affiliation. In their view, the State should not be concerned with the problems of any group based on religion. It may allow for some degree of cultural diversity but on political matters the State should recognise only individual rights, privileges and duties. Muslims, on the other hand, have perceived lack of protection from the State as tyranny. They would like to believe in policies of political pluralism in which privileges are distributed according to their share in population. State, to them, is a federation of communities. Hence poor representation in elite professions *per se* is perceived as evidence of discrimination which leads to frustration and anger.

In a way, partition of the country enabled the Hindu view point to dominate the emerging politics. Muslims were forced to give up political demands and the fact that they were left in a minority in almost all provinces and districts, they became the only identifiable group in India, unlike regional groups, which cannot convert their cultural identity into a political pressure group. Muslim politicians get elected on sizable Hindu votes and are thus constrained from giving voice to extremist's demands of their community. Although, Muslims feel very strongly about their cultural and educational demands like preservation of Muslims Personal Law, status for Urdu, etc., yet from the view of their political status these are non-issues. These are the consequence rather than cause of the Muslims distorted mind which is due to their non-participation in policies on the terms of their choice.

Thus, Muslims in India have acquired a psychology of a deprived group with feelings of alienation and perceived persecution. An ordinary incident like a Hindu band playing music in front of the Mosque takes on an entirely different meaning in the Muslim mind. They see it as a gross and

violent manifestation of vindictive hostility being perpetrated upon them by the entire Hindu community.

The heritage of partition and the memories of the intense political conflict which took place in the first half of the twentieth century keeps Hindu fears and prejudice alive against Muslims. The school text-books also unfortunately encourage anti-Muslim feelings by raising the culture and values of the majority community.

Viewing the problem from a global perspective, one finds that not only the Third World countries, but the developed countries have also seen emergence of communal conflicts based on region, religion and language. In the 1960s and 70s one witnessed ethnic violence in developing nations like Nigeria, Sudan, Guyana and Malaysia, just as the stability of Western countries like Canada, UK and Belgium was also threatened by strong minority movements. These led social scientists to do rethinking on the relationship between economic development and communal conflict.

It has often been assumed that technological and economic development would lessen communal conflict, as new economic identities would subsume communal categories. This may not always happen. The experience from developing countries shows that communalism is a persistent feature of social change.

When a traditional society starts modernising, competition is often defined and explained in communal language. People perceive their competitive world through a communal prism and personal successes/failures are explained in terms of their communal connections.

As different communal groups are placed at different levels of economic development, the rate of economic growth for these groups may not be the same. Because of earlier Western contacts or cultural predispositions, some groups get mobilised at a faster rate. Thus, another dimension is added to the communal cleavage. Thus in the first half of the 20th century, Muslims often saw themselves as being left behind in the race for education and government jobs and defined the conflict as between rich Hindus and poor Muslims.

Even if government policies try to reduce inequalities in either education, job opportunities, wealth, status or power,

it may lead to greater hostility from the already entrenched group. Reduction of imbalance in one dimension produces increased impatience with the remaining imbalance and thus intensifies communal dissatisfaction. A rich member of the scheduled castes may be more intolerant of patronising behaviour from the upper castes than a poor landless tribal.

Although modernisation produces new kinds of identities and conflicts based upon occupation, class or political affiliation, yet it is possible for human beings to operate at several levels and traditional identities may still persist.

We are not suggesting that development would always excite ethnic bonds in human beings, we are merely cautioning that material satisfaction, under certain circumstances, may heighten communal consciousness. In fact, there is a high degree of indeterminacy in specific outcomes—different groups may react differently to the same set of objective conditions.

Next we discuss the linkages between development and agrarian violence in India.

The popular view about the Indian peasantry being passive, docile and unresisting is not borne out by the facts. During the colonial period Indian peasantry took part in a number of agitations ranging from protest movement to large scale revolts. Mention may be made of Santhal Rebellion (1855-56) Bengal Rent Disturbances (1860-73), Indigo Strike (1859), Deccan Revolt (1857), Champaran Struggle (1917), Khaira and Bardoli No Rent Campaign (1918), Moplah Outbreaks (1836-1921), UP and Bihar Tenant Struggles (1920-38), Tebhaga Movement (1946) and Telengana Uprising (1946-51).

Most of the movements except the Telengana Uprising had limited objective of redressal of specific grievances or of taking revenge against the oppressive landlords. There was no effort to bring in a basic transformation of agrarian structure. The 19th century movements took place in such areas of Bengal, Bihar and Bombay where commercial cultivation of cotton, jute, tobacco and indigo was being encouraged. This led to poor availability of foodgrains for the villagers and created uncertainty of cash accruals for them as output prices kept on fluctuating because of under-development in markets. Thus, the new imperfect commercial relations in

agriculture broke the traditional social ties, disrupted economic equilibrium and created conditions of frustration. However, the 20th century movements often took place in areas where traditional mode of cultivation of foodgrains was still in vogue. In UP, for instance, the movement was directed against illegal levies, and unlawful evictions. The landlords perceived that the incomes of tenants had gone up between 1870-1918 because of rise in prices and productivity. But as rent did not increase in the same ratio and moreover the practice of getting rent in kind was being slowly given up because of government intervention, the landlords perceived a relative fall in their incomes and stated oppressing the tenants to extract surplus from them. In many parts of Cudh, tenants were treated worse than slaves. The involvement of Kisan Sabhas and the Congress provided direction and leadership to the Tenant movements. This led to substantial changes in tenancy laws, and for the first time tenants were provided life tenancies.

One would have expected that after Independence—with greater democratisation, awareness and better means of communications—such movements would grow in strength. Increasing disparities in asset holding and incomes should have produced sharpened conflicts, especially in the green revolution areas in India. It does not seem to have happened. The reasons are many. First, abolition of Zamindari has benefited the rich and middle peasantry and thus the tinge of militancy has been taken out of them. Second, announcement of radical programmes like ceiling on land holdings, SFDA, IRD, etc., have created an impression that the government is keen to help the poor and, therefore, antagonism against the State does not get mobilized into action. Third, although disparities may have increased in quantitative terms but qualitative inequalities whereby the poor were regarded as less than human beings have certainly been reduced. Fourth, although scope for upward mobility is severely limited for the poor, yet the more enterprising among them, who would have otherwise provided leadership for militant movements, have been helped by the State machinery by way of job reservations, political offices, land distribution and credit policies, and thus their class interest has changed. Fifth, the process

of growth of capitalism in agriculture is a slow one and thus class antagonism between the landed and the landless has not become widespread, as vast majority of the poor are tiny land holders, acting as a buffer between the two classes. Sixth, it can be debated whether the poor consisting of landless labourers, marginal farmers, artisans and urban workers share a homogeneity of economic interests. They are a social group rather than an economic class.

Certain features of post-Independence agrarian unrest are worth noting. First, these are concentrated in rice producing areas of Bihar, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. These are neither agriculturally the most advanced regions nor the most backward. Areas where green revolution has been highly successful like Punjab Haryana and western UP as also the backward areas like Madhya Pradesh and Orissa have not witnessed many agitations. Secondly, wet paddy cultivation requires long hours of back-breaking work in mud or deep water and therefore even small peasants were traditionally leasing out their lands to the landless labourers to avoid manual work. Thus share-cropping and sub-tenancy is generally high in these areas leading to high degree of antagonism between land owning non-cultivators and sharecroppers. Third, there is heavy pressure of population on land. Fourth, a large section of population dependent on agriculture in these areas consists of landless labourers. In the districts of West Godawari, Palghat, Alleppy and Tanjavur more than half of the agricultural families own no land at all. Fifth, distribution of land is generally inequitous. Sixth, in some districts like Tanjavur which are under package programme tensions have appeared under conditions of substantial growth in agricultural production. And last, distinctions of class get heightened because of caste; the sharecroppers and agricultural workers belonging to lower castes and the rich cultivators belonging to middle and upper castes.

In many areas of acute tensions like Tanjavur and Alleppy, organisational activity had preceded eruption of violence. This changed the conservative and traditional norms of the poor to egalitarian norms without a corresponding change in the value of the rich. Thus the transformation of the rural society from a harmonic to a disharmonic system gave rise to

agrarian tension. So long as there was a consensus, which was accepted by the poor, that the rich had a right to exploit them and that it was their duty to work for long hours for the rich without expecting adequate rewards, the society remained tension free. The continuance of exploitation combined with the change in belief of the poor in its being unjust produced a potentially violent situation. Introduction of commercialisation and capitalism in agriculture polarises wealth and power; it also shatters the old integrative institutions. It is his combination of awareness about injustice, breakdown of old patron-client relations, continuance of sharecropping and the role of political parties which makes the situation simmer with discontent.

Although agrarian tensions are likely to continue in India in future, they are likely to have a limited objective of redressal of specific grievances within the existing system. There is neither any attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the regime nor to bring in basic transformation on society and government, except during the Telengana Uprising and the Naxalite Movement which could perhaps be classified as agrarian revolts, as there was some attempt to capture State power. Both of these movements failed miserably despite initial success. One general conclusion which could be drawn is that so long as the movement remained broadbased with emphasis on involvement of the people it met with success. When agitational approach and mass mobilization was replaced by terrorist violence and individual killing of class enemies the movement failed.

The history of revolution in other countries proves that misery alone does not cause revolution. It needs widespread deprivation, a belief that government is incapable of action, high class antagonism, weak or divided State machinery and a strong belief in the success of revolutionary struggle. Revolution takes place not against mildly incompetent governments which are failing to solve difficult problems but against deeply detested and tyrannical regimes. Either before or after the emergency it is difficult to describe the Indian Government as burdensome or tyrannical. Even the left parties in India talk of revolution only as a rhetoric and do not mean it seriously. Despite inequality, poverty and injustice, there

are no signs that class is becoming the principal medium for representation and consciousness. Politics in India has been so far centrist in nature and this 'middle-of-the road' policy is likely to continue for many years to come, notwithstanding sporadic agitations and violence.

The main features of the linkage between development and collective violence get highlighted through the enclosed case study.

*Meerut Riots (September-October, 1982):
A Case Study*

Communal riots broke out in Meerut in September-October, 1982. Seven Hindus and 24 Muslims (8 in police firing) were officially stated to have been killed during the riots. Fifty-three Hindus and 27 Muslims received injuries. Thirty-five Hindu and 126 Muslim houses and 3 mosques were damaged. Property worth Rs. 28 lakh was destroyed during the riots.

As regards the general course of events leading to the riot, the Minister of Home Affairs made the following statement in the Rajya Sabha on October 5, 1982:

Sir, there has been a dispute between two communities over a certain place contended to be a place of worship in mohalla Shahgasa in Meerut city. In April, 1982, representatives of both the communities came to an interim agreement for a Magisterial enquiry into the matter. Between April 21, 1982 and August 20, 1982, there were some minor incidents and suitable action under law was taken against the culprits. On August 20, 1982, representatives of both the communities entered into a written agreement to the effect that *status quo* ante as on March 31, 1982 would be restored. This agreement was welcomed by the peace loving citizens but was not appreciated by hard core communalists. There were some minor incidents between August 20, 1982 and September 4, 1982. In the night of September 6, 1982 a cracker exploded in Khandak Bazar. People from both the communities started collecting near the place of explosion. The priest of disputed place of worship was stabbed and he died subsequently. The mob which had collected shouted slogans and pelted

stones on the police force. Police resorted to tear gas and lathi charge to disperse the mob. Curfew was imposed in sensitive areas of the city and the communal elements were apprehended. Some incidents of violence occurred between September 6 and September 11, 1982. District Administration took steps to control the situation. The Chief Minister, Uttar Pradesh, visited Meerut. I visited Meerut on September 13, 1982 along with the Chief Minister, UP and Union Home Secretary and emphasised that Mohalla Peace Committees should be activated, efforts should be made to scotch rumour-mongering and better communication should be established with people to bring about normalcy. The process of restoring normalcy picked up and the Id-ul-Zuha festival was celebrated peacefully. It is unfortunate that incidents of violence have again erupted since September 29, 1982.

Throughout the months of September and October, 1982 a large number of dignitaries visited Meerut, some, a number of times to control the situation, including the Chief Minister of UP, Home Minister, Government of India; and several important Cabinet Ministers from Government of India and the State Government. Serious allegations were labelled against the police force, specially the PAC by Muslims before these dignitaries. It was, therefore, decided by the State Government that the District Administration would receive complaints from the public regarding alleged atrocities, investigate into them and take remedial action.

In all 727 complaints were received. About 92 per cent of them were from the Muslim community. Till the end of September 1983 only 10 per cent complaints could be enquired into. These complaints were given to local civilian officers and referred to destruction of property. About 60 per cent of the investigated complaints were found false and in the rest compensation ranging from Rs. 100 to 400 was given.

The rest 90 per cent complaints referred to police atrocities were sent to the SSP for enquiry, but although almost a year has passed, no enquiry has been done. The District Magistrate's explanation was that since a Judicial Commission has been appointed by the State Government, administrative

enquiry into these complaints has been shelved and the recommendations of the judicial commission will be awaited.

The State Government issued notification for the appointment of a Judicial Commission on the January 21, 1983. The Commission has been asked to submit its reports on the following issues;

- (a) Ascertain the facts regarding the said incidents and the causes which led to those incidents;
- (b) Assessing the justification and adequacy of the force used by the local authorities to control the situation; and
- (c) Assessing and fixing the responsibility and the extent thereof in relation to the said incidents.

As regards the first act of violence which led to riots, the District Administration tried to give an impression that the riots broke out in Meerut town because the Pujari of the disputed temple in Mohallah Shahgasa was murdered on the September 6, 1982. The aggressiveness of the Hindus, unlawful activities of the Hindu communal groups and the police inaction prior to the murder of the Pujari was not highlighted in either the reports of the District Administration or in the national newspapers. But, according to the enquiry report of the Divisional Commissioner, Shri R.D. Sonkar, a number of important incidents took place before September 6 which were not properly handled by the District Administration and which poisoned the relations between the two communities. For instance, on the Janmashtami day August 12, 1982, about 400-500 Hindus tried to enter Kotwali demanding permission for a special mid-night Aarti at the disputed place. Despite their being an un-lawful assembly, only four people were arrested. On the next day, about 250 Hindus agitated before the Kotwali, but only 19 were arrested. All the 23 arrested persons were released on bail from the police station itself due to pressure from the Hindu leaders. On August 20, 22, 1982, September 2 and 4, 1982 pieces of objectionable meat were found in the premises of Jama Masjid, Swamipara Masjid, and Barhwali Masjid, respectively. No arrests were made, although it was clear that attempt was

being made by a section of communal Hindus to provoke Muslims. On September 4, 1982 one Nasir s/o Hanlf was stabbed in a Hindu Mohallah near Nand Ram Ka Chowk. Only one arrest was made on September 5, 1982 regarding this incident.

The murder of Ram Bhole, who was a drug-addict, was handled in an entirely different fashion by the District Administration. Although, till this date the mystery of his murder has not been solved, but according to the District Administration's own version, 114 Muslims were arrested for this crime. Twenty-one Hindus were also arrested in the night between September 6 and 7 for being members of an unlawful assembly and for shouting slogans. Spot enquiries made in Meerut show that they (only Muslims) were subjected to severe beating at the police station. Those who came to the PS to get them released were also arrested and treated similarly. Beating of Muslims has been admitted in the FIR No. 293 dated September 6-7, 1982. A question was asked in the Assembly as to how many people who were arrested had serious injuries when they were admitted to the jail. In the answer to this unstarred question, the State Government admitted serious injuries to 4 people, who were all Muslims, out of whom one admittedly died on September 11, 1982. In the *Statesman* of September 8, 1982, the following report filed by Anil Rana is relevant — "While the police refused to give the exact number of people injured during the clash, the Kotwali police station lock-up had 18 of these arrested. All of them had blood-stained clothes and were pleading with the policemen to get them aid. No attention was paid to their demands, even 14 hours after their arrests."

According to the register maintained at the Kotwali the senior officers including the District Magistrate and the DIG visited Kotwali on September 7 and 8, 1982 a number of times. Thus these cases of severe beating by the police must be within their knowledge.

In the list of those arrested for the murder of Ram Bhole were some educated Muslims who by no stretch of imagination could be called anti-social elements. Mention may be made of Shri Fazlur Rahman who possesses a Master's degree and is a journalist. He is also perhaps a member of Congress

party, but this fact could not be verified. Even the son of city Qazi Zaimul Rashidin was not spared. He was arrested and brutally beaten up. During informal discussions, the officers admitted that his arrest was the most indiscreet one as the town Qazi had been throughout cooperating with the Administration and when his son was not only kept in jail for about 20 days but also badly thrashed up, the attitude of the Qazi changed to insolence. This had important bearing on the communal situation and was to some extent, responsible for Muslim-Police clashes after the September 29.

The pattern of casualties and arrests up to September 15, was as follows :

<i>Item</i>	<i>Hindus</i>	<i>Muslims</i>
Casualties	2	8
Arrested in substantive offences	124	231
Arrested in preventive offences	112	86
No. of people arrested under substantive sections per casualty of the other community	15	115

No Hindu was arrested u/s 302 or 307 IPC. Most of the Hindus were arrested u/s 188 IPC or 151 GPC the rest under 336, 436 IPC, 25 Arms Act and 7 Cr. Law Amendment Act.

Although the police claims to have fired at the Hindu rioters on September 6 and 7, no one got injured. On the other hand, when some Muslims wanted to lodge complaints at the police station regarding attacks on them, the complainants were arrested and serious injuries were inflicted on them. Mention may be made of Haji Mohd. Siddiq Alias Gurji, an 80 year old person, who was severely beaten up at the police station on September 8, when he had gone to lodge a complaint against the attack on his house by anti-social elements. Several Muslims injured during the riots did not go to the government hospital for fear of arrest, thereby substantially reducing the number of injured Muslims in the official records.

Right from the very beginning the District Administration saw the communal riot as instigated by the Muslims and the

Hindu action as retaliation and, therefore, chose to take stern action against Muslims only. The perception of the senior police officials is evident from the affidavit filed by the then SSP, Meerut, Shri J.P. Rai before the Parikh Commission. Excerpts from the affidavit are reproduced below:

On September 6, 1982 when Ram Bhole was killed, the Hindus started shouting slogans and Muslims started pelting stones at the police Situation improved between September 23 and 28. But when the court ordered that the disputed temple may be thrown open to the Hindus, Muslims got gripped with feelings of defeat and annoyance, which increased tension in the town After September 24, Muslims put black flag on the roof of their houses against the police and consequently the Hindus put up red flags in retaliation When the arrested Muslims were released from the jail on September 27, they incited the Muslim community by giving exaggerated accounts of alleged police atrocities. This enraged Muslims because of which the police preparation had to be strengthened In the night of September 29 at about 10.15 p.m. Muslims attacked Hindus in several places of the town at the same time. It appeared as if such attacks were a part of prior planning and conspiracy. Forty-four Muslims had to be arrested On October 1, Devendra Singh was killed and on the same day at about 2.30 p.m. Muslims started attacking the police from Feroze Building with firearms, bombs and grenades Muslims of Machheran started firing at the Hindus of Kaisarganj.

The affidavit does not discuss how 16 Muslims got killed at the hands of the Hindu antisocial elements, although their deaths were officially admitted. Similarly the reports from the administration to State Government highlighted the deaths of Vijay Kumar, Ashok Kumar, Devendra and other Hindus or attacks on the police from Muslims, but made no mention of deaths to Muslims.

Similar biased reports were sent by the District Administration to the State Headquarters. In a note submitted to the Chief Minister by the Home Department regarding the back-

ground and the course of events of the riots, it was stated that ;

On September 6 and 7, 1982 the Muslim community attacked civil police and PAC with stones in which one constable got injured. On September 8 along with fire incidents and stone throwing in various localities, there was again attempt to gherao the Superintendent of Police. The police was subjected to heavy stone pelting by the people belonging to Muslim community There was strong resentment among the Muslims when Zainul was arrested on September 24 and they expressed their resentment by putting up black flags and banners against the PAC. Situation thus became extremely explosive On the September 27 about 100 Muslims tried to gherao the police officials at Sorab Gate Police Chowki and attempt was made to launch attack at the police chowki On September 29, there was simultaneous attack with stones and firearms on the police and the PAC. In addition, police posted at religious places was attacked with bullets.

Thus according to the local administration it was a straight fight between the police and the minority community from the very beginning. Therefore, strong repressive measures had to be taken against Muslims only. A number of issues arise out of this perception. First, the statement made by the Home Minister on the floor of the Rajya Sabha, already quoted, gives a different picture and does not support the conspiracy or the insurgency theory propounded by the District Administration. Second, there appears to be perfect consistency between the version of the District Administration and the action of the police and the PAC in the field. Therefore, there are strong reasons to believe that the brutalities committed by the PAC and the police had full support from the senior officers of the State Government. Third, even if isolated attacks at the police by some Muslim individuals are admitted how far the strategy of meeting such attack with counter violence not sanctioned under law on the entire Muslim community is administratively and morally justified is the main issue which should be seriously considered.

The second phase of the riot which was much more dreadful than the first started from September 30 and lasted till about October 10. The temple-mosque question was lost in the background and it became a direct confrontation between the police and the Muslims. Worst atrocities were committed on October 1 against the residents of Feroze building and Hari-nagar where at least 23 people were shot dead by the PAC. According to a report filed by Rajat Sharma in the October 31, 1982 issue of *Onlooker*, "Steel-helmeted, rifle-wielding jawans forcibly entered the houses, breaking down doors that were not opened. They refused to obey the order of the civil officers and commenced reckless ransacking of the houses. They overpowered everybody inside and beat them up with rifle butts. Then suddenly the jawans opened fire, their weapons aimed at the young males of the family. Frightened and taken aback by the jawans behaviour, the civil officers fled from the scene. More than 100 bodies were removed by the PAC. It is said that 450 houses were raided by the PAC and each house has now at least one occupant who will live with a deformity for the rest of his life. A PWD Engineer was killed in Kotwali area and his 16 year old boy was shot dead at Bhumia Pul. His mother, a convent school teacher was assaulted. The trauma made her go insane. Ustad, a motor mechanic and his helper were shot dead in Shahghasa, their hut was set afire. Sakhawal, a rickshaw puller was killed in Purwa Faiyaz Ali."

Udayan Sharma filed the following report in *Ravivar*, a Hindi weekly, in its issue of October 24, "At the Chauhadda and Bhumia ka Pul localities, the PAC located the houses of Sharif Ahmad, Muzaffar Ahmad, Abdul Islam, Iqbal Ahmad, Shabbir Ali Chunna, Dilshad and Abdul Haleem. The houses of Nazir Ahmad, Ali Hasan, Wajid Ali and Samta wrestler were first looted and then set afire. In the night of October 3, at Machheran and October 2 in Khairnagar, Muslim shops were looted and burnt in the presence of PAC."

Shri B.N. Pande, the then President, UP Congress (I) and now Governor of Orissa, visited Meerut in the third week on September 22, 1982. According to his report "it was unfortunate that the ill-reputed PAC was made incharge of

law and order arrangements in the town. The congressmen also complained that the police beat up Muslims belonging to the Congress party in which several people lost their limbs."

A delegation of MPs visited Meerut on October 6, 1982. Their observations which have been taken from the debates in the Lok Sabha on October 7, are given in the annexure. Except for Mrs Rajendra Kumar Bajpai and Shri Ram Jethamalani all other Members belonging to many political parties bitterly criticised the role of the PAC.

It is significant that neither the Chief Minister, UP on the floor of the Assembly nor the Home Minister during the Lok Sabha debate defended the PAC. The Chief Minister said, "But I do not want to defend the deeds of the PAC. If they have committed mistakes, it is bound to come out during the enquiry. Those found guilty will be punished." The Home Minister observed as follows on October 7 : "Sir, with regard to the role of the PAC, barring a few exceptions, most of the honourable Members have by and large spoken against the role of the PAC there. Therefore, the role of the PAC or the constitution of the PAC and the functioning of the PAC have to be thoroughly gone into by the UP Government. At the present juncture, I would only like to state that it is a 'must' to replace the entire constabulary or the armed constabulary of the State Government with the Central Forces particularly the forces like Border Security Force and the CRPF as in the disturbed areas and the border areas. When I visited Meerut, there were complaints about the behaviour of the PAC. The Chief Minister was also there and in his presence we did tell the District Administration that we were not asking for the replacement of the PAC but whenever there were strong feelings and comments about the PAC, in those particular areas, you could, to that extent, replace them with those of the CRPF. Since then we have given about ten companies of CRPF and five companies of the BSF which are already there. Not only that, there is another point which I have mentioned, that if there is so controversial a position with regard to the PAC then for the time being they should also man it in a manner so that it becomes a mixed force with CRPF, BSF and PAC personnel. And I am sure, the local administration must have employed them in that fashion."

PART II

I visited Meerut on September 29 and 30 and October 1, 1983. I had a long discussion with the officers who were well conversant with the events. Shri Bajpai, Additional City Magistrate was himself present at the Feroze Building incident of October 1. Shri L.P. Mishra was C.O. (City), but now has been transferred to the CID. Shri B.S. Varma, ADM (City); Shri Chaturvedi, SP (City); and Tripathi C.O. (City) joined the district after the riots, but they were also interviewed. In addition, I met Shri K.D. Sharma, History Department, Meerut College; Shri Bhupendra Kumar, Vice President, Vyapar Sangha; Shri Hafiz Ahmad, Vice President, Momin Conference; Shri Brijraj Kishore, President, CPI; and Padamshri Haqim Saifuddin. Before my trip to Meerut I had called Shri Manzoor Ahmad, MLA; and Shri Harpal Singh, Member, Congress Party and Professor of Political Science, NAS Degree College, Meerut for a detailed briefing. I also interviewed Shri Shambhoo Nath, the then District Magistrate, Meerut in Lucknow.

During my stay at Meerut, I was keen to meet the residents of Feroze Building along with the local officers, but they themselves suggested that I should go to the Feroze Building without them as the residents of this building have filed certain writs against the local officers. Shri Bajpai suggested that I may get in touch with Shri A.A. Sabzwari, Advocate, who was quite familiar with the area. Accordingly, I visited Feroze Building, Hari Nagar and the neighbouring areas on October 1 and spent about 4-5 hours with the people of these localities.

According to the version of the District Administration the situation in Meerut had come under control by September 11 and very few incidents took place after that date. September 27 was Id and the District Administration tried to persuade the city Qazi and the Muslim community to offer prayers in the usual fashion at the Idgah. However, they did not agree and instead decided to offer prayers only in Mohallah mosques as a protest against alleged police brutalities. The city Qazi called upon the Muslims to wear black badges on the Id day. On September 26, 1982 one Vijay Kumar was

stabbed to death. On September 27, 1982, there was a blast in Mohallah Kidwai Nagar in which two Muslims were injured. On September 28, 1982 black flags were flown from the roof tops by Muslims protesting against alleged police atrocities. In the meantime most of the Muslims arrested between September 6 and 15 were released so that they could offer prayers during the Id. Their exaggerated stories of police brutalities against them infuriated the Muslims and consequently tension was generated. On the night of September 27 and 28 two constables were attacked by the Muslims. The next night about 400 Muslims stoned police posts at Sohrab Gate. A Harijan locality was also attacked.

On the fateful day of October 1 at about 11.30 a.m, a Sikh was stabbed to death in Mohallah Bhumia Ka Pul. The exact cause of his death has still not been investigated, but at that time it appeared to the District Administration that the Muslim community is bent upon creating problems for them and cannot be controlled unless it was 'taught a lesson'.

Feroze Building houses about 250 families which are all Muslims. It is a double storeyed building with open roof at the first floor. From outside it gives the appearance of a fort with a number of small windows opening in all directions. The residents inside could have easily witnessed violence taking place in the neighbouring localities. According to them they had seen the police and the PAC killing a number of innocent people near the Odean Cinema and, therefore, the police were looking for some provocation to enter the building and attack them so that they may not be able to give evidence against the police. On October 1, the building was already surrounded from three sides by the PAC belonging to 6th, 24th and 40th Battallions. The murder of the Sikh was a readymade excuse for the police to enter the building.

On the other hand, the official version of the incident as contained in the FIR of Crime No 232 of Kotwali Meerut is that while the ADM City Shri Mishra along with a heavy police contingent was on patrol, a bomb was hurled upon his jeep from the Feroze Building which compelled him to take action. Therefore, a magistrate accompanied by the police and PAC party had to enter the Feroze Building. There too they were attacked and, therefore, they had to open fire which

killed five people. Thirty-seven persons were arrested from the building. Seven country-made pistols, 15 bombs, 29 live cartridges and 23 spent cartridges were recovered from the building.

There are several inconsistencies in the police version. Since the inside of the Feroze Building is not a public place, the crowd, if any, which was allegedly firing at the police could not be termed as a unlawful assembly as defined under Section 141 IPC. Therefore, the police could not use powers available to them u/s 129 and 130 Cr. PC for firing at the residents of Feroze Building. The police could have used fire only on the pretext of self-defence u/s 100 IPC. According to this section, firing and killing would be justified only if the police party was in imminent danger of losing their lives due to firing from the other side. The FIR does not contain any details of injuries to the police personnel nor any medical examination seems to have been done.

Second, the staircase leading from outside to the building is a very narrow one. At one time only one person could walk through the stairs. If Muslims had collected bombs and were firing from the roof top at the police stationed about 100 to 300 yards away, it should have been fairly easy for the Muslims to attack the single file of PAC jawans who were entering the building through the staircase. It does not stand to reason that Muslims would attack the PAC and the ADM City when they were 100 yards away but would not attack them when it was most convenient to do so.

Third, if the scene of police-Muslim confrontation was really on the roof of the building, one would not have found bullet marks inside the houses. Even after one year of the incident, I could notice a large number of bullet marks in the congested houses which shows that the police party entered the houses and shot people from point blank range.

Fourth, Members of the Parliament visited the Feroze Building five days after the incident and many of them saw blood spilled over the rooms and courtyards of the houses. Even Shri Ram Jethmalani and Mrs Rajendra Kumar Bajpai who chose not to criticise the police, did not contradict specific allegations of the other Members.

Inside the Feroze Building, I met Shabana, aged 11, who

still bears many marks of knife injuries on her body. I visited the houses of Abdul Rasheed, Sheru, Anwar, Sherdin, Zafar Ali, Abdul Aziz, Irshad, Kalwa, Moin, Salim Iqbal, Abdul Zayyam and Wali Mohd. all—deceased in the unfortunate police action on October 1. I was shown bullet marks on the walls, blood-stained clothes belonging to the deceased and many photographs of the houses which were taken soon after the incident which prove not only the fact of entry of force inside the houses, but also looting and wanton destruction of property. At one or two places the CRPF had constructed the walls which were broken open by the PAC. The CRPF had also put up a sign board there indicating 'Reconstructed by the CRPF'. After detailed enquiries I was convinced that at least the killing of eighty innocent people by the PAC were not accounted for in the Police records. Shri Sabzawari, however, alleged that the number of innocent Muslims killed by the PAC/Police was more than 300.

I also met a retired sub-inspector of police Shri Babu Khan who was given notice of retirement on September 9, 1982. He showed the bullet marks on his son's shoulder who was injured during the riots.

I went through the issues of local Hindi newspaper during the riot period specially *Meerut Samachar*, *Hindu* and *Yuva Reporter*. According to unconfirmed reports, the sale of these newspapers increased by 400 to 500 per cent in the months of September and October. The reporting of events in the local newspapers was done in such a manner as to give an impression that Muslims were the aggressors and the police was, therefore, rightly taking action to curb their illegal and nefarious activities. In the issue of *Prabhat Samachar*, dated September 8, the names of 92 arrested Muslims were given. It is not the policy of the Government or District Administration to give community-wise break-up of the names of the dead, injured or arrested to the newspapers. It appears that the newspaper was deliberately leaked out the names by someone in the police or the Intelligence office. Many other news items had headlines like the following:

PAC Jawan Missing—Sohrab Gate Police Chowki
Gheraod—Cars of DM and SSP Attacked—Headless Corpse

of a Police Constable Recovered—Home Guard Jawan Killed—District Administration did not permit Mrs Mohsina Kidwai, Minister in the Central Government to Visit Meerut—DM Accused Shri Manzoor Ahmad, KLA of Escalating Riots, etc.

These reports created feeling of insecurity among the Hindus and their reliance on the PAC for protection increased. The PAC was seen in the role of a saviour and protector and at a number of houses banners were put up by the Hindus in support of the PAC.

Padmashri Haqim Saifuddin bitterly criticised the role of District Administration during the riots. He also said that his telephone connection was disconnected during the curfew days and was restored only after normalcy in the town was achieved. According to him, the reports of the Intelligence were one-sided which poisoned the minds of the DM and the SSP. He was not given even a curfew pass during the peak periods of violence. When Mrs. Mohsina Kidwai came to the town on September 11 and called for him, he was for the first time issued a pass. While he was coming back from the Circuit House late in the evening, he noticed a large number of traders sitting outside their shops even though the town was under curfew.

According to Shri Brij Raj Kishore, President, CPI, the Balmikis were distributed money and liquor and were asked to stop working in the Muslim houses. He also blamed the cloth merchants of Pilkhua town for encouraging communal activities in Meerut as they directly benefited from curfew in the town. The wholesale market of cloth in Meerut town had to remain closed for a number of days which was to the liking of Pilkhua traders and they reaped huge benefits from the situation.

A number of people blamed infighting within Congress party for the continuance of violence in the town. Instead of working for restoration of normalcy in the town, these groups had an eye on the forthcoming municipal elections and thus were more concerned with the question of survival of their leadership.

In the debate on Meerut Riots in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha the role of the PAC was bitterly criticised. A number

of speakers suggested that the PAC may be replaced by the BSF or the CRPF. It appeared to many MPs as if the PAC was acting independent of the authority of senior officers of the district. My own enquiry does not support this inference. The general strategy to restore normalcy was decided through one-sided action at a higher level and the police and the PAC were only executing the orders from above. No doubt, in many places they themselves behaved like a mob and committed atrocities but as far as the general policy to deal with the situation was concerned, it was not left to the constables. The District Administration right from the very beginning perceived threat to public peace only from Muslims and, therefore, they chose to take one-sided action in pursuance of their thinking, observations and the reports which were received by them from the Intelligence machinery. The orders from the senior officers in the district to the Police could be summarised in one phrase—'Muslims must be taught a lesson'. The PAC and the police faithfully implemented this policy. Looting and arson, in this context, was considered legitimate and necessary, and was therefore ignored. The district administration was very keen to retain the PAC in the district and bitterly opposed suggestions for getting it replaced by CRPF or BSF. In some other riots, specially Aligarh 1971, it has been noticed that the presence of District Administration and police force suddenly disappeared for a few hours when most of the incidents of looting, arson and murders took place. The situation in Meerut was entirely different. At no time one could accuse the District Administration of inaction, confusion or hesitation. It is further proved by the fact that no death took place in Meerut due to mob action. People were being killed in isolated violence perhaps in the dead of the night by the members of the other community. This of course does not apply to the people killed by the police and the PAC. During my discussions with the senior police officers it also transpired that the police and the PAC were mortally scared of patrolling the Muslim dominated localities. Even when they were forced to go there they often remained at the periphery of a Hindu dominated locality with their guns pointing towards the Muslim localities.

Annexure
OPINION ABOUT PAC ROLE

Shri Harikesh Bahadur

The PAC is day-by-day becoming a force in which people are losing their faith. The government is not trying to replace this force with some other force like the CRPF or BSF or any other force.

Shri Samar Mukherjee

Never had there been bad relations between Harijans and Muslims. Now Harijans have been involved and still the Muslims accuse PAC not Harijans. I personally heard from their complaints that PAC is instigating the Harijans to attack these Muslims. From the roof of a big house where PAC is placed so many firings had taken place and on the walls there are fresh marks of shooting. Then they complained that the bombs wrapped with petrol are thrown on the houses of Muslims, I am stating this not to provoke any communal feeling. I am stating how attacks on Muslims came from that side where PAC headquarter is placed.

The immediate remedy is that PAC should be removed or the composition of the PAC should be changed in such a way that both sections should feel confident that the PAC can defend both the Hindus and Muslims from the criminal rioters.

Shri C.T. Dhandapani

The lady member had stated that there was no rape incident. Being a lady member she may not like to dishonour the womanhood; that is why they may try to hide those things. But the actual thing is that a girl was raped by the PAC. Her father's name is Karimuddin and the girl's name is Nur Fatima Nizira. I have noted down the names even though I could not understand them, with the assistance of the other Members. This is naked violence by the PAC.

I asked one gentleman who is an advocate by name Gupta, "Why do you want PAC"? He said, "We want protection." I asked, "Suppose BSF or the CRPF can give you

protection do you agree?" He said, "No, I will not agree. We want only PAC." So there is something wrong. The PAC is allowed to attack the Muslims and loot the property of the Muslims. That is why these Hindus, they wanted only PAC.

Shri Rajesh Pilot

It is reported that the PAC had gone to some of their houses and stolen some items. They showed the furniture and some other property which had been burnt down. This should be inquired into.

Prof. Madhu Dandavate

But even when blood was spilled, blood of the freedom fighters, I was not disturbed by that blood, even our leader Mahatma Gandhi was not disturbed, but I am definitely disturbed and concerned when the blood that is spilled is the blood that is spilled in fratricidal war, and in a war between certain sections and the government. That is really the reason why I feel very much disturbed.

You go to the Hindus, almost all of them say that PAC are their protectors and if the PAC was removed from Meerut, there will be bloodshed. That is what the Hindus have told us. And when we go the Muslims, they say that it is this PAC men, who have attacked them, it is not the Hindus or Harijans who attacked them, they have no quarrel with them, it is they who have attacked them.

We have heard the slogans, PAC Zindabad; we have heard the slogans, Mahatma Gandhi Zindabad; we have heard the slogans, Bhagat Singh Zindabad; we have heard the slogans Azad Hind Fauz Zindabad; but PAC murdabad was the slogan here. We must try to understand why that slogan was given by Hindus. It is the fear complex, that if the PAC is not there, and the normal police force is there, there will be certain communal prejudices, and probably they will not be protected. That is what the majority of the Hindus feel and for the very same reason, the Muslims feel that if it is they who attacked them. It is no sin saying how many houses were looted. We went to the Hindu houses. Some Hindus told us what is happening in the Muslim

houses and the complaint that they are giving, that is all drama. And when in the Dharmashala, as Mrs. Brar told, when we met women, others were telling that is all drama. Sir, it appears to be a clash of two dramas. But it was a reality. I told a friend of mine when we went to the Muslim localities and we were told certain dead bodies were lying there for two days, some one came and they told me 'this is all drama'. I said, "A living individual can play a drama, but a dead body cannot play a drama." That is the tragedy.

श्री रशोद मसूद

जो मामला मुरादाबाद, अलीगढ़, इलाहाबाद या और दूसरी जगहों पर हुआ है उसके बारे में हमें शिकायत हिन्दुओं से नहीं है। हमें शिकायत है सरकार से, पी० ए० सी० और अफसरान मिल कर मुसलमानों पर गोली चलायी, उनके घर लूटे, जलाये और उनकी अस्मत् लूटी ...

यह बात समझ में आ सकती है हिन्दू मुसलमान लड़ सकते हैं। हम आपस में निपट सकते हैं। लेकिन आप मरवा रहे हैं इसको जिम्मेदारी कौन लेगा ? ...

जहां भी जाइये मेरठ में मुसलमानों को सिर्फ एक ही शिकायत आपसे मिलेगी कि पी० ए० सी० के जवान यहाँ से चढ़े और यहां से आए और इस तरह से संगीन रख दी, इस तरह से पैसा लूट लिया, इस तरह से मकान लूट लिया। बहुत-सी बातें तो ऐसी हैं कि जो मैं नहीं कह सकता हूँ। इसलिए नहीं कह सकता हूँ कि वो कहाँ हुई, कैसे हुई? क्योंकि अगर मैंने वो आपको बताया कि यह वाक्यात कहाँ हुआ, कैसे हुआ, तो वो लड़कियाँ जिनकी इज्जतें लूट ली गई हैं, उनकी शादियाँ नहीं होंगी। फिर भी आप जिम्मेदार नहीं हैं और जिम्मेदारी कबूल करने के लिए तैयार नहीं हैं। फिर कौन जिम्मेदारी लेगा। मैंने जैसा अभी कहा है कि अगर हिन्दू-मुसलमान फिसाद होता है तो वो अक्ल में बात आती है। फिर दोहराता हूँ कि क्योंकि दो भाई हैं दोनों आपस में लड़ सकते हैं। लेकिन यह हिन्दू-मुसलमान फिसाद की बात नहीं है। यहाँ तो खालिस बरबरियत की, जानवरपन की, वहशोपन और एक-तरफा मुजा-लिम की दास्तान है। किस-किस की दास्तान सुनाएँ।

फिरोज बिल्डिंग को देखा है जहाँ कि खून के घबरे पड़े हुए हैं। हमारे मुवजिज मेम्बरान ने देखा है, खून बिखरा हुआ है पूरी बिल्डिंग के अन्दर। और बिल्डिंग वाले क्या कहते हैं? बिल्डिंग वाले यह नहीं कहते कि वहाँ के बाल्मिकियों ने आकर के खून कर दिया। बिल्डिंग वाले कहते हैं कि दरवाजा

तोड़कर पी० ए० सी० चली गई और अन्दर जाकर गोलियाँ मारी हैं और जहाँ लोग बैठे हुए थे उनके जाकर संगीन घुसा दी। समझ में आती है यह बात, इसलिए समझ में आती है आज भी वहाँ सलवार और कमीज औरतों की पलंगों विलठों टंगी सूख रही हैं। क्योंकि उसी वक्त जब हमला हुआ और पी० ए० सी० घुस गई, गोलियों से मारने लगी तो वहाँ से औरतें बच्चे, जो भी जान बचा सके, जान बचाकर भाग गए और उनके कपड़े जो सूखने के लिए डाले हुए थे, वैसे के वैसे ही पड़े हुए थे।

श्रीमती गुरबिन्दर कौर बरार

इसके बाद हम यामीन के घर गए। यहाँ भी उनकी औरतें बैठी हुई थीं। उन्होंने कहा—हमारे खामिन्द बाहर होने की वजह से उनको यहाँ पर गोली लगी। वहाँ पर एक औरत थी, जो गा कर काम करती थी। उन औरतों ने भी यही कहा कि यहाँ पर कोई रेप नहीं हुआ है। इसके बाद हम यासीन साहब के घर गए जहाँ पर उनकी बीबी बैठी हुई थी, वे बेचारी रो रही थी। उनकी लड़कियों की शादी होने वाली थी लेकिन सब सामान लूट कर ले गए।

श्री जैनुल बशर

पी० ए० सी० ने जो भी जुल्म किया है, चाहे मुरादाबाद में, चाहे अलीगढ़ में या उत्तर प्रदेश के किसी और कोने में, वह एक पुरानी कहानी है। उसको कई बार इस दिन सदन में दोहराया गया है कि पी० ए० सी० ने लूट की है, लोगों को मारा है, औरतों की इज्जत ली है और जो कुछ भी हुआ है वह पी० ए० सी० ने किया है। इसलिए पी० ए० सी० को लगाया जाना हम उचित नहीं समझते हैं। पहले जब गृहमंत्री जी गए थे तब सम्भवतः उन्होंने पी० ए० सी० को हटाने के निर्देश भी दिये थे लेकिन उत्तर प्रदेश की सरकार ने क्यों नहीं हटाया, यह बात हमारी समझ में नहीं आई।

श्री विजय कुमार यादव, नालन्दा

इस सम्बन्ध में जो हमने अपनी आँखों देखा है उसे कैसे भूठलाया जा सकता है। अल्पसंख्यकों के घरों में खूब, लूट-पाट और जुल्म के निशान पाए गए, जली हुई चीजें पाई गईं। किसी भी मुसलमान ने यह नहीं कहा कि यह भाव प्रैन्जी के कारण हुआ है, किसी बड़ी भीड़ ने जाकर यह काम किया है। जहाँ तक हिन्दुओं का सम्बन्ध है, वे जरूर कहते हैं कि पी० ए० सी० को वहाँ रहना चाहिए, नहीं तो हमारी हिफाजत नहीं होगी। हिन्दुओं ने पूरे

डेलीगेशन के सामने सी० आर० पी० और वी० एस० एफ० के खिलाफ कोई शिकायत नहीं की है। लेकिन अकलियतों के लोग, मुसलमान, इस बात का प्रमाण देते हैं कि उनके साथ जुल्म हुआ। सम्भव से नहीं आता कि क्यों पी० ए० सी० को वहाँ से नहीं हटाया गया है। इसलिए हमारी मजबूत मांग है कि जितनी जल्दी हो सके, पी० ए० सी० को वहाँ से हटाया जाय।

Development and Collective Violence : A Theoretical Perspective

Ram Ahuja

Development, which is an induced or a planned change and involves change in structural elements too of a society, may be seen either in its total context or in specific areas like, economic, social, political and cultural. In each area, development aims at achieving *set collective goals* and these goals vary not only in space but in time frame. For example, in India goals for the economic development after Independence are not only economic self-reliance, advanced technology, eliminating destitution and poverty and raising living standards of people, but also distributive justice; goals for the social development are equality, mobility, individualism, and rationality, etc.; goals for the political development are establishing a political system where the ruler is accountable to the ruled, associating more and more people with decision-making processes, and decentralisation of political power. In the religious field, the main goal of the development is change from 'sacred' to 'secular'.¹

A society is expected to provide means for achieving these goals and also to make these means available and accessible equally to all individuals, classes, religions, castes, regions, etc., alike. Development in India appears to have lead to many contradictions in the present Indian social system. Some apparent contradictions are : the aspirations of individuals, groups and communities have been raised but legitimate avenues for achieving these

¹Ram Ahuja, *Political Elites and Modernisation*, Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan, 1975, p. 13.

aspirations by them are limited; egalitarian values are projected but discrimination is practised; ideas of individualism are supported but principles of collectivism are reinforced; rationalism is preached but regionalism, casteism and linguism are encouraged; roles are being modernised but values continue to be traditional; ideational culture is aimed at but sensate culture is being promoted; new laws are being enacted but they are either full of loopholes or are not being properly implemented; old values cease to inspire and new values have not developed roots; rapid change is emphasised by permitting competition but brakes are imposed in the form of granting licenses; we need tolerant, liberal and pragmatist power-holders but we encourage the repressive, reactionary and ideologue leaders.²

In the last few decades, for all the changes envisaged and attempted by our power elite, in several respects India has not changed that much in the deepest recesses of its psyche. Although the past four decades could appropriately be described as the decades of new hopes and expectations that millions of people have derived from the political elites, the decades of development which indicates the emergence of a new style of socio-political and economic management both at the national as well as at the state levels, yet many issues and problems of the pre-Independence period remain unsolved. The problems of unemployment and poverty, corruption and nepotism, inflation and rising prices, police humiliation and torture and emergence of terrorism, population explosion and unresponsive administration at the state level, and the indifferent and casual attitude of government functionaries at district and local levels, not only continue to weaken the development processes but increase frustrations of the people forcing them to adopt collective agitational tactics and strategies. The dominant elite feel that they have allocated values on rational basis and set logical norms free of chaos and confusion, but in fact, they have created more contradictions and frustrations. The collective frustrations of the dejected groups lend to agi-

²Ram Ahuja, "Contradictions in Indian Social System", paper presented at *DIG Police Seminar*, Police Academy, Mount Abu, May 1983.

tations and collective violence in the form of riots, demonstrations, strikes, rasta-roko, and so forth.

Before explaining the process of development of collective violence due to the feeling of relative deprivation, it is necessary to operationalise concepts like aggression, violence, and collective violence.

CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

'Aggression' refers to injurious behaviour. When Berkowitz uses this term to denote "behaviour aimed at the injury of some object".³ Buss defines it as "an act that delivers noxious stimuli to another person"⁴. Buss has also distinguished between "angry or *expressive* aggression" and '*instrumental* aggression'. The former aims at injuring the victim while latter is only means to some end.⁵

'Violence' is the extreme form of aggression. Although violence typically refers to physical aggression but it also is applied to psychological stress that causes suffering. Kempe has defined violence as "physically striking an individual and causing injury",⁶ but Gelles and Straus have defined it as "an act of striking a person with the intent of causing harm or injury but not actually causing it"⁷. Thus violence involves not only *actual hitting* but *verbal abuse* too. It involves not only overt application of force resulting in an injury or destruction of person(s) or property or reputation, but also overt threat of injury that may result in trauma. Violence conveys the heated, the vehement expression of aggressor's feeling to the victims and the onlookers.

'Collective violence' is the force used by group of persons which injures others, or which inhibits the normal free

³L. Berkowitz, *Aggression : A Socio-Psychological Analysis*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1962.

⁴A.H. Buss, *The Psychology of Aggression*, New York, John Wiley, 1961.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶Kempe, quoted by Richard Gelles in Wolfgang and Weiner, *Criminal Violence*, California, Sage, 1982, p. 201.

⁷Gelles and Straus, "Determinants of Violence in the Family" in Hill Burr, Nye and Resis (eds.), *Contemporary Theories About the Family*, New York, Free Press, 1979.

action of movement of other persons. The important issue in collective violence is of *intention*. Is 'injury' the goal or the by-product of some other goal-seeking behaviour? The contention of the author is that 'injury' in collective violence is not always desired by the perpetrators, though they have a reasonable expectation that their behaviour might harm other(s) physically and/or psychologically or even emotionally.

On this basis, not only a riot but also demonstration, gherao, strike and rasta-roko, etc., may be included in the definition of collective violence. All these clearly refer to one central element of violence, which is *intensity* or extreme feelings, actions or sensations. Thus, anger, hate, rage, fury, wrath, ire, dislike, aversion, or hot displeasure are always related to collective violence.

This paper is concerned with the collective violence which acts as *instrumental* violence, that is, which is used to achieve a particular goal, whether a change in the authority structure, or drawing the attention of people in power to the necessity of adopting measures for mitigating grievances. It does not aim at analysing that violence which destroys or physically liquidates the person or group against whom resentment is expressed; nor it aims at understanding that violence which attempts to acquire power or enforce authority. Thus, modern terrorism, anarchist violence or revolutionary violence are excluded from the assessment of collective violence in this paper because they aim at *destroying* authority, if not *taking over* authority.

Etiology of Collective Violence

Main thesis in explaining collective violence is that when large section of people in the society fail to achieve their collective goals, they feel relatively deprived, frustrated, and disillusioned, and this collective frustration (or what Feieravends and Nesvold have called 'systematic frustration')⁸,

⁸Feieravends and Nesvold in Graham and Gurr (eds.), *The History of Violence in America*, Washington, 1969. Also see Rasheeduddin Khan, "Violence and Socio-economic Development" in *Violence and Its Causes*, Paris, UNESCO Publications, 1981, pp. 167-185.

leads to collective violence. For example, collective frustration of industrial workers, students, cultivators, government employees, etc., resulting into violent sections like arson, loot and killings as well as violent action like bandhs and strikes.

Gurr has also mentioned that collective violence is related to rapidity of social change, which means that rapid change brings with it new expectations and as a consequence new frustrations leading to violence.⁹ It also means that a greater rate of change is associated with greater instability. Gurr has summarised that violent conflict is greatest in the developing nations, least in the developed nations, and intermediate in the least-developed or most 'traditional' nations.

This is undoubtedly an over simplification, since a number of other considerations also enter in collective violence. In fact, the action planned by the discontented people to 'tempt' or 'incite' one against whom they have launched protest is *often non-violent*. It is usually some situational factor which precipitates violence. The choice made by the intellectual 'liberal' section of the protestors is non-violence, but a small wing of protestors who despised non-violence from the very beginning and who considered violence essential for the success of their struggle, snatch the precipitating opportunity and start using violence to assert the rightness of their ideology. This subgroup locates the source of discontentment and uses violence thinking that it (violence) will indeed bring about the power elite to the brink of desperation and they (power elite) will be forced to take ameliorative measures for the 'oppressed' and the 'deprived' people.

This subgroup indulging in the 'destructive' behaviour does not represent the total group of the discontented persons. By and large, the behaviour of this subgroup is not owned and equivocally supported by the rest of the discontented group of persons from whose ranks this subgroup of the destructive rioters usually come. Thus, this contention accepts the old 'riffraff' theory of violent riot behaviour which holds that a larger majority of the group (99%) disown and

⁹T.R. Gurr, *Violence in America—Causes and Prevention of Violence*, New York, Signet Books, 1969.

oppose the criminal and delinquent behaviour of the sub-group by describing it as irresponsible behaviour.

The question is, what causes the 'group of individuals' to be violent? Answers from some intellectuals and the research community tend towards common wisdom, simplistic hypotheses, as well as some serious propositions. Some of the theoretical propositions on collective violence typically encountered are that: (i) it is a normal response to provocation, or (ii) that it is a response that is consistent with norms supporting its use, and so forth. This calls for the analysis of some important existing theories. Excluding the psycho-pathological theories (because they focus on aggressor's psychological personality characteristics and pathological disorders as the chief determinants of violence, and we consider this important for explaining the *individual* violencee rather than the *collective* violence), we may classify the other theories in two groups : (a) on the level of socio-psychological analysis, and (b) on the level of socio-cultural or sociological analysis. In the first group, we may include theories like Frustration-Aggression Theory, Perversion Theory, Motive Attribution Theory, and Self-Attitude Theory. In the second group, we may include theories like Structural Theory, System Tension Theory, Anomie Theory, Theory of Sub-cultures of Violence, Resource Theory, Social Learning Theory, Symbolic Interaction Theory, and Exchange Theory.¹⁰

The contention of the author is that these theories fail to explain "collective violence which is the result of a feeling of relative deprivation", arising out of the failure to achieve set collective goals of development. An attempt has been made here to explain collective violence in terms of a new theoretical model, termed as "Social Bond Approach".

THEORETICAL MODEL : SOCIAL BOND APPROACH

This Model not only explains the etiology of collective violence but it also uncovers the recurring patterns in which particular types of people take to collective violence in

¹⁰For discussion of these theories, see Ram Ahuja, *Crime Against Women*, Research Project Report submitted to Ministry of Social and Women Welfare, Delhi, Government of India, 1985.

particular types of circumstances. This model concentrates on the sociological analysis of social-structural conditions. The important conditions which lead to collective violence are : *life stresses, status frustrations and career crisis*. This view focuses attention not only on the aggressive act of the group of individuals but also on the persons who use aggression and the persons against whom aggression is used. Our view is that the aggressors use violence not because they are uninhibited hedonists but because they suffer from *insecurity* feelings and anxieties. The origins of these feelings and anxieties are traceable *both* to the *social barriers* created by the oppression of social systems and the power elite, as well as to *individual's* inappropriate upbringing and hinderances to *individual's* childhood social development and incidents in his life that serve to aggravate his tendency to irrational and unrealistic attitudes to social norms and social institutions.

Our theory also takes into account, on the one hand, the three factors in aggressors' behaviour, *viz.*, adjustment, attachment, and commitment, and, on the other hand, the factor that a lack of adjustment, attachment and commitment leads to 'frustrations'. Maladjustment, unattachment and non-commitment are to be examined in terms of social environment in which individuals operate as well as the socialised personalities of the individuals. Thus, in our theoretical model we have given importance to the social system, the personality structure of individual aggressors, and the sub-cultural patterns of the society in which individuals use violence. In a social system, we include strains and frustrations; in personality structure, we include the adjustment (in status), attachment (to groups) and commitment (to values and roles); and in sub-cultural patterns, we include the (synthesis of traditional and modern) values which operate as a means of social control (in community/society). Our basic hypothesis is that *the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the degree of adjustment, commitment and attachment of the individuals (aggressors)*. Thus, our theory supports Games Theory of rational group behaviour but rejects LeBon's and other theories of Social Facilitation in irrational collective behaviour.

Attachment is the bond of affection between an individual

and other (conventional) persons. The degree of attachment is how much the person cares for others and is cared for by them, and how much the person values others' feelings, opinions and expectations (e.g., attachment of a Hindu with persons of other religions like Islam or Sikhism; or attachment of students with their teachers; or attachment of workers with their managers and employers). An individual who is strongly attached to others is likely to consider how his behaviour will affect others and their attitudes, including their attitudes towards that individual. Unattached or less attached people lack such inter-personal stakes in conformity and have only themselves to think about. Attachment is, thus, a powerful inhibitor of violent behaviour resulting from social frustrations. The more a person is attached to other persons' feelings and expectations, the less likely he is to remain frustrated and feel inclined to indulge in violence.

Commitment is a feeling of obligation to seek a particular goal or to follow a particular course of action. The greater the individual's/group's commitment to a goal or to an action, the greater will be his/its stake in conformity to the norms. Thus, commitment serves as a bond between the individual/group and social norms, and represents what the person/group has to loose by violating the norms of society.

Adjustment refers to the smooth switch-over from one status to other, perceiving one's role as perceived by others, an active participation in all roles, and having a problem-solving attitude. Adjustment specifies a relatively harmonious relationship within and between individuals and groups. The greater the adjustment, the lesser the possibility of the individual's indulging in violent behaviour.

Maladjustment, unattachment and non-commitment lead to a feeling of *Relative Deprivation*. Relative deprivation is a perceived discrepancy between an individual's value expectations (i.e., expectations pertaining to justice, security, welfare, freedom, status, power, etc.) and their value capabilities (conditions of life individuals or groups think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them).¹¹

¹¹See T.R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, Princeton, N.J., 1970, p. 13.

Relative Deprivation = Perceived opportunities + Perceived
capabilities

$$R.D. = P.O + P.C.$$

$$R.D. = P(O + C)$$


Here, the important factor is 'perceived' (by the aggressors themselves); hence the different variations in behaviour or relative deprivations do not always lead to violent agitations.

Relative deprivation occurs when: (i) expectations increase while capabilities remain the same or decline (*i.e.*, $E+$, and $C-$ or $C=$) or (ii) when expectations remain the same while capabilities decline (*i.e.*, $E=$, $C-$). Since both expectations (E) and capabilities (C) rest on perception (P), therefore the value orientations of an individual/group have an important bearing on: (a) the way the individual/group will perceive deprivation, (b) the target(s) to which it (R.D.) will be directed, and (c) the form in which it will be expressed. Since each individual/group is subjected to different forces, each individual/group will respond differently in terms of violence.

Our approach thus explains the differential distribution and patterns of violence not in terms of the agitators' motivations and mental processes, but in terms of the variations among individuals in their social adjustments, values and beliefs and their social conditions. It is contended that individuals with maladjustment patterns and values and beliefs are more likely to react aggressively than individuals having no such maladjustment patterns and values and beliefs. Hence, individual differences in aggressive behaviour may also reflect different degrees of integration with these values.

Our contention is that the frustrated and relatively deprived individuals are not constrained by their beliefs and values allowing for use of violence whenever and wherever they feel but they are influenced by: (i) the individuals too against whom the violence is to be used, *i.e.*, the 'victims' have to be those who lack 'resistance potential' towards aggressive behaviour, and (ii) by the idea of the justification of their act (violence) before and after its commission. Thus, violence is used by these frustrated individuals when they view certain individuals as appropriate victims and certain

Social Bond Theory for Collective Violence



situations as suggestive of, even opportune for, the use of violence, that is, in specific circumstances and not in all circumstances.

Let us take two recent examples of collective violence in Ahmedabad and Assam. In both cases, the violence was the

result of the feeling of deprivation. The main issue in Ahmedabad was the reservation issue, where both groups the 'anti-reservationists' as well as the 'reservationists', felt deprived and frustrated. Their frustration was exploited by political parties for their vested interests and the reservation issue came to be linked with caste and religion. Anti-social elements engaged in boot-legging and thriving because of the political support also spread communal venom. Thus, even a minor provocation was enough to flare-up the population sharply divided along communal lines.

The same frustration or the feeling of economic, social and political deprivation of the Assamese was responsible for the riots or collective violence in Assam. As soon as the power elite became serious and took peace initiative to solve the crisis, Assam was back to normal and collective violence was controlled.

Both these examples, thus, show how deprivation-induced collective discontent and politicization of this discontent give spur to violent action against political objects and actors.

Our Social Bond Theory based on adjustment, commitment and attachment and the relative feeling of deprivation is different from the Frustration-Aggression Theory in the sense that this theory (original Freudian Theory) views the emergence of frustrations in terms of an *innate drive*.¹² Psychologists explain frustrations as a result of a variety of intra-psychic conflicts and pressures. We view frustrations as the consequence of inter-personal relations and the functioning of sub-systems in the society. In our approach thus, the source of frustration is not internal but external. However, our approach accepts Dollard's and Berkowitz's¹³ modified psychological claim that aggression is always directed towards the source of frustration. But we do not accept their view that aggression is a *learned* response. Our contention is that aggression is specifically chosen to achieve a particular goal, or that it is *instrumental* aggression. Our theoretical approach thus has a sociological orientation.

It may be argued that the concepts of adjustment, attach-

¹²John Dollard, *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, 1939.

¹³*Ibid.*, Also see Berkowitz, *op. cit.*

ment and commitment and social bond and relative deprivation may be more applicable to individual's violence but not to a big group's violence. My answer would be that as already explained earlier, though many-a-times it is a big group which feels frustrated and discontented but it is a small sub-group or a compact subsegment of a numerically large heterogeneous group which initiates a violent action, and gradually more and more people become involved in it. Thus, Social Bond Theory is not an extension of the explanation of individual's behaviour to social levels but it explains the collective frustration and the collective violence of small and big groups.

At the same time, the Social Bond explanation is not essentially an elitist theory of violence that the small sub-group, which takes the initiative, is ideologically 'superior' to decide when and how violence will be employed 'for the good' of the total frustrated group, on whose behalf it vocalises its protest. Further, the small group does not depend upon a widespread collective action of the frustrated masses. In this context, our explanation is in contrast to the orthodox Marxist theory because Marx did envisage this kind of mass uprising and mass revolution.

The Social Bond Theory supports the linkage between change and violence as explained by Coser¹⁴ and Dahrendorf¹⁵ but not Karl Marx. Coser sees violence as mechanism for conflict-resolution when established authority fails to accommodate to demands of new groups. Dahrendorf has also viewed violence as instrument of intervention and as the necessary prerequisite of change.

It may be concluded that Social Bond explanation holds that: (1) the main cause of collective violence is a lack of integration because of the failure of attachment, commitment and adjustment on the part of the discontented people, (2) collective violence is symptomatic of various shortcomings in the social order, (3) it is closely related to *instrumental*

¹⁴Coser Lewis, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, Illinois 1956, p. 111.

¹⁵R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, California, Stanford, 1959.

behavior, (4) it is a rational and an adaptive response, and (5) it is not development itself but the process and pattern of development (Rasheeduddin Khan and Sugata Das Gupta have called it 'maldevelopment')¹⁶ that results in collective violence.

¹⁶See Rasheeduddin Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 183 ; Sugata Dasgupta, "Peacelessness and Maldevelopment" in *Poverty, Development and Peace*, Netherlands, 1968.

Value Structure and Collective Violence

B.M. Sinha

Human society or any of its units should move in an harmonious flow for its progress from fundamental negativity to fundamental positivity. The greater is the distance of the society and the units constituting it from the forces and factors that lead them into committing acts that are crude and base, the closer they move to doing deeds and developing thoughts that are sublime and helpful in uniting mankind. It is when the harmonious flow of society is disturbed by one or more than one anti-progress forces that violence erupts causing serious and sometimes irreparable damage to man and the institutions he makes for his movement forward.

Society, in Sanskrit, is made up of people who are moving together and whose movement is parallel to one another. The word *Samaj* is made up of two words—*Sam* which means equal or parallel and *Aj* which means movement. Thus only those whose movement is harmonious and even in flow can constitute society and only such a society is true and real. The dictionary meaning of society is : "An organised group of persons associated together for religious, benevolent, cultural, scientific, political, patriotic or other purposes." To achieve this goal they think together, move together and work together, organising and pooling their resources and utilizing them in a proper and systematic manner. It is thus clear that if the members of any society do not move and work together, they will not be constituting society in the real sense; they will turn into a crowd. And it is a crowd which becomes easily violence-prone because it lacks harmony and unity of purpose.

If we accept the definition of human society then we should assume that each society has a goal and, in order to achieve it, it should function and operate as one whole irrespective of the caste, religion, language, regional differences, etc. This awareness of the truth that human society is one and indivisible. It grows and becomes powerful with the narrowing of both physical and mental distances between one community and another in view of the strides being made by science and technology. The distance between one planet and another is also on the point of disappearing, making us realise that this entire universe is one whole, and, therefore, indivisible.

It is our inability or deliberate refusal to see and admit the indivisibility of human society that gives rise to tendencies and forces which cause violence not only at the physical level but at mental and spiritual level as well. This violence is both at the individual and collective level. We are here to find out what collective violence is and why it takes place. We need not take only a partial view of the problem. This violence has its manifestation even at physical, social, mental and spiritual levels.

Today we find our lives have gone out of rhythm. Cries of suffering—physical, psychic and spiritual—are rising from everywhere. Not only from India but even from advanced countries of the West. Diseases emanating from poverty like malnutrition, epidemics and famine have afflicted countries like India. The diseases afflicting the developed countries are those of wealth like over-indulgence, hypertension, heart attacks, and alienation. These diseases of poverty and wealth provoke violence on a mass scale. It is these diseases that take the forms of social, economic and political problems. And these problems either drive hundreds and thousands of people to mad and frenzied acts of violence or are exploited by crafty people to cause large scale violence like the communal carnage at Bhiwandi and Jamshedpur, or political turmoil in states like Assam and Punjab. Similar instances can be very easily cited from other countries also.

Perhaps India is one of those countries which provide glaring examples of how efforts to divide human society have led to great violent upheavels. However, several instances of

collective violence have also shown that it sometimes produces positive results. Sometimes it may help to correct certain imbalances or abnormalities that block the onward movement of a society. Ironically, while these efforts are made on the claims that they would help improve the life of one section of people or another, they cause a considerable suffering to the participants. A close and rational study of these examples will help us identify the tendencies and sentiments which work as the causes of collective violence.

One of the important tendencies or sentiments that causes collective violence arises from the attachment to land. This attachment can be either to a piece of land or the whole country. This sentiment is whipped up by those who believe a piece of land is more dear to them than a human life. When it is dangerously whipped up, this sentiment helps in mobilising even thousands of people together. They indulge in acts of violence without caring for the serious and irreparable damage it may cause to the society. This sentiment is aroused to make some political, religious or economic gains. The most recent example is that of Abohar and Fazilka which are being demanded by the Haryana leaders in exchange for Chandigarh and whose transfer is being resisted by Punjab. A war-like atmosphere that had developed at the time of the Mathew Commission submitting its report. The way Punjab has persisted in its demand for full and complete transfer of Chandigarh to it also constitutes another example of this sentiment which has been described by a scholar as geo-sentiment. The feud between Karnataka and Maharashtra over Belgaum and the fight over the birth place of Lord Rama in Ayodhya are some other examples. They prove how to whip up geo-sentiment with the slightest effort. Political and religious leaders can arouse considerable anger among a particular community or group of people and provoke them into acts of collective violence.

Another similar but more dangerous sentiment arises from the attachment to one's social group or one's community whose members may be spread all over the world. This sentiment when aroused and made strong through various means, leads the people or members of a particular community to believe that their social, economic and political interest alone

are important. While serving their interests they do not care and violate and damage the interests of the members of any other community. In their desire to serve their interests, the members of one community destroy and annihilate several other communities or social groups. This socio-sentiment gives birth to other sentiments like socio-religious, socio-political and socio-economic sentiments. The socio-sentiment or the sentiments arising from it produce atmosphere and circumstances conducive to collective violence. Like the November Riots in Delhi after Mrs. Indira Gandhi's murder on October 31, 1984. We have watched with dismay how these sentiments have been politically and economically exploited by clever leaders to create unbridgeable gaps between once closely related groups of Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab. Today we can see how socio-religious, socio-economic and socio-political sentiments have led the acts of violence, both individual and collective, which we had not imagined even 10 or 15 years ago. Such acts of violence were also seen in Assam. In Punjab an increasingly large number of Sikhs have come to believe that they are superior to the Hindus and should have full control over their land. The same is the feeling of the Assamese today. They feel and believe Assamese should be allowed to rule their State and their social ethics and economic interests suppressed for decades should be protected and nurtured. The socio-sentiment was and is behind acts of terrorism in Punjab. The same was behind the massacres of people in place like Gohpur and Nellie in Assam when collective violence erupted there in February 1983.

When socio-political sentiment is aroused, then violence takes place on a large scale too, for example, restore N.T. Rama Rao to power. This sentiment is exploited. Karunanidhi organises violent mobs to publicly support the cause of the Sri Lanka Tamils so that his own political base becomes powerful enough to topple MGR from power. Bhajan Lal or Charan Singh instigates violence by the members of their communities in retaliation against the violence committed on some of them by the members of another community. It is the socio-political and socio-economic sentiments which caused violence on a large scale in February 1983 between the Assamese Muslims and the Muslims who had migrated into

Assam and between the Assamese Hindus and the Hindus who had come to the State from across the border. Today the workers belonging mostly to the same social and economic strata are organised in cities like Bombay by a Datta Samant and provoked into acts of collective violence against the owners of textile mills who belong to a different social and economic strata. Socio-economic sentiment is also behind communal riots at places like Moradabad and the violence by workers in West Bengal and Bihar against Marwaris and landlords.

It should be carefully noted here that the socio-sentiment is more dangerous than geo-sentiment as it does not remain confined to a particular land or country. It is often found spread over several countries. It is this sentiment that has helped to mobilise a large number of Sikhs in Punjab and Muslims in J & K in countries like Canada, UK, etc., and they are doing their best in providing help to violent activities in India and causing, perhaps, disasters like the Kanishka air tragedy and murders of Indian diplomats. It is again this sentiment which creates the kind of stir that has been built up against the Supreme Court verdict in the Shah Bano case. Massive demonstrations organised by the Fundamentalists Muslims in cities like Bombay, Calcutta and Bhopal can easily turn into a holocaust. It is again this sentiment that can help a Muslim bigot and fundamentalist like Syed Shahabuddin to win election against a Congress (I) Muslim candidate who too condemned the Shah Bano verdict !

Thus the genesis of collective violence lies in the attempts to destroy the indivisibility of the human society through mobilisation or exploitation of tendencies and sentiments that have roots in the evil of negativity and that drive men away from the sublimity of positivity. It is a tragedy of human society that its so-called leaders in religious, political and economic spheres try to solve its problems through resort to these tendencies and sentiments. The problem of culture conflicts is sought to be achieved through linguistic division of India—and thereby help cause language riots in the south or in the north-east. The problem of religious differences is solved by partitioning India and creating states like Punjab. The problems created through the resort to such tendencies

are again sought to be tackled through the same means—the Punjab Accord which helps mobilise the Sikhs into a separate nation and the Assam Accord which helps the Assamese to consolidate their position against the Bengalis and the Muslims. The indivisibility of human society thus gets further affected giving rise to circumstances that contribute to the occurrence of collective violence with greater frequency and ferocity.

Therefore, the prime need is to take steps to reverse the movement of society from fundamental negativity to fundamental positivity. How can this be done? Is there a way out? History is witness to the truth that whenever the society seems near annihilation a way is found out to turn it away from that point and put it back on the path of progressive movement. History also proves that the society is part of a universal phenomenon, a phenomena which is always unfolding itself in newer colour and designs. Every new colour and design is an improvement on the earlier ones. If such is the phenomenon, which we call universe, how can the society, an integral part of it ever be left behind? It will continue to be pulled back from the verge of annihilation whenever the crude and negative thought of some powerful men will push it towards it.

The antidote to collective violence is an universalistic thought and approach that should form part of whatever we do in social, economic and political spheres. This thought and approach based on humanistic principles should inform and inspire every programme and policy conceived, initiated and carried into practice. As stated earlier, human society is one and indivisible. Conflicts between one community and another, between one country and another arise only when we begin to motivate the people through division tendencies mentioned above. The time has come when we will have to really begin to think of human society as one family whose members will not fight one another on grounds of religion, language, culture or caste. All the members should be treated equal in status, no matter where they live, what they eat and what dress they wear. What is important to bear in mind is that though we all are human beings we develop peculiar features and way of living where we live together. This

happens because of the influences of conditions where a group of people live. Thus, a group living in Madhya Pradesh will be different from groups living not only in other parts of the world but even in other parts of India. It is these conditions that create different communities, each with a separate language, cultural traits and religious practices.

When we talk about the need of our following universalistic thought and approach it does not mean that all the communities should give up their individual identities. It should be kept in mind that each community has its independent cultural ethos and sentimental legacy which need to be protected; its socio-economic development too needs to be planned keeping in view the situation and the conditions in which it is placed. This will be easier to do—when we follow universalistic approach based on humanistic principles. Such an approach pursued sincerely would help integrate human society with hundreds and thousands of communities and social groups though often vastly different from one another.

These humanistic principles should not be utopian. They can be and should be made practical for all of us to follow. Let me clarify here that by humanistic principles I don't mean internationalism or general humanist sentiment. Internationalism fails to achieve the objective of integrated human society as it admits existence of hostile nations. General humanist sentiment also fails to prevent intra-creature conflict. In the name of this sentiment one nation seeks to exploit another nation. Don't we see how multinationals are helping the exploitation of the poor by the rich in the name of serving the former? It also causes inter-creature conflict. Do the protagonists of this humanist sentiment bother about the deliberate devastation of forests along with the living beings dependent on them? The protagonists also make a distinction between the utility and existential value of the animate and inanimate things in the world. We should not forget that an object or living being may not have utility value for us but it has existential value for the universe.

These principles point towards a thought that can be called Neo-humanism. It is, in fact, a cult of love for all creations of the universe. It will, however, be not easy to practise Neo-humanism because it would affect those who are living

and thriving on conflicts of one kind or another. It will be opposed even by those who call themselves revolutionaries and reformists because they are mostly pseudo in character.

For the true practice of Neo-humanism in social, economic and political spheres the following things need to be done by those who are interested in the welfare of human society.

We need a spiritual ideology whose practice should help us in training ourselves in identifying the socio-economic evils and eradicating them. This ideology will have to be based on the Principle of Social Equality and will be opposed to the Principle of Selfish Pleasure which most of us seem to be practising today. The practice of the Principle of Social Equality, in fact, will help us develop and follow universalistic approach which would become the basis of all our social, political and economic policies and programmes. This principle will also help us promote the 'holistic' theory which the science too is finding today to be the only way of saving the world. The practice of a spiritual ideology will create a psychic transformation which is necessary to consider and treat the human society as one and indivisible. There will in fact be a liberation of intellect which is today in various bondages, bondages which are at the root of various conflicts.

The practice of spirituality will slowly make spirituality an essence of life in social, economic and political spheres. It will inform all our actions and deeds and thereby help us all move both materially and mentally towards positivity. This kind of life, which will in fact be true to the concept of life envisaged by the sloka : *Sang Chandhavam Sang Baddha-Vam*, will adopt spirituality as a mission.

Social Change and Social Violence in India : A Contemporary Perspective

R.S. Shrivastava

This paper is intended to explore the implications of some aspects of change in Indian society in recent times for emergence of some forms of social violence. Both social change and social violence have complex origin and diverse character and only some significant elements of their relationships will be covered here. It is necessary at the outset to define and delimit the meaning of social violence. Violence may be defined as application of physical force to inflict injury or damage. It is an intentional act to harm or injure. It is considered as a persisting feature of social relationships and societies. Violence may not be understood in physical sense only as being the exercise of physical force but it may be mental or psychological, it may also be institutional, *i.e.*, inherent in the institutions of the society itself and operating in a very subtle and imperceptible way. Much of violence found in contemporary society may be classed into three categories: First, violence which is used in the commission of crimes may be termed as criminal violence. The violent crimes, or 'crimes of violence', fall in this category. Secondly, social violence which occurs at the societal level as an integral feature of interpersonal or intergroup relationships. It takes place among the various social groupings of society such as caste, communal, political, economic, ethnic, majority-minority, etc. Thirdly, state violence in which the state uses force and coercion against its own citizens in a legitimate manner to 'civilize'. These distinctions among three kinds of violence may only be tentative for the purposes of discussion.

often, there may be considerable overlap among them. All kinds of violence may be 'criminal' from the strictly legal point of view. But the distinguishing feature of social violence is that it occurs at the societal level during, or as a consequence of, some features of social relationships among members of different social groupings.

BASIC PROPOSITIONS

Social violence in the above sense is a predominant feature of societies with multiplicity of groups, each trying to fulfil its own differing and sectional interests. The groups with opposing interests compete with each other for power and privileges to which they have differential access. This often results in contradictions, coercion, and conflict. Thus it may be argued that transformation of a society from a homogeneous and well integrated one to a heterogeneous type is accompanied by increased situations of social conflict and violence.¹ These situations are characterized by poorly defined interpersonal relationships, lack of consensus, confusion of norms, social anonymity, and alienation of groups from each other. There is the resulting tension, maladjustments, and conflicts in society. As commitment to social norms weakens law and other forms of formal control emerge to enforce rules in society which in any case are rendered ineffective due to their lack of moral force. As a corollary to the above it may be stated that social conflict and violence can be reduced only by enhanced integrative processes and mechanisms set in operation and by bringing about some fundamental changes in socio-economic and political structures.

Another proposition is that the tendency to violence is determined by several factors. First, the tendency to violence is learned and finds expression in certain specific social contexts. It has to be promoted by a favourable combination of social factors, motivations, rationalization, values, and norms; second, the tendency to violence also varies according to the position of the individuals and groups in the social order and how they condition themselves to respond to various social pressures.

¹S.N. Eisenstadt, *Modernization : Protest and Change*, New Delhi, Prentice Hall, 1969, p. 22.

THE INDIAN CONTEXT

The general context of some of the specific kinds of social violence in contemporary Indian society can be understood in terms of some of the basic propositions stated above. Historically the internal integration of Indian Society had been sustained to a larger degree by some of its traditional values and structures. Some of these were characterised by the autonomy and independence of social and cultural traditions, absence of a single overarching state or political centre, hierarchical division of society, institutionalized inequality, holism, and transcendence,² while some of these traditional features facilitated integrative mechanisms, in the wake of modernization the same features also created some disintegration and conflicts. Particularly since independence the processes of economic development and social change accompanied by values of democracy, socialism, and secularism, derived from both the freedom struggle and impact of western values, led to the emergence of various interest groups or pressure groups. The different groups and cleavages were brought together in a common framework through participatory political processes. This resulted not only in their growing interdependence but also increasing cleavage and conflict encouraged by an urge to obtain positions and privileges offered in the new social order. The social conflicts among various groups tended to become more organized, having societywide organizations and exploiting traditional and parochial loyalties. The social conflicts were used as symbols of social and political identification and also as a means of demonstration of power in a competitive struggle for powers and privileges. In the initial phase of Independence (in the early fifties) the potential for tension and open confrontation among several groups was held back considerably by several factors. There was hope among all sections of society that the future would bring all of them nearer towards the ideals of equality and social justice promised to them during the freedom struggle as well as on achieving Independence. Great faith was also reposed in the political leadership and ruling elites who had involved

²Yogendra Singh, *Modernization of Indian Tradition*, Delhi, Thomson Press, 1973, p. 32.

the masses in the struggle for freedom, instilled a sense of nationalism, and projected a vision of the 'New Society' before them. It was also hoped that the powerful and affluent classes would sacrifice some of their class and sectional interests and extend their support to the ameliorative and welfare policies to realize the goals of social justice. Above all, there was a sense of confidence that the newly emerged Independent nation-state would be able to work effectively and sincerely to help the weaker and under privileged sections of society to realize their constitutional dreams.

During the decades, since Independence India has no doubt made tremendous progress in economic sphere, agricultural and industrial production, and scientific and technical fields. But unfortunately the failures in realizing goals of social justice are more glaring. Uneven economic development of various parts and regions of the country, failure to carry the fruits of economic development to all sections of society, particularly the weaker and under privileged ones, failure of many ambitious poverty ameliorative and other programmes, intended to bring about a radical change in prevailing economic structure, a state sponsored capitalist system in a professed socialistic garb, and administrative failures and corruption have all combined to generate a high degree of tension and resentment among several sections of society, magnified by failure of their aspirations raised by initial hopes, visions, and pledges made to them by leaders as well as Constitution of free India.

This is the broad scenario within which social violence is generated and takes place. The phenomenon of violence, both in rural and urban areas, can be understood more clearly by analysing some more specific processes and factors operating within this general context. Some of these significant dimensions of social violence are mentioned in the following paragraphs.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

There are several socio-economic dimensions of the problem of social violence. In the first place the process of planned economic development itself generated a lot of tension and social unrest. The existence of regional disparities

and the anxieties to have a share in the 'National Cake' coupled with mutual suspicion led to a number of agitations and collective violence in several parts of India.³ Secondly, the vast rural areas which are considered placid and tranquil till recently are seething with anger and dissatisfaction. Increased agricultural production and 'Green Revolution' in a few pockets have generated tension and social conflicts by creating feelings of deprivation among those who could not reap its fruits in the same and other regions. New agricultural technologies made agricultural enterprise more profitable but the prevalence of an inequalitarian agrarian structure and failures of various land reform measures generated and intensified social conflicts in rural areas. A new class of large farmers has emerged in rural areas but few economic options and opportunities are left with the small and petty cultivators and a vast humanity of landless labourers. Thirdly, the rural-urban disparity and gap in terms of the distribution of economic resources and facilities have also generated lot of social unrest. Though only about 20 per cent of the population lived in urban areas the bulk of the facilities are concentrated in the urban centres. Fourth, an important aspect of rural violence is the caste related violence. Worse incidents of inter-caste violence and atrocities have taken place in recent years. The causes are both economic and social. At the economic level distribution of land resources, harvesting of crops, provision of wages and other work conditions have led to fierce collective caste based violence. At the social level the values of social justice, institution of political democracy, and a general awakening have created a sense of resentment among the castes who were traditionally assigned a low social status. They are no longer prepared to accept their traditional roles which, in turn, invites violent reactions from caste Hindus who feel that their power and privileges are being scuttled. But caste violence occurs not only between caste Hindus and Harijans, but also between upper caste (traditional landlords) and lower middle or intermediate castes, and between intermediate castes and Harijans. So it is a very complex

³T.K. Oommen, "Sociological Issues in the Analysis of Social Movements in Independent India", *Sociological Bulletin*, Vol. 2b, No. 1, March 1977, pp. 18-19.

phenomenon. The problem has been further complicated by the involvement of criminal and anti-social gangs and use of terrorism and 'senas' on both sides. Fifth, the processes of urbanization and industrialization have in their wake generated other sources of social tension and violence in urban areas. These twin processes have brought together in urban-industrial centres people belonging to various linguistic, religious, regional, groups and castes through process of inter-regional migrations. In a situation in which the economic opportunity structure is limited, they compete with each other to gain access to these limited, and often inequalitarian, opportunities. The linguistic, regional, and other loyalties are then utilized to attain economic goals through collective mobilization, agitations and violence. Varied phenomena such as the emergence of 'senas', 'sons of soil' policies, pro- and anti reservation stirs, could be viewed in this perspective. The sudden outbursts of collective violence which are becoming an endemic feature of urban centres could be seen as manifestation of symptoms. They may assume communal, linguistic, regional or other forms but have deeper socio-economic dimensions. It is difficult to understand their genesis merely by proximate or local causes which only serve to ignite the immediate violence. The underlying socio-economic circumstances have led to the emergence of quite explosive elements in cities. This chiefly comprises of those migrants who come to cities with many hopes and aspirations but are lost in the vastness, anonymity, poverty and squalor of urban complexities. The contrasts of city life generate a strong sense of deprivation, class hatred, and individual worthlessness. The army of jobless and homeless youths cut off from their roots become the potential recruits for those in search of 'hired' mercenaries for mobilization and violence along communal, regional, linguistic or other lines. Extreme poverty, unemployment, widening disparities and lack of social justice provide much of the inflammable material constituting our urban social volcanoes. Unplanned urban growth, corruption, breakdown of urban governments, and lack of civic amenities have played no lesser role in exacerbating various forms of social violence in urban areas.

Collective mobilizations have taken place on such issues

as city transport, water and electricity, sanitation, housing, and a host of other problems which have been aggravated by growing inefficiency and corruption of local governments. Another disturbing feature of urban violence in recent times has been the increasing role of the organized criminal elements that have been fomenting and participating in collective violence of various types. Some well known smugglers are reported to have actively supported and incited communal riots in Bombay and Bhiwandi a couple of years ago and cities like Bombay, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Surat, have of late witnessed fierce communal violence prompted by rivalries of bootleggers and mafia leaders for control of illicit liquor trade in the city. The struggle for real estate in urban areas has also been attracting the attention of slum lords, smugglers, and mafia leaders. They first set up unauthorized colonies and slums and then take recourse to threat and violence to force out the occupants in order to take possession of precious urban land. The very character of urban rioting has changed due to involvement of organized criminals. Now urban riots involve more arson, accompanied by looting, in order to suppress all evidence; use of more sophisticated techniques and arms, terrorism, and persistence of rioting for longer duration which becomes difficult to contain.

Another factor in present day urban violence is the growth of urbanized peripheral villages. Due to growth of our big cities the villages on the fringe have been absorbed in the sprawling urban complex. The residents of these villages had been dispossessed of their land by relatively nominal compensations for urban growth, and they have witnessed the escalating cost of the same land. This has created considerable resentment in their minds. Their frustration and anger finds expression in organised incidents of looting and arson in the city which they perceive as the 'cause' of their despair. They are easily recruited to participate in the urban riots and violence.

POLITICAL DIMENSIONS

Social violence has important political dimensions. In a participative democracy, based on elections and votes each political party strives to establish and maintain its pockets of

influence. In this struggle of competitive politics various loyalties such as communal, caste, regional and linguistic are exploited to mobilize the collectivities for political action and support. It is also used as a means of demonstrating one's political power. Violence becomes an integral part of such mobilizations for political purposes. Its dramatic nature unfailingly draws the attention of the whole community and helps in focusing attention on the issues involved, or even deflecting attention from the real issues which may be politically inconvenient. Violence also has an emotional appeal to activists and participants and helps in rallying them towards the political cause.

Sometimes local politicians, whose political position becomes precarious or uncertain, instigate violence as a channel for self-enhancement or to regain their lost political position. Apart from these direct ways of politically prompted violence, the links of rioters and criminals with politicians, and the political protection and patronage, emboldens them in indulging in future bouts of violence. It may also be argued that the moral decay of Indian politics and political leaders breeds more violence in society. The verbal commitment of political parties and leaders to such values as secularism, socialism, democracy, social justice, etc., is not manifested in their political practices and generates an atmosphere of violence in society. The lack of a firm and secular political leadership is another factor of societal violence. The political office is not perceived as a public service but merely as a means of social mobility and personal aggrandizement through an access to a system of spoils by the 'power brokers and agents'. The resulting lack of confidence and cynicism among average citizens about politicians and political parties lead them to desperate violent actions.

Emergent Values

Certain values and life-styles have emerged during the last about four decades of Independence in our country which have encouraged a culture of violence and are a real threat to national integration itself. During these years many contradictions of the development process have surfaced posing new challenges. These new values and life-styles originate from

the neo-rich class of our society who have gained considerable wealth often through dubious means and also as a result of deriving maximum benefits from the programmes and policies of economic development—both in rural and urban areas. The contractors, medium level business men, brokers, agents, black money operators, and a host of others who have reaped benefits through exploitation in a corrupt system of spoils. In rural areas also some sections have been particularly benefited by new programmes of developments and reforms and they have acquired considerable wealth. These neo-rich sections wield tremendous influence over society. They have projected values centering around self-interests, cunningness, lack of fellow feeling, dishonesty, corruption, and opportunism. All aspects of social life—social, economic, political, educational—are being influenced by their philosophy and values. The values of consumerism and shameless exhibition of wealth on their part have serious consequences for a society marked by high degree of economic and social disparities. The ensuing frustration and 'normlessness' are reflected in recurrent social conflicts—caste, regional, minority-majority, etc. Broadly, it may be stated that cultural values commensurate with social mobility and economic progress have not emerged so far.

Socio-Psychological Dimensions

Though social violence occurs in group situations it is important to understand the psychology of the individual participants and groups, as collective processes include a series of individual actions and in critical and resistant situations, individuals often resort to violent reactions. These individual reactions vary according to individual's position in social order, his bond with the members of his groups and outgroups, stereotyped images held about others, ethnic dissatisfactions and frustrations, and above all, the initiative learned patterns of response to social pressures and frustrations. The child-rearing and socializing practices differ in different classes, which make violent response an appropriate form of behaviour in some sections of society. Due to the conditioning of individuals in the deprived sections of society, frustration-induced aggression is directed outwards, resulting in violent behaviour. In the middle and upper classes it is

directed inward, resulting in depressive, and often suicidal tendencies and behaviour. Heightened personal expectations generate a sense of relative deprivation and individual worthlessness. The individual perceives violence as a channel to self-regard and self-enhancement. He is easily attracted by the appeals of religious fundamentalists, political activists, and other instigators of collective violence because such appeals provide him hopes and collective identity. His participation in collective violence is an alternative to individual criminality in which he participates with a 'nothing to loose attitude'. Each individual comes to perceive members of outgroups not as individuals but as a collectivity which is assigned certain stereotyped characteristics. He is guided by this perception in his interpersonal interaction. The 'others' are perceived as 'evils' with no positive traits. Given these perceptions and beliefs merely external symbols—religious, linguistic, caste—begin to be exploited for starting a reciprocal and unending chain of actions whose end-product is violence. In this the intergroup violence becomes persistent, more brutal, and uncontrollable. The underlying beliefs and images causing hostile outbursts are spread through rumour, scapegoating, or knowledge of a specific incident. Whether such beliefs are true or greatly exaggerated is irrelevant. The important point is that they are 'believed' to be true and serve as a background for action. Given these beliefs, coupled with structural strains and susceptibility, conduciveness the individual becomes a ready material for mobilization for collective action. It is in this background that any rumour or insignificant event serves as a precipitating and proximate 'cause' to ignite collective violence.

The Social Control Dimensions

The operation and effectiveness of the various factors—both proximate and predisposing—depend on the level of success of general social control mechanisms to contain violence in society. This has several aspects. Most important among these conditions is the prevalence of a general atmosphere of non-violence in society. Much depends on the extent to which there exists a tradition of non-violence in society and the internalization of norms of non-violence by the indivi-

dual members.⁴ If the norms of non-violence are weakened then outburst of violence may get direct or indirect support. People gradually get accustomed to violence or remain indifferent, which, in turn, promotes further violence. This implies that the institutions of a society—family, neighbourhood, community, religious and educational institutions, mass media, etc.,—play an important role in fostering the norms of non-violence in society. Similarly, the effectiveness of leadership in all walks of life—social, political, academic, religious—determine the extent to which they can develop positive attitudes towards non-violence. If the people develop negative attitudes towards leadership, norms of non-violence are difficult to be fostered. Finally, the state and its agencies are also important. Motivations to personal and group violence and revenge become stronger if there is inaction and inefficiency on the part of the state. Similarly, if the state fails to promptly punish the culprits of violence or gives them encouragement, or firm and prompt action is not taken to contain violence and redress grievances of people, it is a sure way to prop up further violence in society. The state structure—administration, police, and judiciary—is the mainstay not only in the maintenance of law and order but also in ensuring welfare and social justice in a democratic society. The failure to achieve this leads people to desperation and resort to violence as an alternative means of seeking redress. The respect for law in a society is dependent on the respect for law makers and law enforcers. If they lose moral authority and respect due to inefficiency, corruption, or misuse of power, the people may use violence as an alternative.

CONCLUSION

Social violence as an aspect of inter-group relationship does not take place in a vacuum but a number of social and cultural factors determine its origin and expression. As a symptom it reflects the underlying socio-cultural structure and dynamics of society. Even if the oft-repeated slogan, "All change is revolutionary change", may not be accepted, it can be argued

⁴E.W. Stewart and J.A. Glym, *Introduction to Sociology*, New Delhi, Tata McGraw Hill, 1976, p. 230.

that the processes of social change are often accompanied by, and sometimes are also initiated by, some amount of social violence. In the Indian context the processes of industrialization, urbanization, democratization, and cultural modernization have tended to bring together diverse collectivities into mutual interdependence and impingement. Possibilities of strains and conflicts among them have increased because of the acceptance of new values and ideals of equality and social justice, and a widening gap between these ideals and practice. As the knowledge and awareness of the gap between poverty and wealth increases along with the rising aspirations and assertion of one's rights, the conflict is intensified. As a result of the perception of the state structure as inefficient, partisan, and corrupt, its external symbols themselves become the target of attack. Faith in the social institutions—law, police, judiciary—begins to decline and a tendency for 'direct action' becomes stronger. New techniques of mass protests are devised to browbeat the law enforcing agencies. Above all, new rationalizations for recourse to violence are invented. It will be futile to search for the 'causes' of collective social violence in merely localized events and factors. The deep rooted unrest having its ramifications at the national level has to be carefully analyzed. We cannot afford to proceed from incident to incident in an *ad hoc* fashion in search of causes and solutions. This also underlines the fact that there cannot be a merely 'law and order' solution to the problem of collective social violence. In fact, the legislative, policing, and judicial apparatus need to be geared to meet the complex challenges by integrating them with other community actions and developmental programmes. Insofar as collective social violence could be viewed as an attempt at redefinition and restructuring of the prevailing social structure, possibility of an alternative and peaceful manner of such change could always be explored. Fortunately, in our country, the norms and traditions of violent social change have not yet become firmly established; the informal social control mechanisms have not been completely dislocated; the pathological values of the neo-rich class have not taken deep roots; and the values of conciliation and compromise inherited from the national movement are still alive. There is still time for us to pause, reflect, and take timely [action to contain the impending disaster.

*Multiple Causation of Collective Violence : A Sketch of the Nellie Tragedy**

C.D. Tripathi

We have grown accustomed to giving labels to episodes of collective violence on the basis of a single cause or factor—communal, agrarian, caste-based, election violence, etc. To my mind, such labels are mostly misleading because aetiology of collective violence is not so simple or straightforward. Eruption of collective violence almost invariably takes place on account of a multiplicity of causes. Sometimes it may be possible to establish a hierarchy of such causes but quite often even that is not possible. What happened at more than a dozen places in Assam during the elections in February 1983 in the course of just three weeks amply illustrates this point. In this short paper it is proposed to discuss the concept through a very brief study of the violence that took place in the Nellie area of Nagaon (formerly spelled as Nowgong) district on February 18, 1983. I have selected this episode because the Nellie Tragedy was perhaps the most severe in the history of collective violence in Independent India.

SOCIO-POLITICAL BACKGROUND

First, a brief summary of the background. An agitation on the "Foreign nationals issue" was launched in the State of

*This sketch is drawn from personal perception of the author based on information gathered from newspapers and newsmagazines and personal knowledge. It is in no way connected with the author's position as a government officer or with official records, to which he had no access.

Assam towards the middle of 1979. Quite a lot has been written and discussed about the real nature of the agitation but that is not relevant for our purpose. The point relevant for us is that during this agitation which seemed to defy any solution, very strong forces creating sharp divisions amongst various sections of people living in Assam were unleashed. By the beginning of 1983 the relations between various communities and social cohesion in the state appeared to have reached the breaking point. In this situation, the search for a political solution was a most unenviable task. However, in January 1983 the search for such a solution coupled with constitutional compulsions resulted in announcement of elections to be held on February 17 and 20, 1983. The elections were opposed and boycotted by the agitators on the ground that no proper elections could be held unless the revision of electoral rolls was done, alleging that the rolls contained the names of a large number of foreign nationals. Government and the Election Commission were determined to go ahead with the election and deal with their administrative and security implications. The elections that followed were most unusual by any standards and during the first three weeks of February violent incidents took place all over the Brahmaputra valley in the plains of Assam, resulting in large scale killings and arson. The violence at Nellie and 10 surrounding villages over an area of approximately 80 sq. kms. was the most serious one. In this paper we are not concerned with the wisdom or otherwise of holding the elections, nor with the state of preparedness and attitudes of the law-enforcing authorities. We shall concentrate only on bare facts necessary to understand the causes of the tragedy.¹

The first and the foremost fact to be taken note of is the population composition in the area under reference. The original inhabitants of these areas are a tribe called the

¹The background of the elections in Assam in February 1983 as well as their aftermath have been reasonably well described in Shekhar Gupta's book, *Assam : A Valley Divided*, New Delhi, Vikas, 1984. The book gives a graphic—though journalistic—account of the violence in Assam, including Nellie massacre.

Lalungs, who are related to the extensive Bodo tribal group.² The total population of Lalungs is not more than ninety thousand. Traditionally, the Lalungs looked upon all the lands in and around their villages to be their own regardless of the fact whether these lands were settled with them or not or whether they physically possessed these lands or not. From the turn of the century, Muslim landless peasants from the over-populated erstwhile East Bengal started migrating to various regions in Assam including the area under reference. These hardy immigrants proved to be excellent cultivators and gradually reclaimed large tracts of lands, brought these under cultivation and became reasonably prosperous, though by no means rich, even by rural standards. Like many areas in Assam where the Muslim immigrants settled down, in the Nellie area also they were disliked by the old inhabitants. Religious and cultural differences accentuated the dislike. Their prosperity—though acquired solely by their toil—also created envy. Above all, the Lalungs looked upon these immigrants as usurpers. In Independent India some Hindu Bengali refugees also settled in small numbers at and around Nellie. They were also never accepted by the local Lalungs.

Events

Thus the Lalungs' perception of the foreign nationals' issue was essentially not a political one and whatever support they extended to the agitation was based primarily on their experience of economic and cultural effects of the immigrants' occupation of the lands that they regarded as their own. Very little is really known about how the violence in the Nellie area was organised, who were its organisers, and even what actually happened. We do not know if the government made a complete analysis of the Nellie tragedy. In any case, it is unfortunate that full and authentic facts are not available to the public and for any analysis of the events we have to

²A brief account of the Lalungs may be found in G.S. Sarma Thaukr's book, *The Plains Tribes of Lakhimpur, Dibrugarh, Sibsagar and Now-gong*, Tribal Research Institute, Government of Assam, Shillong, 1972.

almost entirely rely on the reports of a few journalists.³

We, however, do know that while the Lalungs supported the agitators insofar as boycott of the elections was concerned, the immigrant Muslims were pro-elections. This created an immediate rift between the two communities and there were some incidents of violence between them which proved to be provocative. Some children of both the communities were murdered on February 16 and 17.

In the first twelve days of February a number of clashes between various communities took place in many parts of Assam and a large number of lives were lost.⁴ In the next five days serious incidents multiplied, the most outrageous being the violence at Gohpur in Darrang district in which about 100 persons were killed.⁵ The government machinery was fully occupied with the preparations for and holding of elections. The public order environment, therefore, was not conducive to proper maintenance of law and order which, according to popular impression, was receiving a rather low priority.⁶ It was in this atmosphere that the Lalungs of nearby villages decided to attack the villages inhabited by

³Government of Assam had appointed a one-man Commission headed by Shri T.P. Tiwari (A former Chief Secretary of U.P.) to enquire into various administrative aspects of the violence in February 1983 soon after the Congress (I) Government headed by Hiteswar Saikia took office. Findings of the Commission were not published. The new Asom Gana Parishad Government formed in December 1985 has also not published these findings.

The violence at Nellie and elsewhere in Assam was naturally covered by all newspapers and magazines in India and many abroad. Greater reliance may be placed on the coverage done by *India Today*, *Sunday*, *The Indian Express* and the *Telegraph* in their issues during the relevant period. *India Today* (March 15, 1983) carried a vivid account of the "Nellie Massacre" with gruesome photographs, Arun Shourie's analysis of the events and circumstances leading to them appeared in May 15, 1983, issue of *India Today* and 12-18 June, 1983, issue of *Sunday*. The latter gave rise to a hot debate which was carried on in this magazine till the end of July.

⁴*India Today*, February 28, 1983. In the cover story, "The Burning of Assam" by Chaitanya Kalbag, the death toll in the anti-election agitation in the ten days after February 2, was reported to be seventy.

⁵*India Today*, March 15, 1983—the cover story, "The Nellie Nightmare" by Jagannath Dubashi and Sumanta Sen.

⁶Arun Shourie in *India Today*, May 15, 1983, and *Sunday*, 12-18 June, 1983, *op. cit.*, also Chaitanya Kalbag in *India Today*, February 28, 1983, *op. cit.*

the immigrants. This was preceded by some incidents of violence between the two communities as noted above but when and by whom the planning of the attacks was initiated is not known. There is, however, evidence to show that the tribals had started gathering at least four days prior to the attacks. The actual attack by about ten thousand tribals took place in the morning of February 18, 1983 and continued for just five or six hours. The sole object of the attackers was to kill which they fulfilled in the most brutal manner. They used spears, swords, knives and daos although in a few cases fire arms were also used. Some non-Lalungs—both tribals and non-tribals—also reportedly joined them. The terrified villagers including a very large number of women and children started running away in the western and northern directions, *i.e.*, opposite to the direction of attacks. The northern and western sides of this area are bound by the river Kopili. Fleeing villagers were surprised by groups of Lalung tribals at the river bank and many of them were butchered there. By the afternoon, it was all over. We do not know the figures of casualties. The figure given by the government is reported to be 1,383 dead, although many believe it to be between 2,000 and 2,500. The figures would certainly be higher than those given in the first reports, because for weeks after the incidents dead bodies continued to be discovered in paddy fields and river banks not only in the Nellie area but in many other places in Assam.⁷

Whatever the actual figures of casualties, there can be no two opinions about the severity of violence. The dehumanization of an entire people was complete. The photographs of the large number of children and woman butchered by the attackers, which were flashed all over the civilized world, bear ample testimony to the merciless nature of violence.⁸ The

⁷The official figures of death toll quoted by Arun Shourie in *India Today*, March 15, 1983, *op. cit.*

⁸In *India Today*, the most gruesome photographs taken by Bhawan Singh appeared on March 15, 1983. The most horrible of these was that of the massacred children laid out for mass burial at Nellie. A photograph of the same scene by the same photographer was also published by the *Time* magazine and later included in "Images of 1983" in the special issue of *Newsweek*, January 2, 1984. Interestingly, the

(Continued on next page)

other salient points to note are the swiftness and severity of attack and the strategy adopted by the attackers. The first one could be attributed to the traditional war methods of the tribals. In fact, the history of Assam is full of incidents of very swift surprise attacks by tribals on British garrisons during the 19th and early 20th centuries.⁹ But the other aspect, namely, the strategic positioning of the attackers to block the escape routes and use of fire arms implies organisation and guidance by experts trained in such methods. We know practically nothing about who were behind this organisation.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES

Having briefly sketched the events, let us try to analyse this single biggest incident of violence since the partition of India. The carnage at Nellie raises many pertinent questions regarding the state of intelligence, adequacy of otherwise of the available police forces and their deployment and, above all, whether the carnage could have been prevented. By passing all such questions as not being germane to the analysis at hand, I would like to take note of the following four points :

- (i) As observed earlier, there was perpetual hostility between the Lalungs and the immigrants on account of the occupation of lands of Lalungs by the latter. If these lands had not been occupied by immigrant Muslims but by some other groups belonging to the same religion as the Lalungs, there would still have been bitterness and hostility. But would there have been a violence of such magnitude? The answer is perhaps 'no'.
- (ii) On the issue of elections the Lalungs and immigrant Muslims were opposed to each other. The opposition

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Newsweek added the following legend to the photograph, "In India, decades of sectarian hatred exploded into bloodshed as Hindus in Assam killed more than 3,000 Muslims, mostly women and children."

⁹E.A. Gait, *A History of Assam*, (Third revised edition), Calcutta, Thacker & Spink, 1963, chapters 20 to 22 give interesting accounts of such raids.

of Lalungs, as noted earlier, was itself essentially based on the land factor. Would the opposite stands taken on the issue of elections have resulted in large scale violence? The answer again is clearly 'no'.

- (iii) It was well known that the holding of the elections being the top-most priority for the government machinery for enforcement of law and order was primarily busy in that connection. In fact, the police forces were already over-stretched. It was also known that in accordance with the directions of the Election Commission of India, Army was not likely to be called out in the aid of civil power during the elections. In such a situation organisers of violence—whoever they might have been—felt convinced that there were serious gaps in the maintenance of law and order and if an attack was carried out swiftly their objective would be met before any intervention by the authorities.
- (iv) A fact, which is not at all well known is that the Lalungs have been staunch Hindus for a long time. In their own way, quite often, they would exhibit an attachment to their faith which is much stronger than even that of high caste Hindus.¹⁰ This strong faith coupled with tribal ruggedness gave a communal touch and barbarity or the worst type to the whole episode.

With these observations it may now be possible to sum up the factors responsible for violence at Nellie as follows :

- (a) There was a feeling of hatred towards the immigrant

¹⁰This statement is based on the author's personal observations during his tenure as Dy. Commissioner of Nowgong between 1969 and 1972. However, the author is grateful to Shri Homen Borgahain, a top-ranking literary personality of Assam and a reputed journalist who pin-pointed its relevance in the context of the Nellie massacre. It may be mentioned that unlike other tribes in the north-eastern India, Lalungs, regard a Hindu god (Lord Mahadeva) as their creator. In their pantheon the Hindu deities are most prominent. Further, in the 20th century, the formal Hindu religion and religious practices have been gradually submerging the traditional tribal religion of the Lalungs.

Muslims amongst the attacking Lalungs because of a sense of deprivation.

- (b) These feelings were fomented during the four years of agitation, the main target of which were immigrant Muslims.
- (c) The announcement of elections placed the two communities in violently opposite camps and proved to be the immediate cause of the explosive situation.
- (d) The elections also provided the timing and opportunity for attacks; and,
- (e) There was an organisation to plan, guide and execute the attacks.

It is clear that the violence at Nellie cannot be labelled as communal violence. It cannot be labelled as a land-based or agrarian violence. It will be even more wrong to describe it as an election violence. The 'total violence' at Nellie included elements of all these and more.

COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE : MULTIPLE CAUSATION AND PREVENTION

While model building is quite often an unrealistic exercise, it is, nevertheless, useful for understanding the basic nature of things. No model can be of universal validity. However, if Nellie is an indicator of aetiology of violence, it suggests that a situation of large scale collective violence develops when the following factors are present (since the discussions in this paper are essentially from an administrator's point of view the suggested 'model' may also be considered as an administrative one as distinct from, say, a sociological one) :

- (i) Long standing hostility and friction between two or more groups of people;
- (ii) deterioration of public order environment;
- (iii) heightened activities of organised groups fomenting violence helped by unsatisfactory public order environment; and
- (iv) immediate precipitating factors and the opportune moment for such groups;

Quite often it is the last one which catches the eye and gets the highest importance in the public mind resulting in giving a single label to episodes of collective violence. At least the administrators and the social scientists should be informed and cautious enough not to commit such mistake.

Before concluding this sketch, one may venture to draw a framework for preventing collective violence by identifying the roles for various concerned agencies with reference to the factors enumerated above. I would suggest as follows :

- (i) The first factor can be removed by political will and social action.
- (ii) The second factor can be removed by political will and administrative vigilance.
- (iii) The third factor can be curbed by political will and administrative action.
- (iv) The fourth factor can be avoided by administrative vigilance and action which, in turn, can be ensured only by political will.

One need not point out that political will is the common denominator in all the four preventive measures.

Discussion

Collective violence is application of force and physical force for a particular interest on another group with a projected goal in sight. Collective violence is an adversary intermediary perspective between the two groups exercising power and those who are the recipients of this phenomenon. It may be application of injury or it may be a threat of the application of injury, because that is the result, or it may be that the injury may be more psychological. Violence is necessary in certain obstinate situation in which a particular group wants a particular change but the other group—adversary group which is a more *status quo* oriented and does not want a change, then protest has to be converted into violence for getting certain things done. Another aspect of collective violence is when a particular assembly turns into an exciting situation and then collective violence takes place. Then there is another very important aspect of collective violence, where it would appear as if it is not collective, but there is a collectivity behind violence as well. So collective violence may be a reflection of a group or a reflection of sentiments of a collectivity and is being taken up by a couple of precipitators as in the case of Naxalites or in the case of pluralism where the precipitator appears to be good, but there is a collectivity behind it. The most important aspect is that violence does lead to a change and may be it is a residual change, and may be a normative change later on, or may be a goal-oriented change which we call as development. The residue of collective violence is a change—there is some change in the society. Whether this change is also a development-oriented—economic development, technological development or social development. The concept of social development is still being debated. What actually is social development or what is the concept of social development? It may be worthwhile to

delineate the possible linkage between development and collective violence: (1) It is not the development but the pattern of development and the resultant frustration that may lead to collective violence. (2) The main source of collective violence may be the lack of adjustment, commitment and attachment. (3) Collective violence may be symptomatic of shortcomings or contradictions in social system. (4) Collective violence, partly may be rational and partly it may be goal oriented. (5) Sometimes collective violence could be instrumental and sometimes it may be an adoptive response, what may be considered to be a rational choice of behaviour. We need to explain the importance of the social bond vis-a-vis the collective violence in India, in particular, and in general in all societies.

The contention that Indian masses are peaceful is not borne out by the available account. The reality of the 19th century movements in Bengal and Bihar, although limited in goals, yet they reflect a facet of the reality. In the 20th century, quite often, the Zamindars and villagers entered into a conflict situation. In the last three decades, there has been agrarian violence in different states during the harvest seasons. It appears that with the removal of Zamindari, the middle classes have benefited and, as a consequence, the class interests have been altered. Many sub-classes and new classes have emerged over the years. Our endeavour has been to introduce induced and planned change to achieve collective goal. However, without structural changes development is not possible. Moreover, we wanted to have distributive justice in a society which is characterised by inequalities of various types. Political development was aimed at the change in group oriented power structure to individual oriented power structure. Cultural development was aimed at the development of secular sentiments. Since our rules are modern but modes are traditional, it leads to collective frustration. We witness that, in the last four decades, the hopes of the people have not been adequately fulfilled. New problems have arisen which have led to collective frustrations and violence.

In collective violence the actors, participants and aggressors are those who suffer from a sense of insecurity,

maladjustment, lack of commitment to conventional values and ideals that prevail and are effective at a particular point of time. These realities ultimately would decide as to whether violence will take place or not. Human society can grow only if every member and the community attempt to operate together. The individuals and communities are different in many ways, but continue to be unit of a society. Since we have been and continue to have diversity, there is a likelihood that the sentiments of a segment could be invoked by the interested which may result in the generation of forces that lead to violence. Division of minds leads to violence as there are people who get governed by personal motivations and tend to exploit these divisive tendencies, geo-sentiments, etc.

It may not be the process of development but the pattern of development that may lead to collective violence as development leads to poor adjustment, commitment and attachment to the society. These, in turn, may result into violence. Collective violence partially may be irrational and part of it may be goal oriented. At times it may be adaptive violence.

With a view to understand the total reality, we have to understand the traditional and modern context of Indian society. The emerging value system is pitted against the traditional value structure. We have projected new hopes—equality, justice, fraternity, etc., and we repose considerable faith in our political leaders that they will be able to translate these philosophical aspects of our Constitution. Quite often hopes may be belied. Broadly, we have the following variations :

1. Socio-ecological deprivations,
2. Rural-urban disparity,
3. Caste conflict,
4. Political culture and their varying shades,
5. Neo-rich middle class, and
6. Social control dimension.

As a consequence, conflict and cohesion continue to dominate the operational dimensions of Indian society during the developmental era.

There are two ways of looking at this problem of collec-

tive violence. One is from the point of view of the agencies particularly state agencies which are supposed to check collective violence or the agencies whose failure to do the responsibility assigned to them leads to collective violence or also in provoking collective violence. (2) There are certain administrative or economic reforms that should be taken, which should be carried out, but when they are not carried out they provoke collective violence. Division of mind at the personal level, at the individual level, at the collective level leads to violence.

In order to understand the emergence or occurrence and frequent occurrence of violence in contemporary Indian society, it was necessary to take a rather holistic view, *i.e.*, unless we try to look at and appreciate the national scene and the basic causes of unrest in all walks of life, mere attention to certain specific events and specific causes may not lead us further. Although Indian society is plural, some degree or an amount of internal integration was maintained traditionally because of a particular kind of social order or social structure, certain values which were inherent, though in sociological literature we find that our traditional social order was based on an hierarchical system, there was inequality inherent in the institutions and the society itself. There was a holistic characteristic and these are some of the traditional characteristics of the Indian society and the contradictions which have come about or which are coming about or that certain new values are fixed against the traditional structure and values. The institutionalised inequality is pitched against the modern concept or new values of equality or justice. Hierarchy is pitched against the more equalitarian social order. In this sense the transformation is supposed to be taking place in the traditional social structure as well as the value structure and it is this, you may call break or certain maladjustment in this process of transformation which gives rise to the various problems.

India attained Independence with certain hopes and aspirations with which we had started our journey. It is very important to see what were the hopes and aspirations which were projected at the dawn of Independence and what has happened and what has been the result of all the process of

change or transformation and attempts and policies which have been undertaken after Independence. The picture today is rather bleak in the sense that there is uneven economic development, without social justice, failure to carry the fruits of economic development to all sections of the society, failure of any ambitious programme of poverty amelioration and land reforms and all these programmes and development of vested interests in these programmes. Then we also find some amount of contradictions—despite our socialistic pretensions we have developed a rather capitalistic society under state patronage—which is another factor. We also observe failure at the administrative and political level in the form of corruption, inefficiency and other issues which have come up. This is the broad scene, the national scene right from Independence till this point of time, that gives us an idea of what the real ailments at the national level are. Within this broad framework we have to discuss a few dimensions of change which have created several irritants in the relationship amongst collectivities or pluralities. Despite the contradiction and maladjustment and tensions, we can still have some hope in our national social parity because the norms and traditions of violence are not firmly established in spite of several incidents of violence these days. The pathological values of the neo-rich class have also not taken roots as yet and the values of compromise and conciliation which we have developed or inherited from the national movement are still alive. There is a ray of hope, and probably all these tensions and maladjustments can be managed and our society can really absorb these shocks of transformation.

If violence is only due to violence in the hearts of men, then 'thought', unless translated into 'action' is of no consequence. This point gets illustrated by this incident. When the first riot took place in UK against the Blacks and the Asians in UK, about five British youths were brought before the court of law, and this was the judgement of the High Court. *It is that here in England you are free to think of dirty thoughts, the Constitution allows to think dirty thoughts. But you are not allowed under the Constitution to translate dirty thoughts into dirty action.* So, a thought process is different from an action process. And he said you are quite free to

think that all Blacks should be massacred, you are quite free to think that all Asians should be expelled from Britain, but if you violate the law of the land, if you disturb, what is called, the Queen's peace on the road, the law will come heavily upon you and he sentenced them to seven years rigorous imprisonment. We should distinguish between dirty thoughts and dirty deeds. One has to ask what is the state of society? There can be social tensions, very serious social tensions, and still no rioting may take place and there can be just mild tensions when rioting takes place. There is no society in the world, there it never was and there never will be, a society in the world which is free from injustice and tensions. But injustice and tensions sometime lead to riots and sometimes not a leaf stirs. We have to ask this question as to why? The same tensions are building in the minds of the Muslims everywhere in India, and rioting takes place in one state and does not take place in the second state. Now take the same state. Everything is the same in Moradabad, Aligarh or in other areas of the State, the same Chief Minister, the same Home Minister, the same Director General of Police, the same Chief Secretary—and in one district there is absolute peace and in another district there is a district magistrate and a senior superintendent of police who allow things to get out of control and there is rioting. So, if tension always converts itself into action, there should be something uniform. In any society, while dirty thoughts are permissible, dirty actions are not. But, sooner or later, thoughts lead to action, and the violence which follows dependent on how soon or how late. The British lobby failed to be a protector of racial minority because dirty thoughts caught up with him sooner or later. And therefore though the effect of that is not immediate, it is insidious, and those who look into the deeper causes of violence ought to take note of the dirty thoughts and see that these dirty thoughts do not spread and instead are replaced by more wholesome thoughts which can hold. People may have a stake in society, may have a faith in society, must have a faith in the institutions and sooner or later will be able to deal with deprivations effectively, and if this does not exist then the processes of social disintegration, including violence, are bound to take place.

The word 'collective' is the order of the day because we talk of collective thinking, collective wisdom, collective bargaining, and why not 'collective violence'. The book on 'The Anatomy of Destructiveness' discusses forms of violence: (i) Biologically adaptive—life saving, and which is common for animal and men, and (ii) Non-adaptive. Unfortunately the first kind of violence can be seen only in animal kingdom not in human beings, because they have a life instinct, they have to preserve their life.

In violence what is important is the concept of uneven development across the communities, across the regions and territory that you can leave the territory—some territories are so important that the struggle is about those territories which are important to development, that they become focal for economic development. Some systems are irreconcilable and this difference between the denied and those who have the power. Violence is the result of thought connected with actual overt action by this mass communication and somebody said at one time that certain modes of mass communication may be responsible for emergence of collective violence and severity that it attains.

Thought and action should be separated and language should never be allowed to come in that part of the thing which you want to remove, *i.e.*, collective violence. And some type of contradictions are antagonistic, they cannot be reconciled. So what happens is collective violence. There is a general theory of human being that language and action can be separated. Not only this but thought, action and language could be separated and we separate them one by one. Unless the families are themselves made in a certain way, aggression is concentrated in certain family, and are not in one family or one class, or one community or one political party so then in that case that aggression will become collective violence otherwise if it is bad, it is never changed to collective violence, if it is uniformly heterogeneously distributed, it does not become homogeneous in some section—so all definitions or/explanations of psychology would need some sort of additional structures.

What should be given thought is : Has development resulted in uniform development process (*per se*) or it has resulted

in deprivation and consequently what are the consequences in terms of behaviour of the groups that have become more deprived. This aspect needs to be highlighted.

VI TRENDS



Collective Violence is the Child of Politics

N.S. Saksena

Like individual violence, collective violence can either be due to immediate emotional reactions or due to premeditated motives. We are concerned with the latter variety. It is possible to make this variety of collective violence an exceedingly rare phenomenon due to the following reasons:

1. An overwhelming number of the people generally want peace.
2. In a well-policed state, the rioters may not be able to match the resources of the internal security apparatus.
3. The legal powers available to the police are enormous.

In spite of these three favourable factors, lawlessness in India is escalating due to lack of will of the political executive. This lack of will is not due to human kindness. It is due to their own guilt-complexes. The recent examples of Punjab and Assam prove this point. The two Accords prove that till 1984 the Government of India was treating the dominant sections in Punjab and Assam unjustly due to election politics; counting of votes and maintaining law and order cannot be reconciled.

In 1970 the then Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh gave a press statement:

1. Government will not interfere with the police in fulfilling its mandatory legal role of maintaining law and order.
2. No case will be withdrawn from courts.

3. No premature release from jails.
4. No convict will be given a higher category as political prisoner.

The results were unparalleled in the history of law and order:

1. Not even one communal riot took place in 1970 in Uttar Pradesh—a state known for several communal riots each year.
2. There was not one case of police firing on mobs.
3. There were no fake encounters.
4. There were no deaths in police custody.

These are verifiable facts from records.

This state of calm can be attained. It does not mean that social or economic or political tensions will disappear. Groups can continue to have dirty thoughts of killing each other; they can nurture thoughts but they will not be permitted to translate them in action. Laws against rape cannot prevent what the Bible calls "adultery in one's heart" but these, if strictly enforced, can prevent physical crimes. One participant raised the question whether rule of law is rigid or dynamic. It is a rigid concept but dynamism is affected by changing laws and by the functionaries. There is no need to change the concept.

To attain a state of calm the political executive has to be divested of its powers to interfere with the process. The government which came out with a White Paper on Punjab did not mention that under its own verbal directives the police did not even arrest the accused when its own DIG, Mr. Atwal, was murdered. One aspect of state terrorism is for the state not to enforce its own laws. The guarding of frontiers is the most elementary duty of the state and yet in Assam the foreign nationals were openly encouraged to infiltrate in order to become vote banks. This process has been considerably contained on Rajasthan-Pakistan borders.

The scale of violence and rigging in the last State Assembly elections in Bihar was so much that the elections could not be called true and fair. This collective violence should not have been rewarded. The government's duty was to dissolve the

Assembly and hold fresh elections. Even in Bihar free elections can be held.

The science of maintaining law and order has not failed. If every doctor in India was first to investigate that political beliefs of his patient, to report these to his Health Minister and get orders whether it is desirable to kill or cure the patient it would not be the failure of the science of medicine but the ethics of the doctors and the government. Something like this on a modest scale obtains in the fields of law and order. The Communist Government in Kerala in the years 1957-59 took no action when its own Unions indulged in violence, the police opened fire repeatedly on violent mobs instigated by rival Trade Unions. The Government of West Bengal had the same discriminatory policy in the years 1967-70. The police attitude towards Student's Unions depends on the party in power and the label of the Unions. Discrimination destroys people's faith in law itself.

One serious difficulty now being faced by the government is that the police is no longer a reliable instrument because the police, apart from the public, has hardly any faith in the government. Eminent leaders of the police have to lecture to their men that the government will support them if they enforce the law. It is like the DG of Medical and Health Services exhorting the doctors that no harm will come to them if they cure their patients. The gap between practice and precept destroys credibility which is essential for any government action, including maintenance of law and order. That is why even Machiavelli advised his 'Prince' to *always* speak the truth so that his occasional lies could be believed.

We talk of high level Cabinet meetings taking big decisions. In the field of law and order not more than one out of 10 DGs of Police can now get their orders implemented by the Police. A government fond of stooge Police Chiefs and a plethora of Police Chiefs trying to please their Chief Ministers have virtually destroyed the credibility of Police Chiefs also. If a list was made of all the Police Chiefs in India for the last two decades it would be found that almost all darlings of the government were hated by their men and the orders of all effective Police Chiefs were obeyed by the force. Since they were hated by the government, they

remained in office under exceptional circumstances for a short period only.

More than 50 per cent serious cases of collective violence in India were due to inaction orally ordered by the government:

1. In the Ahmedabad riots of 1969 the police was ordered *not* to use firearms on the first day.
2. In Patna in March 1974 the Chief Minister ordered the Chief Secretary/IGP not to let police carry firearms. When arson broke out in a large scale it could not be checked because the Chief Minister has not available for long to change his orders.
3. In the Nellie massacre in Assam there was enough force to check murders but they had strict orders to guard only the ballot boxes. The right to vote, which very few excesses, got the priority over the right to life which thousands could not get.

It may be added that all these orders are totally illegal.

How can law and order be maintained if even in 1980s the Governors, sworn to uphold the Constitution and the laws, force the Police Chiefs to enforce their illegal orders. The Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, Mr. Jagmohan, had no legal authority to issue direct orders to the para-military forces before the Chief Minister's dismissal. The second example is much more atrocious, Mr. Ram Lal, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, had no legal powers to order the arrest of the Chief Minister and 162 of his MLAs.

It must be added that the Opposition has also evolved a dangerous theory that any amount of loss of property and loss of lives is justified if it gets them a few more votes in the next election.

What is the remedy ? It is total depoliticalisation of law and order. It is so even now under the law but not in practice. Suitable changes can be made to ensure that politics is totally kept out of this sphere. This does not mean independence to the police. There should also be legal machinery to prosecute policemen for murder if they stage false encounters or kill suspects by torture.

Politicians are not the only persons issuing illegal orders to the police. Senior IPS and IAS officers do the same every day.

Contemporary Terrorism in India with Special Reference to Punjab

S.S. Srivastava

The paper attempts to analyse the collective dynamics with regard to violence of an extreme criminalising nature. It pertains more to the analyses of the social conditions of a collectivity behind a structured violent behaviour than to the study of collective violence *per se*. It, therefore, endeavours to distinguish two different but overlapping violent criminal phenomena :

1. Emotionally charged, vandalic collective upsurge, reflecting, *sui-generis*, *spontaneity*. May be it is a mobilised action, motivated by a group with vested interests like riots or other forms of hostile mob behaviour.
2. Strategically structured phenomena, reflecting typical *continuity*, built on the support of a collectivity having both tacit and manifest interests (by and large political and economic) like terrorism.

Terroristic violence is raising its head in the developing countries more than relatively developed countries. For a democracy like ours, it is challenging its political and economic systems. It appears that the process of growth has not checked the disparities rather reinforced them. The classes experiencing relative deprivations—endogenous or imposed, while struggling for betterment, generate expressive violence. In non-compromising situations certain groups take or are made to take extreme step of making separatistic demand. In obstinate situation they break all the democratic and humanistic values and resort to indiscriminate killings to

humiliate the persons considered as adversaries.

Terrorism is neither a random or venomous attack of a frustrated or misguided person nor it is an irritant or indiscriminate outburst of an excited or inimical group. It is, *inter alia*, a cool, calculated and surreptitiously planned action of an organised collectivity, precipitated for a predetermined purpose.

Conceptualisation of terrorism has not been an easy task. Even the UN Expert Committee on Prevention of Terrorism, failed to arrive at a definitional consensus mainly because of the political and ideological differences of the member nations. It is interesting to find one justifying terrorism as a counter terroristic measure against the other. Terrorism, therefore, can only be conceptualised within the national parameters where it may emerge in different forms. In our country the diversity is apparent in three sub-structures—terrorism in Punjab, insurgency in the north-eastern border states and 'naxalism' in other parts of the country. These sub-structures differ with regard to the determinants of strains, ideological commitments and differential identities (*vis-a-vis* the national identity) of the precipitators and supporters, nature of the demands and the ecology of the area of operation. The common characteristics are identifiable as guerrilla type of *modus operandi* with total indifference to victim, personality traits of the precipitators and similar other characteristics.

The typological clarity, by analysing the structural parts of a phenomenon, is necessary for its systematic understanding. An attempt to delineate the concept of terrorism may include : (a) Ideology of extreme violence; (b) Destruction of life and property or threat to perform such an act; (c) Set on a selected or chance or spill-over targets belonging to the adversary group; (d) The precipitators are the youths committed to highest degree of violence—homicidal or suicidal, for a cause considered sacred and existential with the support community (collectivity) to which action plan the precipitators owe allegiance; and (e) The support community generates power for the precipitators by extending them money, material, training and protection.

The targets invariably belong to the groups which is

opposed to this either as a functionary of the law enforcement or the members of the general society. *Terrorism, therefore, is an interactional divisive conflict between two divergent interest groups—one having the prerogative of the formal power and the other challenging it with the generated informal power.* The support structure for the emergence of such aggrandising criminal structures after Independence, may be understood in the background of the social forces prevailing since then.

Among several changes having taken place after the advent of our democratic, secular and socialistic Constitution, are the following interlinked processes for granting high valence to the crimes of excessive violence indulged in mostly by the young persons :

1. Consciousness for collective power as a consequence of democratic politicisation;
2. Egalitarianism and rise of anti-authoritarian and anti-meritocratic sub-culture affecting more the socially and economically marginally involved youth sections;
3. Belief in violence as a process of politics of success; and
4. Sharp deviation from the ideological commitments for survival in the operations of political realities.

These almost sequential processes are the aftermath of political modernization imposed upon the traditionally conditioned action systems. It is experienced that this hiatus is supporting vested interest more than the normative interest satisfactions. The egalitarian spirit of the Constitution vowed to social and economic parity among the masses has led to the growth of reactive classes in terms differential social and material power in operation. Both the privileged and the under-privileged groups interact in a state of confrontation which, in a multi-party democratic set-up, more-often-than-not, is exploited by the political and economic interest groups. The privileged are the historically conditioned power groups, the under-privileged are being politicized to muster power to face the challenge, often under the protective norms of the state. Three conflicting structures, the under-privileged, the privileged and the mediatory formal power group interact

and effuse violence. The privileged and the under-privileged clash with bitterness when the question of survival comes up. This conflict can be enlarged to a movement like terrorism if favourable leadership and the necessary youth power is available to a community predisposed to violence and seeking for privileged status to mitigate the strains. This phenomenon explains much of our present day rise in the incidence of caste/communal strifes and upsurge of the tribal peasantry against the immigrant exploiters.

Different groups have been affected differently. Particularly the youth aggregates, provoked for modernised adult satisfactions, experiencing relative deprivations have reacted sharply. It is nothing strange if the youths in the country predominate in all forms of crime of violence.

There is a typical polarisation of a section (both rural and urban boys, in terms of the location of their families) which exists as surplus youth power concentrated in the urban aggregates (like educational campuses), having no vision of 'adult work future'. A strong craving for quick success and the realisation of a 'meagre hope' in the existing normative system of the general society, make them to alienate from it if not rebel against it. Such aspirants step in a state of 'marginality' and anti-authoritarian in terms of the legitimate cultural constraints. It is interesting to note that the National Policy on Education favours specialisation for technological and vocational advancement while the youths are prone to drift towards anti-meritocracy.

There is another noticeable feature to reckon with. The youths in general and rural migrants in particular, are in a state of slow transition from the self, kinship or communal identity, to a well needed national identity. They, by and large, are in a state of marginality; the national identity is yet to emerge to a desired extent. Therefore they oscillate in a state of sub-national animation in certain areas. Therefore these youths are exploited by the motivators of the communal, ethnic or separatistic ideologies. The tribals of north-east areas claim to fight for the preservation of their ethnic identity. This unholy alliance between the volatile youth population and strategy oriented adult population becomes more operational during elections. The striking

students, fighting labour unions, agitating minorities and even the bands of criminal (all youth aggregates) are activated by the political groups in order to raise a strong force of mercenaries to jeopardize the political interest of the opponents. After the elections the mercenaries, prone to violence, are left out in a state of reinforced conflict, to resort to further violence for survival. One can observe that serious criminalities shoot up before and after the important political events.

It may, therefore, be concluded that the current political conduciveness to violence is a necessary precondition (a strong contributory factor), if not a sufficient condition, for the spurt of grave violence in the country. However, there may be more associating factors which cumulate to make the precondition sufficient to cause collective violent phenomena. These factors need be essentially considered while a particular mode of organised collective violence is to be understood.

In this reference one may realise that when *marginality* and serious social strains abound in the country, then why only certain cultural groups are relatively more disposed to terrorism, 'naxalism' or insurgency. Maybe their cultural habits, specific values or topography, specifically support extreme assaultive behaviour. For example, in some communities loyalty to an ideology considered necessary for existence is a value *par excellence*. Invariably such communities have a high degree of mechanical solidarity and potentiality to strong reactions, both homicidal and suicidal, in defence of the sacred value. Much depends upon the content of the strain and quality of leadership. If such communities are also habituated to hard life having remarkable strength to tolerate pain and to dissipate fear quickly and keep arms as a symbol of masculinity, one can comprehend the presence of a typical sub-culture of violence in them. Such sub-culture is highly combustible for ablazing regional, communal or ethnic terrorism, if the communities feel serious socio-economic strain and have surplus youth power. These traits create dualism in personality. A highly moralistic person may, at times, strongly justify irreligious indulgence and marginally culturalised groups can be provoked to resort to brutal killings and fight to death for a rhetorically sacred cause.

Punjab terrorism is a typical example of polarisation of separatistic communal politics drawing strength from religion and linguistic differences by exploiting the surplus youth power and general vulnerability of youths to violence. It is a tactful conversion of a minority communal movement into a violent political movement, by a group motivated to another division of the mainland. Sizable section of the agitators, however, may prefer to settle down with political concessions if not secession. The strong cultural sensitivity to such a line of action has effused because a section of the community, not averse to aggressive behaviour, feels, *inter alia*, economic strain which throws an alarming number of young persons out to destabilise the economic and social status. They are, at the same time, psychologised with the belief that secession or even a radical political concession, is feasible, is the panacea for the ailment. The surreptitious vested interests of the core of the precipitators are amply evident.

Punjab thus has come in the web of a distressingly antagonistic group politics between five overlapping societal structures : (1) Conformists of the Constitution, who call for improving socio-economic status of the state. (2) Communal concessionists who strive for a special minority identity mainly for political considerations. (3) Radicals who follow the broad communist ideology. A section of the radicals has 'naxalite' leanings. Being vocal against the separatistic activities, the radicals, of late, have become hit-targets of the extremists. (4) Communal separatists are the proliferators of terrorism. They claim separate national identity. The demand being non-negotiable under the Constitution, make them pursue extremistic ways. They hit with vengeance and thrive because of the support of a large collectivity of marginals (semi-conformists, communal concessionists and communal separatists). (5) Traditional offenders who have established a typical criminal nexus with the extremists for mutual existence. They prove more functional to the continuance of terrorism *per se*. The marginals constitute a large but amorphous group being nationalist by inertia but communalist by the psychology of the vested interest. They thus maintain dual identity which gives anonymity to the extremists when they take shelter under their cover. The marginals have

grown excessively soft to the terroristic activities rationalising them as the obvious reactions of the youths avenging the blue star injury and the incessant oppressions thereafter.

The separatists also claim to muster a strong sympathetic community support from those fraters who have settled outside the country. These migrants enjoying relatively higher status have projected an intense polarising effect favouring secession, on their Indian fraters. The separatists in the country perceive greater mental and social identity with them. The support community of Punjab terrorism, therefore, is a trans-national collectivity. The separatists maintain different identities at the same time. All of them (communal, linguistic, regional, ethnic, national and trans-national) however, remain in a state of diffusion. The national identity is the weakest of all.

In unravelling the specific social forces fomenting turbulence in Punjab, one can visualize three undercurrents. The first refers to the surreptitious interest of the migrants who have already established reference group influence on the Indian fraternity. The migrants incidentally are experiencing a strong wave set to squeeze them out of their present moorings with no plausible alternative settlement. The squeezing is getting intense day-by-day. The Western countries from where they were pushing terrorism with impunity, are themselves being affected by terrorism which, of late, has adversely affected their internal stability and international relations. Meanwhile the migrants have built up a strong consensus to divert significant portion of their money to feed the separatist movement, through the nexus that they had built with the extremist elements is operating in India. A separate homeland where their effects can be safely transferred without being diluted in the general economy of the country, had been their tacit ambition.

A large chunk of the surplus youth power in Punjab and in neighbouring areas, is that of the prospective migrants who are frustratingly held up in the country because of the constraints on immigration to West. This has reinforced the feeling of deprivation and intensified their impulse to violence.

The other under-force distracting the unskilled and

unengaged youths from the national mainstream and pushing them to sectarian politics, operates from within the disbalanced economic growth of the state. Major portion of the economic inputs (money, material and technology) in free market situation, has slided more towards the urban industrial growth in small private sectors with limited job potential. The majority of peasantry roughly 60 to 70 per cent, have been deprived of the benefit. They have raised their productivity by sheer hard work and mechanisation. The mechanisation, however, has created surplus manpower—unskilled and unmarried youths, prone to move to cities (even abroad), for employment and education. The disjunction between agriculture and industry has added to the plight of these transient migrants. The agriculturists are reticent towards investing their savings in industries, the industrialists are equally reticent to create job opportunities to absorb the rural boss. Punjab cities, therefore, have large aggregates of surplus youth power biologically and culturally fit for the take-off in aggravated violence.

The third force symbiotically related to the first (*i.e.*, role of the migrants) but subscribing heavily to the dreaded terrorism is the criminal intimidation by the cross-national forces hostile to the country's stability. The borders are vulnerable to anti-national infiltrations to and fro. The cultural proximity of the people on both the sides with age-old free interactions, have not checked the illegitimate flux of men and material including those concerning proliferation of terrorism. The border villages are infested with traditional offenders, drug traffickers who play hand in hand with the terrorists. A typical marginality *vis-a-vis* the national character, prevails all along the borders and which goes in favour of persistence of anti-national activities. The occupants of the Indian side of the border—the Jat Sikhs, have a tradition of contributing squarely, to our armed forces. At the same time they are equally friendly to the inhabitants settling across. It appears that the local cultural affiliations defy political barriers.

The functional structure—the organisation, of terrorism is a laminated hierarchical but highly unified composition of a strong central 'core', a large but trusted 'ring' of the field operators and a prominent support communit—intra and inter-

national. Both the 'core' and the 'ring' are the actual precipitators of the extremists. Notwithstanding the high permeability between the three structures, the ring appears to be a different class. Most of its activists may be ideologically inept having long criminal records. Many of them may have changed their appearances for anonymity, which the religion they fight to defend, does not permit. Many of them belong to other communities. The typical nexus between the protagonists of Kashmir liberation and separate 'Khalistan' speak of this fact. The 'ring', therefore, is a hybrid class, comprising, *inter-alia*, even irreligious youths fighting for a religious cause.

On the whole one can say that terrorism is a criminopolitical process with different objectives. Some of them are non-negotiable and inherent in the continuance of terrorism *per se*. Whenever some important decision in connection with normalisation, is to be taken, the extremists come above board and strike with a hard blow. And now there is a group of dissidents among the Akalis, who for reasons not always unknown, are inhibitive of speaking anything against the terrorists if not against terrorism. In this reference the following realities are worth consideration:

1. Terrorism is so much criminalised and deep rooted that a political solution solely may not contain it. Should the majority of the precipitators and support community withdraw their hands, a section of the terrorists may stay on. The offenders or the avengers, have reached a point of no return.
2. Terrorists if continue to be blessed by the transnational forces, they can lay hands on sophisticated warfare technology and training.
3. The precipitators equipped with sophisticated weapons and enjoying anonymity, match well with the combating forces. In desperate situation the combating forces may over-act to resort to reprisal and develop what is called 'state terrorism', entailing chain reactions.
4. A sudden political change without striking the sources of strain and reclaiming the wayward youths, may hibernate terrorism for sometime only.

The Punjab terrorism is a highly complex phenomenon. The vested interests of the sub-groups, the social conduciveness of the support community, highly organised operation, the manoeuvrings from across the borders and the ecology of the area, have conjoined to add to the complexity. The counteraction programme, therefore, will necessarily involve a multidimensional and integrated approach of the social scientists and the administrators, besides a strong and neutral law enforcement for immediate control of the criminalities and restoration of confidence among the people.

In the light of these generalisation, a few rudimentary suggestions could be made regarding the containment of terrorism :

1. Setting up a strong neutral law enforcement machinery to break the 'core' and the 'ring' and to protect the vulnerable places like banks, commercial centres, transport, etc. Banks are being looted, but the banks' security is still neglected.
2. Induction of an intensive programme for the development of loyalty to nation. This programme will be educational and may have to start from the primary group level. Punjab villages have a tradition of serving the armed forces with pride. This can serve as one of the cues to build the programme.
3. The 'marginals' and the 'concessionists' have to be brought back to the national fold so that the right of sanctuary which they give to the extremists is snapped. More than 65 per cent of the state's population is still for the national cause.
4. A balanced economic growth is needed for the state with still greater emphasis on cooperatives, banking and agro-industries at the village level and on setting more national level public sector industries in the urban areas. The small sector's sectarian growth of industries in Punjab, has been counter-productive in terms of national development since it has given rise to loyalty to self or personal groups only—a degenerate trend promoting sectarian ideology.

The violent political process might have succeeded elsewhere; the Indian plurality has always rejected it of course at a heavy cost. It shall never succeed even now. Society is only paying for the misdeeds of the politicians.

Discussion

We are passing through times in which collective violence has been rearing its head again and again. We have found how violence in a sense is a historical stigma that has continued with us. In medieval times we were not able to have any system of grievance redressal and the only way in which people could express dissent was revolt. In a sense we continued this through the movement of civil disobedience which enabled us to find a weapon which the British could not counter. In later years, collective violence has continued probably on a bigger scale after Independence and we have got to face this reality. It is not the Muslims who used this weapon, it was a group within the Muslims who used it, it is not the Sikhs who used it, but a group in the Sikhs. This weapon of collective violence was used by groups within parties and communities and has now come to stay as a powerful weapon in the hands of those who want to express dissent or to show displeasure or even to ask for power. The fact is that there is also a peculiar trend of state violence that has continued from the medieval days. There is no doubt that the only weapon which was used in medieval times to suppress dissent was hanging or being crushed under an elephant or if you have political enemy then you should take him to the top of the rampart of the fort and push down to the troops below. The state violence which was used in the past continued to be used in British days and is still with us. And the only way in which we can get rid of state violence of a wrong type is when the right approach is made to all problems by parties and by all people.

The two groups, the administrators on the one side, and the academicians, on the other, have been practising a very mild form of collective violence against each other. The only redeeming feature has been, however, that this collective violence has been for bridging the gap between the administrators, on one side, and the academicians, on the other. A

large majority of people generally want peace. Whether it is a rich or the poor or the wage-earner they all want peace. Then, in a well-policed state, which India is, the resources of the rioters are no match for the resources of the internal security apparatus. At this time our resources in communication, in violence, in manpower, in rioting, etc., are enough to meet collective violence. It may just last for a short time but cannot last for long. Then, the legal powers available to the police are enormous. In fact the legal powers that have been given to the police in India are more than the Czars of Russia or the USA or France.

In spite of these powers, why lawlessness is escalating because there is a fourth factor which is essential for maintaining complete peace and that is the will of the political executive. And that will is lacking. Why it is lacking? It is not lacking because the political executive is overflowing with the milk of human kindness. They are capable of anything, but they are suffering from a guilt complex and when a man suffers from guilt complex, he cannot be strong. Only a man who does not suffer from guilt complex can be very strong. We have examples of the Punjab and Assam accords. However, the accords may not have the enthusiastic support of the dominant sections for both the accords. Now, is it possible to have perfect peace? A situation in Uttar Pradesh in 1970 is worth mentioning here. The Chief Minister, who after coming to power, gave a press statement emphasizing : (i) that government will not interfere with the police in fulfilling its mandatory legal role of maintaining law and order; (ii) No case will ever be withdrawn by the government from courts; (iii) We will not have any premature release from jails; (iv) No convict will be given a higher category as political prisoner. The results were unparalleled in the history of law and order and they are verifiable from records which are maintained by the Home Ministry. Not even one communal riot took place in 1970 in Uttar Pradesh whereas the number of communal riots every year used to be 40, 50 and 100. Not a single communal riot took place, and not a single Hindu or Muslim got a scratch. There was not one case of police firing on mobs; there were no fake encounters; and there were no deaths in police custody. Now, how can this stage be attain-

ed ? This stage was not attained because violence had disappeared from people's hearts, that there were no tensions in people's minds, there were social and economic tensions.

Rule of law is a rigid concept. There are no flexibilities of rule of law. The flexibility may come provided we change or amend the laws themselves. Rule of law means that the laws will be observed. If the cases are not registered under oral orders or arrests are not made, then the criminals or anti-social elements would use this reality to their advantage. These situations could be observed in Assam and Punjab. The worst type of collective violence is that the state which has got a monopoly of all sorts of power, it refuses to enforce its own laws. It is an elementary duty of any government not to allow invasion of its borders, and here the borders were open and invaders were, a sort of, welcome because they became vote banks. This process is now being repeated although in a very very small way on Rajasthan-Pakistan borders.

If violence is rewarded and that too by the government, how can collective violence be stopped ? And the latest example is of a State Assembly elections in Bihar where even the Election Commissioner had to admit that it was not free from large-scale rigging and if there was large-scale rigging and large-scale use of violence, how can one allow those persons to form a government ?

Now people talk as if the science of law and order has failed. It has not failed. If any doctor in India has instructions from the Health Minister that before taking a patient you should first investigate his political background and then only orders would be issued as to whether he should kill the patient or cure the patient. Of course, something like this is happening in the field of law and order and this was practised by government.

The situation is so bad that even the police force is not amenable to government's will. It is not like a violin on which the Home Minister or the Prime Minister can play any tune they like. And at least this is a matter of understanding that not more than one out of ten DIGs of police—let us say there are 30 or 40 DIGs not more than 4-5 can bend the police to his will, the others about 95 per cent of

the DIGs could come and go and they may issue any orders, but the police will do what it likes not what the DIGs want or what the government wants. Why it is so ? If the DIGs were to tell the police force that if you carry out your legal duties honestly you will not be punished. If, like the DG of Medical Services saying to the doctor that if you cure the man no action will be taken against you—if the patients are cured no action will be taken, meaning thereby that it is within the powers of the DG of Medical Health or the Health Minister.

The oral orders from the senior ranks have led to a state of situation when there is no credibility of the government. This can happen only when the politicians are advised to reserve their occasional lies for real emergency when they want that the people should believe what you say. Unfortunately, we have come to a situation when all the truth spoken by the government is not believed by the people. Even the decisions of the Cabinet travel all the way in the form of circulars and ultimately reach the police station where the Station Officers may not read and do what they like. Now, why do they do what they like, because they have seen how the police chiefs are appointed and are made to leave their office. This reality affects the reality of the government. The remedy is total depoliticalization of the police. If, as long as politicians have got powers to order—they do not have any powers—first, under the law they have no power. They have to be deprived of illegal misappropriation of powers. Even the Chief Minister of a state has no legal status to order a police force to arrest or not to arrest. The Calcutta High Court stated, “That neither the Governor nor the Council of Ministers nor any executive authority in the State or in the Centre has any power to alter even the coma of the law. They have no powers to deprive the police force of their mandatory duties of (to) maintain and they have no powers to interfere with the legal processes/procedure”. Even the senior IAS and IPS officers at times are issuing orders which may not have legal sanction. Each functionary should be allowed to function in accordance with the provisions of law.

From the very first session where we had some difficulty

in differentiating the legitimate exercise of power and authority from the illegitimate exercise of power and authority. This could be seen in a situation of conflict of power. Some exercise of this power is legitimized by law. In a democratic situation we find difficulty in finding the appropriate limits of legitimate exercise of power, particularly when we know civil disobedience is a very perfectly legitimate exercise of power in a democratic society. But violent civil disobedience, to what extent can be comprehended by the legitimate exercise of power is a serious issue for debate among political scientists. But in actual politics we find that one could err this way or that, but we do not equate what we call terrorism with the collective violence. We see on campuses, the collective violence we find amongst workers, organised section of workers. We need to go into this form of collective violence which has become almost common, and to some extent it is even sanctioned by some trade union laws. This issue threatens the very existence of political authority, the very respect for law and authority.

The existing criminal justice system, even the existing system, with some changes in implementation, should be able to cope up with students violence, workers violence or, to some extent, even caste violence. However, the existing criminal justice system, may be inappropriate to meet the type of terrorism that has taken roots in some parts of the country which is the real challenge to authority and organised state power. In certain respects you would find that what is the legitimate extent of violence, you could find the answer in law. In fact, the question of right of private defence which is given to individuals or collectivities and even to nation states, is nothing but the legally ordained or sanctioned form of violence. But again, the question of how much force could be used in the exercise of right for private defence? Nobody can give an abstract answer and in this lies the difficulty as to what is the legitimate limit of legally sanctioned power or force. The question, therefore, is : who will determine the legitimate limits of violence or force and how? Obviously, the Constitution and the laws of the country have, for ordinary purposes, institutional structures to contain violence and keep it in limits either by using counter-violence or preventing

it by appropriate political methods. To the extent these institutions are inadequate or imperfect, the society will have access to violence either from the sections of the people who perceive injustices or from the machinery, the police, which is intended to curb the violence.

Terrorism is the most modern manifestation of collective violence which is really disturbing and for which we have a series of legislations recently passed, particularly in the context of Punjab and Assam. In fact, we need not go outside the law even to find a definition of what is terrorism. Terrorist activity is defined in the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985. There are certain characteristic features of this form of collective violence which are comprehended by the legislative definition in this piece of legislation and you will find that along with that there are a large number of other legislations like the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, the Terrorists Affected Areas Special Courts Act, a large number of criminal legislations have come forward, which has almost radically changed the established criminal justice administration. Passing of these legislations on an *ad hoc* manner, without proper thinking, has led to the situation that it has not achieved the purpose, and, on the contrary, it has worsened the existing system of criminal justice administration.

Terrorism is a phenomenon we find in democratic societies and perhaps we have to live with it. We cannot just wish it away in a pluralistic society like India with lot of variance in economic levels of living and in-built cultural conflicts we are bound to experience more and more organised violence may border on terrorism. Therefore, so long as we are democratic, we have to find some strategies to contain it within reasonable limits. That is the challenge. Perhaps, if we are to be ruthless dictatorial government we would have solved the problem. That is the way which is not open to us. That is why we are concerned with 'State terrorism' also. Now the democratic governments are soft governments as stated by Gunnar Myrdal and probably that is the reason why we are unable to contain, in earlier stages, the phenomenon of terrorism. In dictatorships whenever terrorism emerged it has been ruthlessly put down with crude force, which we are

unable to do. There is the finding by researchers who have studied some of these terrorists, which is quite contrary to common people that if terrorists are cowards and they carry out their acts secretly under cover of some perceived objectives or revolutionary label. In any case, terrorism, some studies show, is the state of the reaction of immature minds in emotional distress getting involved through subtle propaganda and false beliefs. Whatever be—we have this problem of law enforcement in a democratic society unable to cope up without the use of counter-terrorism methods.

The initial softness to terrorism encourages the phenomenon of weakness or the respect for law. Governments are then forced to adopt repressive laws some of which are applicable to Punjab and Assam. They have been passed, the result of which has been curtailment of freedom of even ordinary citizens which promotes resentment amongst wider sections of the people, which is actually what the terrorism want. And this facilitates further terrorism a vicious circle. Terrorism in the form of wanton destruction of property and killing of innocent people can be met by two strategies : the use of counter-terrorism by state forces which has its own limits, and the democratic participation of people themselves in the exercise of state power. If people in power are bound to abuse power and collectively they may abuse power, then there is no answer except by associating people in all the phases where exercise of power takes place on behalf of the state. Perhaps this is the logic of the Prime Minister when he ordered elections in Punjab when the terrorism was at its heights. He felt that allowing the people to involve themselves in government and the use of exercise of power is the answer, and to some extent it had contained terrorism. In other words, state sponsored violence can be countered only by democratic legal processes and not by terrorism.

From the law enforcement angle, organised terrorism needs constant supply of money, manpower, training, or intelligence, communication networks, steady supply of arms, popular support, organization and a strong leadership. All these factors which are needed to sustain terrorism presuppose that there would be a long time lag before a perceived grievance manifests itself into a terrorists activity. The

government enforcement apparatus has to be active in this particular phase if terrorism has to be curbed. The long-term strategy for terrorism is of course the government and democratic participation of people in the government. Our Constitution has provided the framework, though, unfortunately, it has not been functional in the sense in which the Constitution envisages. It was envisaged by the Constitution-makers that a pluralistic society, with wide differences cannot survive without decentralised exercise of state power and without a socialist, secular republican government. The Constitution has been dysfunctional and that is the reason why there is a hue and cry for more powers to the states. The Centre-State relations in the fashion it worked out has not been in the spirit of the Constitution. And that is one reason why collective violence grew up in the political sphere. The short-term strategy of course is the development of radically different criminal justice system which is flexible yet firm and fair beyond the interference of party politics. A radically new criminal justice system to meet this type of terrorist activity challenging the entire foundation of the Constitutional government—we did come out with some changes about the legislations, but on an *ad hoc* basis without study and reflection and without trained manpower and adequate resources. A host of laws, comprehensive definition, power to exclude it from the judiciary and these are some of the features where we deviated in these legislations affecting Punjab and Assam from the existing criminal justice system : special courts, non-identification of witnesses, in-camera trial, place of trial wherever the government thinks fit, subjective selection of judges who would try—the whole lot of modifications unknown to criminal law anywhere—have been adopted. It is doubtful to what extent they are consistent with the spirit of the constitutional rights. But, nonetheless it had to be done in order to face a situation for which the criminal law as was administered earlier was inadequate. But even these laws we find it extremely difficult to implement. Under these Special Courts Acts, etc., there has not been real convictions which could effectively curb the increasing terrorist activity. Therefore, neither the National Security, nor the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, nor the Terrorist Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, nor the Terrorist Affected Areas Special Courts Act, nor the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act had the impact which they deserved. We need a criminal justice system that would be totally at variance with the existing Criminal Justice System, but it is justified in terms of the seriousness of the gravity of the offences that terrorism envisaged. But this sort of criminal law which is repressive, which is violative of many of the fundamental rights would not be justified to meet students violence or labour union violence or this sort of thing. We have, therefore, to make distinction between two forms of collective violence. We, therefore, need a well-thought-out self-contained code, nationally applicable, administered by trained and independent agencies under judicial supervision, outside the usual criminal law and order apparatus.

We may also need a National Terrorism Prevention and Management Commission to continuously monitor the development, coordinate the implementation and recommend preventive action. It should be a semi-judicial commission, with non-officials and it should have power to investigate violent excesses of even state power, specialised squads for spot investigation and specialised agencies for conciliated settlement of conflicts should be available to this commission. The commission will assume the role of a judicial enquiry, it will have power to recommend even material relief to victims of violence and prosecute culprits before special courts. An appeal against the decisions of this National commission shall lie only to the Supreme Court.

The existence of collective violence may be due to our failure to set up appropriate grievances machinery through the ages; it is not a new phenomenon. As a result of this, the other process which has kept pace with this, has been what is called the violence by state. The problems of violence in general, and violence by state in particular could be remedied only when we have evolved right approach to solve problems on all occasions without any exception. Unless all members of a society and the Administrators in particular are able to perceive these realities, there may not be any effective results in dealing with this problem. It is difficult to say as to whether over-policed state is equivalent to a well-policed

state, which has got adequate legal powers, very well equipped, etc. The will of the political executive to deal with the problem may matter to a large extent. The discriminatory and partisan enforcement of law and order, as noticed in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, etc., also contributed to such a situation. A combination of these factors is, what he would like to call today's polices which is not at all amenable to any orders either of its hierarchical superiors or any other reasonable authority. And all these have resulted in a total lack of credibility of the present-day government. There should be respect for laws and the authority which enforced law and order, there should be a line drawn with regard to the limits and the powers that they could exercise, and this could be done only by institutions which would uphold them on behalf of the whole society. If the institutions that are supposed to meet the challenge of violence are subverted, these are not equipped with adequate powers and procedures, these are dysfunctional, there would be perhaps greater freedom for terrorists to be active. The softness of attitude on the part of the government, dealing with terrorism which will ultimately lead to repressive measures resulting into resentment among people. With regard to the state agencies, dealing with this problem, there should be constant supply of resources and facilities, though, to tune up state machinery to deal with this problem, may itself be time-consuming and it may be long time before results could be anticipated.

In any human society there would always be an amount of irreducible violence—violence in a society which is even the best administered—because violence has a human phase, it has human constituents of which every one is made up. In case there is an excessive violence, then it may be because of an unjust society or a society in which the performance of the state is not on the lines expected or targetted, with the relevance of the institutional inadequacies that are there, which is not even able to take care of the overflowing violence from situations. In Indian society, a primarily exploitative society, the amount of latent violence is far more than the manifest violence. We have dychotomy in our professions and in our performance. And yet because we happen to be at the speaking end, asking end, demanding end, we do not

want violence. If we take a census of the whole history contained in the world, where laws have been enacted but have not been enforced, we will carry the cake. This must be probably one of these very few countries, if at all, where we enact laws, motivated by the most unethical considerations, and when it comes to implementation, we stop short.

The government is to make the whole process of government more open. We have seen that there are so many contradictions in the society and we have certainly to live with them at least in the foreseeable future. But if we want that these forces of contradiction should not lead to collective violence, then the different sections of people must be much better informed about things, views, problems of other sections than it is now, and nothing can facilitate this process more than a system of open government. Our structures of reconciliation have gone into disuse. Efforts should be made to revive them so that the issues are resolved amicably rather than through violence. The laws should be capable of being enforced by diligent people, who are honest and who are scrupulous and who are not really supermen, who are ordinary people with ordinary IQ, but who are willing to work hard and get at it. If law enforcement is seen to be effective and fair, a lot of collective violence will subside because people will then take recourse to the state machinery for the resolution of their differences rather than take law unto themselves, because they feel if somebody has murdered someone else in their family, the only way out is to murder that chap and they have no faith left that if man is prosecuted something can be done about it. There are two categories of personnel or two categories of groups which are not playing their assigned game, which they should be playing. One is the politicians and the others are the police, and they have some kind of a nexus in-between them arrived at—convertly or overtly, intentionally or unintentionally, which actually leads to the perpetuation of collective violence or to the accentuation of it. We must recommend therefore that we make a very strong point for the formalisation of certain norms which ought to be observed by these two categories in the discharge of their public functions. Politicians who represent a political party in power, in particular, they should be given certain guidelines

not by their parties but by the political system, may be that they are formalised and they are called upon to adhere to those norms strictly, and secondly, the police personnel also, inclusive of the bureaucrats, for them also certain norms are laid down and they are made to observe those norms consciously. At least, if we control the situation from these two nexus points, collective violence in a substantive quantum could be controlled or contained, to some extent.

SUMMATION
VALEDICTORY ADDRESS

Summation

P.R. Dubhashi

The Indian Institute of Public Administration took the initiative in organising this National Seminar on Collective Violence: Genesis and Response. The initiative has been widely welcome by everybody, including the participants in this seminar. As I said, we took the initiative in holding this seminar because we felt that the subject of collective violence had assumed such serious proportions that it had become a matter of national concern and has posed a serious challenge to our administrative system. Therefore, we feel that this is a subject which could be discussed at a national seminar where we could bring together the academicians and the administrators to examine the subject in all aspects and in its various dimensions. And I am glad to say that the seminar evoked an excellent response. We have more than ninety participants, where more than half of them are academicians related to various social science disciplines including sociology, psychology, criminology, law and public administration, from different universities and the institutes of training and research in the country; and we have also had about one-fourth of them are administrators, many of them senior police administrators who at different stages bore themselves the responsibility at some time of their careers who dealt with the occurrence of collective violence.

It is not quite possible to sum up in a few words the discussions that went on in this seminar during the last three days in six sessions and over a period of about twenty hours of intensive discussions. But I think it would be proper on my part to at least present a gist of these discussion to give a flavour of what went on at that National Seminar for the last three days.

Perhaps the most important point that could be made about the discussions at the seminar is that we discussed its various forms and manifestations—collective violence in the nature of communal violence, caste violence, tribal violence, violence against untouchable and sometimes by them, class violence including agrarian violence and violence by trade union workers or violence on factory premises, campus violence involving students on the campus of universities, political violence, and above all, the most serious form of violence—collective violence today is the recurrence, and then the state violence when the state has to deal with collective violence through the exercise of its coercive powers.

While discussing these various forms and manifestations and various shapes of collective violence, there is one general conclusion which the seminar arrived at, at the very outset, is that while collective violence might be triggered off by some incidence, there is only the tip of the iceberg and below this incidence lies a set of complex factors, and then at the bottom of these complex factors are what are called the 'root causes' which slowly build up to make these complex factors and lead to the basis which trigger off collective violence. And, therefore, if we are to deal effectively with collective violence, it becomes necessary for us to examine and understand the root causes of collective violence. This fact led the seminar to investigate into the root causes of collective violence.

During the scrutiny of these basic maladies which lead to collective violence as the root cause of collective violence, the seminar felt that in the society there are factors which lead to social discrimination and economic exploitation, and those who suffer from social discrimination and economic exploitation often deem it necessary to rebel against the institutions which lead to such discrimination and such exploitation. Therefore, they organise themselves and initiate collective action or there are people who organise such discriminatory elements into collective action, and this collective action sometimes results in collective violence. If this analysis is correct and if these are the root causes of collective violence, then it becomes necessary to take steps or measures to eliminate social discrimination, economic exploitation and

other causes which to disaffection, alienation or even contradictions in the society to which these elements belong.

There are two ways of dealing with exploitation and social discrimination. One is the revolutionary way. This methodology may often lead to what is called 'revolutionary violence' and some participants in this seminar felt that such revolutionary violence, though it is violence, might have some kind of legitimacy. In these cases, violence may be considered as a legitimate instrument in the hands of those who fight against discrimination and exploitation. On the other hand, there is another way of dealing with discrimination and exploitation, and that is the democratic way, the constitutional way, the legal way. The Indian Constitution stands for justice—social, economic and political—and it has provided in the hands of the people of this country the instruments to bring about changes so as to eliminate discrimination and exploitation. These are often described as a part of the process of development. The seminar, therefore, entered into the nature of the process of development. It was recognised that rural development and agrarian reforms have perhaps eliminated the possibilities of a kind of resistance that was often seen in even the pre-British period in the shape of agrarian unrest. But, on the other hand, there are other aspects in the process of development where development has been accompanied by distortions or development has had certain features like even corruption or maladministration; and unless the process of development is placed on right lines and is made an instrument for eliminating exploitation and discrimination, we may not be able to prevent the emergence or collective violence in the country.

The emergence of violence could also be viewed from another perspective. It is in terms of the value system of the society. Where there are established norms and values which guide the attitudes and behaviour of people the society is in a state of equilibrium. But where, as is happening perhaps today in this country, old values are given up, the new values have not established themselves, there are positions where persons, individuals, institutions may enter into a state of normlessness, and therefore there is ambiguity in the shape of guide for the attitudes and behaviour of people and the

organization which is there to effectively support the attitudes and values and norms, they also get confused. And in this country, therefore, while old values have gone, new values are not yet established, it becomes necessary for us to establish new values, such as values of secularism, values of peaceful change, values of the roles and relationship between different elements of society. I think they have to be established. This is what the seminar was called for. They have to be established to create a sense of balance which is the bulwark against the emergence of collective violence in this country.

The seminar discussed the relationship between the state of collective violence and the semblance of collective violence. One participant said that collective violence is often the child of politics in our country, and therefore, it becomes necessary for us to evolve the conventions of organization of political life in such a manner that things are decided on the basis of legitimate democratic means rather than using collective violence as an instrument of vote-catching.

What is the role of the state in using this collective violence? When collective violence emerges the state naturally has to deal with it. But more violence than is necessary may come into the picture if the state is either negligent or weak. If the state is negligent about the problems of social discrimination or economic exploitation, people may feel that they have nothing to look forward to, and there would be a revolution of rising expectations from the state. And if the state does not respond then often they will turn to collective violence. If negligence of the state is one thing that leads to collective violence, another thing that leads to collective violence is the weakness of the state. If the impression goes round that the state will bend before every possible force of collective violence, then the people will be encouraged to take to collective violence. Therefore, the state must play its role as a pacesetter of economic development and social change, the state must be responsive, at the same time the state must be strong so that violence is not put a premium on.

Another combination was that collective violence is often the result of the erosion of rule of law. The rule of law must be upheld and the instruments of the state must be

allowed to uphold the rule of law without any interference. If the rule of law is eroded, the entire authoritative culture might blow and that might lead to collective violence. However, it was also said that while the rule of law must be upheld, the rule of law itself must not lose its legitimacy, as it would if the law does not provide justice. Laws must be based on justice if the rule of law is to be upheld by the people of the country.

The instrument of the state is the police and the administration. What is the role of the police in relation to the eruption of collective violence? The police has to use the coercive force as the instrument of the state to uphold the rule of law and to put down collective violence. But if the police force has to be effective the force must be used in a professional manner, not in a partisan manner, not for vindictive considerations, nor as a retaliatory course, because if this happens then the use of force by the police would not be either responsible or professional in character.

The judiciary has also to play its role in dealing with cases relating to criminal matters. But often the cases are inordinately delayed and that becomes a weakness in dealing with criminal cases which might be connected with collective violence.

Finally, the approach of the administration itself. The administration must be alert. It must have sympathy with the people, it must deal promptly with grievances and if this is there then those incidents which trigger off the collective violence might be prevented in advance. So, the police, the judiciary, the administration and above all the political government which would together constitute the criminal justice administration must be galvanised in such a manner as to forestall and contain the forces of collective violence in the country.

There is no such thing as the violence-free-society, though that might well be a Utopian Idea. But surely in this land of Mahatama Gandhi it is worthwhile trying to develop an economic and social order where there is minimum social violence. Can this be brought about? The answer is: it cannot be brought about by merely *ad hoc* responses to the incidence of collective violence. It can only be done on the

basis of a comprehensive understanding of the social and economic and political economy which are at the bottom of forces which give rise to collective violence. It is a matter of building up the tradition of appeal. And India has a long tradition of non-violence. It seems to have at least in terms of ethical teachings of people from Lord Budha to Mahatama Gandhi who were apostles of non-violence. But the question is : to what extent these teachings, which is a part of the cultural heritage of this country, can be translated into the ways of behaviour of people so that it promotes national integration and acceptance of peaceful resolution of disputes as the way of life. Can this be done ? If the answer was it can be done through socialisation of the family itself, that is where the flow of bastion against collective violence is built. It can be done in schools, it can be done through the educational process and proper value orientation through the younger generation. We are today thinking of great educational reforms. One part of it surely can be to build up educational system which imparts positive values. The role of the media could also be significant. How can be media propagate the culture of non-violence or does it show violence in various forms. And therefore it is through the family the educational institutions, the media, the political and economic institutions and social institutions that we can develop a new culture of non-violence in this country. It is a multiple approach, which includes hope, shorten the years, and adopt the basis. I do not know whether this constitutes an adequate enough agenda for dealing with collective violence or a proper summing up of the intensive discussions that went on during the last three days. But I think it does convey the spirit of the seminar as it took place during the last three days in which ninety people—academicians and administrators put their experience and knowledge together.

Valedictory Address

Arun Nehru

Shri Dubhashi and friends ! I have no intention of inflicting a long speech on this learned gathering of professionals present here. Being the only amateur amongst you, I would merely like to express some views on this subject of collective violence.

Whenever I think on this subject, I am reminded of an incident which occurred long ago, when some of us, as university students, had gone on a holiday to Mathura. On the return trip, when only two of us were present in that small train, we were confronted by an angry mob of 300 to 400 people, who were extremely agitated by the fact that two or three trains proceeding towards Mathura had been held up and delayed. They were under the mistaken impression that this had been done to suit the convenience of some VIPs travelling on that route. We tried to pacify the crowd by using our persuasive powers and ultimately had to travel back to Mathura with them. This incident set me thinking and I tried to understand as to why even normal people in some situations could react in an emotionally unbalanced manner, without verifying the facts of the situation. All these people were normal human beings, who had lost their sense of proportion and balance at the time of the incident. One of the conclusions which I had drawn immediately at that time 25 years ago and which I think still holds good is that use of force in such situations is never the right answer. Use of force generally results in escalation of violence, requiring more force to be used. If you want to understand the phenomena of violence, particularly collective violence, we must try and understand the psychological factors which lie at the root of such violence.

Collective violence is a comprehensive subject. I would not like to generalise on this subject and would merely like to share my views with you on a few selected aspects of this problem. The first aspect which I would like to touch pertains to the problem of what, for want of a better term, may be called 'political violence'. Whenever elections come, speeches are made by people belonging to various parties. On such occasions, even good and normal people sometimes lose their sense of proportion and perspective and deliver speeches which provoke and inflame the feelings of the public. Basically it is the responsibility of all political parties, in fact of all political leaders at the Central, state or block levels, to ensure that the speeches delivered on such occasions are temperate in language and contents and do not inflame the feelings of the public. In fact, we must all impose upon ourselves a proper code of conduct which governs our speeches not only during elections but campaigns on all other occasions as well. I have advocated all along and will continue to propagate that whenever we go to the people on any occasion, whether in connection with elections or otherwise, we must state the truth and not try to distort situations to suit our own personal or political ends.

Let me now share with you my views on what is happening in the tribal belt of this country, which spreads right from Gujarat on one side to the north-eastern states on the other. Despite all the massive investments that we have made in these areas and plans to do so in future, why is it that violence erupts and erupts on a very large-scale on some occasions? The whole belt may not have faced the problem of collective violence, but there is a great deal of tension and potential for violence in almost all the areas. Opening police pickets in such areas or sending units of para-military forces to these places is not going to solve the problem. Use of force merely results in creating or strengthening the feeling of alienation amongst the people of these areas.

In our attempts to accelerate the pace of progress in these areas and in the process of implementation of various developmental schemes, we forgot to preserve the traditional institutions, customs and values to which the tribal people had been used for centuries. The tribal people have a tradi-

tional culture of their own, of which they are rightly proud. While bringing them into the national mainstream, we failed to ensure that their traditional values and institutions remained in tact and were not uprooted by the forces of change. The result was that while the developmental schemes increased their aspirations and expectations, fruits of progress did not reach all, and this gave rise to a feeling of frustration, grievance and injustice. While our planning was good, the implementation of the schemes was tardy. It would be wrong to blame any single or a few district officers for this failure. It is the system which failed and not the individuals. Even our system of postings in such areas was defective. These postings were regarded as punishment postings meant for those who were not wanted elsewhere. Normally, you should put your best people in the most difficult assignments. This did not happen and now we are trying to correct it.

Another thing towards which we have not paid adequate attention over the years is the need to improve the standards of training of our people in the administration. We may have the best schemes in the world, but unless we have a set of trained, dedicated and motivated people at all levels of administration to implement those schemes, we will not be able to achieve our goals. Fortunately, our Prime Minister had laid considerable stress on the need to improve training standards and we definitely intend to give progressively more benefits to trainers. We have one of the largest bureaucracies in the world and we intend to bring about an alround improvement in their training standards. Training must be imparted to all, right from the top to the bottom. It is a healthy sign to note that even the Cabinet Secretary went on a training course. That is as it should be.

In the police also, we attach the utmost priority to improving their training standards. So far as the police training is concerned, it is not merely a question of making them physically tough are more proficient in the handling of firearms, but mainly that of changing their attitudes towards the public. They must realise that they have to deal with human beings all the time, and also that the use of force is not the only and definitely not always the right way to deal with human beings. We have already introduced many

changes in the training programmes meant for police personnel and we intend to review their training requirements periodically. Training has to be a continuous process and we must keep on updating our knowledge and experience. Over the years, training has been badly neglected and a system has developed where, instead of the best, discarded people are posted in the training institutions. We are going to change all this by assigning top priority to training requirements and by spending enormous amount of money to meet those requirements.

If you study the phenomenon of violence, particularly violence occurring in rural areas, you will notice that at the root of all that is happening is a feeling of grievance, a feeling of injustice, harboured by a certain section of society. Our judicial system has failed miserably to deliver justice in time. Our courts remain clogged with cases and arrears go on mounting year after year. Denial of justice in time creates a feeling of resentment and frustration. People lose faith in the judicial system and this ultimately results in the issues and problems being taken to the streets. I do not think that the problem can be solved merely by increasing the number of courts or judges. They have their own problems, some of such are genuine. What is required is a change in the system and approach, which ensures that court cases are not unnecessarily delayed for a long period and that justice is delivered within a given time-frame. The legal system must be reviewed and overhauled thoroughly so that delay in trial is cut down to the minimum and speedy justice is delivered to the people, particularly those living in rural areas.

Our problems are many, some of which are really acute. We must tackle these problems on a long-term basis as there cannot be any short-term solutions. Growing population is a cause of most of our problems, particularly those faced on the economic front. The economic problems are receiving and will continue to receive our utmost attention for some time to come.

We are passing through a period of change. What is required is to control and administer change in a manner which does not result in producing conflicts and generating uncontrollable violence. The administrative apparatus of the

state will have to change itself in tune with the needs of the times. While we take the necessary steps to improve the proficiency of administrative agencies, they must adapt themselves to be responsive to the needs of the people.

One of the strengths of the present government is that it is receptive to new ideas. We have no fixed notions and are prepared to absorb new ideas and new concepts. The ideas and suggestions thrown out by this seminar will be received by us with great interest. Thank you.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Major Incidents of Collective Violence in India During the Last Three Decades

K.M. Mathur

<i>Period and Date</i>	<i>Areas or States</i>	<i>Brief Description</i>
(1)	(2)	(3)
1951	W. Bengal	Cooch Behar Riots and Communal Violence.
1953	A.P., Madras, Mysore	Riots for the proposed re-organisation of Andhra State.
1955-56	Maharashtra, (Bombay), Gujarat	Bombay city Riots for the proposed re-organisation. Ahmedabad Riots.
1955-56	Assam (Nagaland)	Demand for separate Naga State and resultant violent incidents.
1956	Maharashtra	Bombay Riots on state re-organisation proposal.
1956	Orissa	Riots at Cuttack and Puri on the proposed state re-organisation.
1956	Punjab	Sikh agitation for Punjabi speaking state.
1956	Kerala, Madras	Agitation by the Tamil speaking TTNC areas and Riots on the proposed re-organisation of Madras and Kerala states.

(1)	(2)	(3)
1956	M.P.	Agitation against the State re-organisation committee. Proposal of merging Vindhya Pradesh into M.P.
1957	Madras	Anti-Brahmin agitation/caste agitation.
1957	Kerala	Internal violent disorders in Kerala under the Communist led Government.
June '57	Punjab	Save Hindi agitation.
Aug '57	India	The threatened strike by Central Government employees. Essential service maintenance act promulgated.
1957-58	Assam (Nagaland)	Naga rebel activities and violent incidents carried out by insurgents.
1958	Kashmir	Terrorist activities. The Mangla Dam dispute.
1958	Kerala	Break-down of law and order situation in Kerala. Clashes between Congress and Communist party workers.
1958	Kerala	Industrial strike near Quilon.
1958	Kerala	General strike.
1958-59	Assam (Nagaland)	Naga rebellion. Guerrilla activities.
1959	Punjab	Agitation against the government bill on the management of Gurudwaras. Demand for separate Sikh State.
Aug/ Sep '59	West Bengal	Food riots in Calcutta and Howrah.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Jun '60	Punjab	Renewed agitation for a separate Punjabi speaking State. Delhi riots on the issue.
Jul '60	Assam	Anti-Bengali riots in Assam and agitation for the recognition of Assamese as State language.
Aug '60	Assam	Hill States separation demand and resultant violence.
Oct '60	Assam	Riots on the language issue.
1960	West Bengal	Counter riots in West Bengal against the agitation in Assam for the language issue.
1960	All over India	General strikes of Central Government employees.
Jun/Jul 1960	Assam	Riots at Gauhati on language issue.
July '60	Assam	Anti Bengali Riots.
April/ May '60	Manipur	Agitation for the self-government by Manipuris.
June 5, '60	Madras	Agitation for secession of Madras state from India and its renaming.
Aug '60 Feb '61	Nagaland	Continuance of Rebel activities.
March 31, '61	M.P.	Disturbances in Buthar district of M.P. due to the deposition of Maharaja of Buthar.
Feb '61	M.P.	Communal riots in Jabalpur.
March 30, '61	Maharashtra	Agitation for the separate state of Vidharbha. Riots at Nagpur.

(1)	(2)	(3)
July '61	Assam	Agitation for the recognition of Bengali in Assam by the Bengalis of Kachar districts.
Oct '61	U.P.	Communal riots in Aligarh and other 12 towns of U.P.
Sep '61 to Oct '62	Nagaland	Naga Rebel activities.
July 9, '62	Madras	Renewed agitation by DMK for secession of Madras state from India. Widespread riots in Madras and Vellore.
Nov 13, '63	Madras	Anti Hindi agitation launched by Annadurai.
Jan/Mar 1964	Bengal, M.P., Bihar, Orissa	Widespread Communal riots.
Jan/Mar 1964	West Bengal, Kerala	Food riots due to short supply of Foodgrains.
Dec '64 Jan '65	All over India	Mass arrest of CPI (ML) members under Defence of India Rules. Agitation for the repeal of Defence of India Act and Rules.
1964-65	Nagaland	Independence demand and rebel activities. Peace mission's (B.P. Chalia, J.P. Narain, Rev. M.Scott) attempt to obtain agreement.
Jan/Feb 1965	Madras, Mysore, Kerala and Pondicherry	Anti Hindi language riots and disturbances as a consequence to substitution of Hindi for English as official language of Indian Union.
Jan/Feb 1966	Kerala, W.B., Punjab and Delhi	Food riots.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Mar '66	Delhi, Punjab	Riots and violence in Punjab and Delhi for the partition of Punjab.
Mar/Jul 1966	Assam (Mizoram)	Mizo hill district armed revolt. Demand for the formation of Mizo state. Continued guerrilla warfare.
Jul/Nov 1966	Delhi	Anti Cow-slaughter agitation by Hindus in Delhi and other places.
Oct '66	Mysore, Kerala	Mysore/Kerala, Mysore/Maharashtra boundary disputes. One man commission of investigation appointed.
Oct/Nov 1966	A.P.	Steel Plant agitation, resultant disorders.
Nov/Dec 1966	Punjab, Haryana	Punjab/Haryana boundary dispute. Sant Fateh Singh's threat to commit suicide.
Sep '66	M.P., U.P., Bihar,	Students' riots and violence throughout India.
Jan '67	Punjab, Kashmir, A.P., Orissa, W.B.	
Mar '66 Sep '67	M.P.	Tribal revolt and violence at Bastar District.
Aug '67	Bihar	Ranchi communal riots.
Feb '67	Bihar and Other Northern States.	Outbreak of violence during General Election.
Mar/Jul 1967-69	W.B.	Communist led tribal revolt at Naxalbari.
Aug/Oct. 1967	Bihar	Ranchi Communal riots.
Oct '67	Bihar	Sursand Communal riots.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Oct/Nov 1967	Mysore, Kerala and Maharashtra	Boundary disputes. Riots against implementation of Mahajan Commission Report.
Mar '67	Rajasthan	Riots in Jaipur organised by Opposition leaders to protest against the formation of Sukhadia Ministry.
Nov '67	West Bengal	General strikes and civil disobedience movement consequent on dismissal of A.K. Mukherjee's Ministry.
Feb/Mar 1967	Assam	Terrorist attack on North East Frontier Railways.
1967-68	Maharashtra, Assam	Regionalistic activities by Shiv Sena and Laehit Sena.
Nov '67 Feb '68	Northern and Southern States	Language riots, (Anti English riots in Northern States and Anti Hindi riots in the Southern States).
Oct '67	A.P.	Girijan revolts and violence.
Jan/Mar 1967	Assam	Communal riots.
May '68	Assam	Bode tribe (Golpada), Agitation for autonomous tribal region.
Jun '68	Kashmir, Maharashtra, U.P, Assam, W.B., Bihar	Anti Muslim riots in India. Pakistani government's review and protest.
Jan/Mar Jun '68	Kashmir, Maharashtra, U.P., Assam and West Bengal	Communal riots.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Sep '68	Kerala	Central Government employees strike.
Sep '66	Assam	Guerrilla activities of Mizos.
Oct '68	(Mizoram)	Mizo contact with China and Pakistan.
'66, '67, '68	Nagaland	Naga demand for alteration of boundaries.
Jun '68	Nagaland, Mizorm,	Clashes between Indian security forces and Naga underground, Mizos and Kuki tribal men. Nagas demand for independence. Clashes between Naga and Indian security forces and between moderates and extremists among Nagas, Assassination Gen. Kaito Sena.
Oct '68	Manipur, Assam	
Sep '68	All over the country	Government employees strike. Arrest and termination of services.
Nov '68	West Bengal	Anti American riots in Calcutta.
Nov '68	Bihar	The tribal unrest.
Jun 68		
Dec '68	Bihar	Naxalite raids on farms.
Nov '68	A.P.	Tribal revolt and tribal violence.
Jan '69		
Nov '68	Kerala	The Vayanad revolt by left wing extremists and resultant violence.
Jan '69		
Dec '68	Tamil Nadu	Kilvemani Massacre.
1969	A.P., W.B., Kerala, Bihar, Orissa, Punjab, Raj., T. Nadu, Tripura.	Naxalite activities continue.

(1)	(2)	(3)
May/Jun 1969	A.P.	Telangana agitation for separate state.
Sep '69	Gujarat	Gujarat communal riot.
Feb '69	Maharashtra	Shiv Sena riots.
Mar/May 1969	West Bengal	Clashes between United Front and Naxalites.
May/Aug 1970	Maharashtra	Communal riots.
Aug/Sep 1970	All over the country	Land Grab movement initiated by CPI, SSP and PSP.
Jun/Nov 1970	West Bengal, Assam, A.P., Bihar, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab	Naxalite activities.
	Mysore, Maharashtra	Mysore-Maharashtra boundary disputes and resultant disorders.
Mar/Oct 1970	Maharashtra	Shiv Sena activities.
Feb '70/ Jan '71	A.P.	Telangana agitation.
Mar '71	U.P., W.B.	Disorders in General Election.
Sep '71	Maharashtra	Vidharbha agitation.
Jan '71	Kashmir	Indian Air Craft hijacked by two Kashmiris.
Aug/Dec 1971	Punjab	Akali Dal agitation over control of Sikh Shrines.
Mar '69 Mar '72	Nagaland	Rebal activities in Nagaland. Attempted Assassination of Chief Minister.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Mar '69	Assam	Tribel activities by Mizo Hill
Jan '72	(Mizoram)	district tribals.
Jun '72	U.P.	Communal riots.
Jul '72	Tamil Nadu	Riots, resulting farmers agitation.
Aug/Sep 1972	Delhi	Anti Police and Harijan riots.
Sep '72	Bihar	Student strike against rising prices.
Oct '72	Punjab	Student's strike/riots.
Oct/Nov 1972	Assam	Disturbance arising at the medium of instructions at the Universities.
Oct '72	West Bengal	Disturbances in Darjeeling over language question.
Nov '72 Aug '73	Nagaland	Naga rebel activities.
Jan/Feb 1973	A.P.	Telangana agitation.
Feb/Aug 1973	Mizoram	Terrorists activities by MNF.
Apr/May 1973	Maharashtra and other parts of India	Railway Strike and resultant violence.
May '73	U.P.	Students riots, PAC clashes with army.
Jul/Aug Sep '73	Gujarat, Kerala, M.P., Maharashtra, Karnataka.	Food riots.
Jan/Mar 1973	Gujarat	Navnirman agitation and resultant violence on very large scale.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Jan/Mar 1973	Maharashtra	Disturbances in Bombay, Dalit Panthar movement, Shiv Sena agitation.
Dec '73	U.P. (Meerut)	Communal riots.
Mar '74	Bihar	Students riots.
Feb/Mar 1974	Mizoram	Terrorists activities.
May 15, 1974	All over India	Railway Strike.
	All over India	General strike for one day called by TUC in support of Railway strike.
1974	Mizoram	MNF violent activities.
1974	West Bengal, Bihar and other States	Naxalite activities and violence by extremists.
Apr '74	Bihar	Navnirman political agitation.
Jan '75		Bomb explosives. Death of Shri L.N. Mishra.
Feb '75	Delhi	Delhi Muslim riots.
Mar '75	Delhi	Attempted assassination on Chief Justice of India.
Jun/Jul '75	Delhi	Strikes and sabotage.
May '75	Delhi	Communal riots.
Jun '75	Gujarat	Strikes, demonstrations.
Jun/Jul 1975	Kerala	Anti government demonstrations.
1975	Bihar, Gujarat	J.P. movement, and civil disobedience campaign. Student agitations.

(1)	(2)	(3)
1975	Mizoram	MNF activities against the state.
Dec '75-76	Bihar, A.P. and other states	Naxalite activities and executions and resultant violence.
Feb/Mar 1976	Tripura	Tribal activities.
Mar '75	Gujarat and other states	Violent agitations and sabotage activities by opposition parties.
Apr '77	Nagaland	Negotiation with the Federal Government of Nagaland.
May '77	Nagaland	Naga students demonstrations and agitations in Dimapur. Clash between Police and student demonstrators. Fifty students injured.
Jul/Jun 1977	Mizoram	Renewal of terrorists activities in Mizoram.
May '77	Nagaland	Student unrest.
1977	Mizoram	Isolated activities of terrorism by MNF.
1977-78	U.P., Maharashtra, Gujarat, Bihar, A.P., Tamil Nadu, Karnataka	Caste rivalries and conflicts.
Sep '77 Aug '78	U.P., A.P.	Communal riots.
Mar '78	U.P.	Thirteen people died in Hindu/Muslims riots at Sambhal.
Aug '78	A.P.	Communal riots in Hyderabad.
Oct '78	U.P.	Communal riots in Aligarh. Eleven killed.

(1)	(2)	(3)
1978	Punjab, U.P., Delhi	Akali-Nirankari clash at Amritsar.
1978	U.P.	Communal riots in Lucknow, Kanpur, Aligarh and parts of U.P. About 10 people killed.
1978	U.P., Bihar	Terrorist campaign abroad by Anand Marg supporters and terrorists activities within India.
Jan/Jul 1979	W. Bengal, Bihar, Punjab, A.P., Kerala, Assam, Tamil Nadu	Naxalite activities revived.
May/Jun 1979	Punjab and other parts of India	Police Agitation.
Oct '79	Tamil Nadu and other parts	Police agitation.
Late '79	North Eastern States	Continued disturbances in N.E. States on foreigners issue.
Late '79 Jan '80	Assam	Agitation against foreigners.
Late '79	Meghalaya	Agitation against foreigners.
Late '79 Early '80	Tripura	Terrorists activities by Tripura Sena.
Late '79 Jan '80	Manipur	Terrorists, activities by seces- sionists.
Nov '79 Jan '80	Mizoram	MNF terrorists activities.
Jan/Apr 1980	Assam	Increased violence of Assam agitation.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Feb '80	Bihar	Caste conflict and Caste violence.
Jan/Apr 1980	Manipur	Riots in Imphal.
Mar '80	W. Bengal	Agitation against Assamese.
Apr/Sep 1980	Manipur and Assam	Continued violence, suspension of students agitation, terrorists activities. State declared disturbed area.
Jun '80	Mizoram	Continued terrorists activities.
Feb '80	Bihar	Caste conflicts.
Apr '80	Delhi/Punjab	Assassination of Nirankari leaders.
1980	Assam	Assam agitation continues.
May/Sep 1980	Nagaland	Terrorists activities by Native Naga Maoists.
Jun/Jul 1980	Tripura	Tribal uprising. Messacre of Bengalis, South and West Tripura declared disturbed area.
Aug/Sep 1980	U.P., M.P., Kashmir	Communal riots.
Oct '80	Manipur	Anti-foreigners agitation by the Students.
1980-81	Maharashtra	Police agitation and police misconduct.
1980-81	Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra	Wide-spread agitation by the farmers organisations in Tamil Nadu. Maharashtra and Karnataka throughout 1980-81.
1980-81	W. Bengal, Bihar, A.P.	Naxalite activities.

(1)	(2)	(3)
1980-81	Maharashtra	Farmers agitation in support of demands of remunerative prices of their produce.
Sep '80 Nov '81	Assam	Anti-foreigners agitation continued resulting in violence at many places.
Late '80 Jul '81	Manipur	Terrorists activities by insurgents.
Late '80 Mid '81	Nagaland	Terrorists activities by Naga separatists.
Late '80 Mid '81	W. Bengal	Congress I agitation against the Left Front Government.
Jan/Apr 1981	Gujarat	Anti-Preservation agitation by upper caste people in Gujarat.
Apr '81	Tamil Nadu	About 1300 Harijans converted to Islam in Meenakshipuram village and communal riots in some states.
May '81		Assassination plots against the Prime Minister by damaging the aircraft in which she was supposed to travel.
May/Jul 1981	Bihar and A.P.	Major communal riots occurred in Bihar Sharif in May '81. Communal riots in Hyderabad on the issue of alleged mass conversion.
Sep/Oct 1981	Punjab	Khalistan movement. Terrorists activities.
1981	Bihar	Jamshedpur Communal riots (1979) Judicial enquiry report. Communal violence.
Apr/Sep 1981	Bihar, A.P.	

(1)	(2)	(3)
1981-82	Gujarat/Tamil Nadu	Caste conflicts. Anti reservation agitation. Conversion of Harijans to Islam.
Nov '81	U.P.	Caste violence—24 Harijans murdered by Caste Hindus in Deoli.
1981	A.P., Kerala, Tamil Nadu, W. Bengal	Naxalite activities. Changed modes of protest and violence.
Nov '81 Aug '82	Assam	Continuation of Assam agitation.
Nov '81 May '82	Punjab	Continuance of Khalistan movement. Terrorists Incidents. Communal riots between Hindus and Sikhs. Ban of secessionists organisation.
1981-82	U.P.	Dacoity problem, Police operations.
Jan/Jul 1982	U.P., M.P., Tamil Nadu	Caste conflicts.
Jan '82	All over India	General strikes call given by opposition leaders and trade union leaders for the withdrawal of national security act and essential service maintenance act 1981.
Early 1982	W. Bengal	Mass murder by Anand Margis.
Apr/Aug 1982	Karnataka	Linguistic agitation to implement Gokhale Committee report.
May '82	W. Bengal	Violence during State Election.
Mid '82	A.P., W. Bengal, Bihar.	Naxalite activities.

(1)	(2)	(3)
1982	Bombay, Maharashtra	Bombay textile mill workers strike.
Apr '82	Punjab	Akali Dal organised Road blockade in Punjab. A senior Police Officer was killed in Golden Temple Amritsar on 25th April by Bhinderwale men.
4 Aug 1982	Punjab	Attempted hijacking of an Indian Airlines Aircraft by the Sikh activists. Hijackers overpowered by police.
20 Aug 1982	Punjab	Another attempted hijacking by Sikh Militant of an Indian Airline Aircraft. Hijackers shot dead by police.
Aug '82	Maharashtra	Police revolt in Bombay. Government announces in Sep '82 certain benefits to Police men.
Sep/Oct 1982	U.P.	Communal riots in Meerut. Twentyeight people died.
13-18 Dec '82	Gujarat	Communal riots in Baroda. Army was called to assist civil authorities.
30-31 Dec '82	Kerala	Communal violence in Trivandrum and other parts of Kerala.
1982-83	Punjab	Akali agitation among militant Sikhs in Punjab which had number of violent incidents in '81. Continued and intensified the militant activities in '82-83. Repeated attempts for

(1)	(2)	(3)
		negotiation between Sikh leaders and government fails.
Jan '83	A.P.	Violent clashes between Congress (I) and Telugu Desam party workers during the State election campaign.
5 Jan 9 '83	A.P.	Communal violence at Hyderabad.
Feb '83	Assam	One policeman and 9 other demonstrators killed in the clashes between Police and anti foreigner agitators on 2nd Feb '83.
		Over eighty people killed till 13th Feb '83 as the pre-poll protest continued. Only about 10 per cent of the voters turned to vote in the state general election on Feb 14th, 17th, 20th and 21st. According to official figures 1127 people killed in violent incidents since Feb 2nd till 22nd Feb.
16 Feb 1983	Assam	Clash between Assam Police and Central Reserve Police Force in Golpara district.
2 Mar 1983	Assam	Violence in state. Most of the Brahmaputra valley was placed under direct Army control under the terms of disturbed area Act 1958. Reports on March 5th described a massacre of 500-1000 Bengalis at Choutha in Mangaldos district between

(1)	(2)	(3)
		<p>Feb 19th and 22nd. Reports on March 6th described a massacre of 200-500 Bengalis on the Island of Oppidaya in the Brahmaputra river at an uncertain date between 13th and 22nd Feb. About 25 to 40 people died in violent incident on March 19th and 20th protesting the opening session of the newly elected legislature.</p>
<p>16 Mar 1983 to 3 Apr 1983</p>	<p>Punjab</p>	<p>Whole of Punjab declared a "Dangerously disturbed area", due to agitation and violent incidents.</p>
<p>18 May 1983</p>	<p>Assam</p>	<p>Five more deaths in Golpara and Nawgaon districts.</p>
<p>29 May 1983</p>	<p>A.P.</p>	<p>Communal violence in Hyderabad.</p>
<p>Jun '83</p>	<p>Maharashtra</p>	<p>A militant protest by Dalit Panther in Nasik following an order by local authorities for the removal of a State erected illegally to commemorate Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, resulted in burning of a police station and in killing of several people in police firing.</p>
<p>Jul/Aug 1983</p>	<p>Tamil Nadu</p>	<p>Agitations to demand Central Government intervention in Sri Lanka following serious communal violence between Tamils and Sinhalese.</p>

(1)	(2)	(3)
Jul/Aug 1983	Punjab	Two attempted hijackings of Indian Airlines Aircraft by Sikh militants. Both ended peacefully.
Aug '83	Assam	Renewal of Assam movement agitation by AASU and AAGSP.
Aug '83	Punjab	General strike in Aug 29 sponsored by Sant Longowal. Militant agitation continues.
Sep '83	A.P.	Communal violence in Hyderabad.
1983	Assam	Agitation over foreign nationals issue continues and violence during Feb '83.
1983	Punjab, Haryana	Continued Sikh agitation. Sikh terrorists attack on innocent Hindus. Retaliatory protest and agitations in Haryana.
Mar '84		Twentysix days natural dock strikes, reported to have cost the Indian economy \$ 30,000,000. Agitation turns violent on 19th March 1984 at Paradip, West Bengal, 5 police man killed.
May '84	Maharashtra	Twelve days of communal violence in Bombay and surrounding places.
Jul to Sep '84	A.P.	Widespread Hindu-Muslim communal riots in Hyderabad and other parts.
Aug '84	A.P.	Dismissal of N.T. Rama Rao Ministry in A.P. Widespread agitations in Andhra.

(1)	(2)	(3)
Oct '84 Tripura	Terrorist activities in Punjab from 1983 onwards up to present day	The general strike called by tribal separatists.
1984 Assam		It resulted in a number of murders, injuries and other terrorist acts indiscriminately carried out by the terrorists including assassination of popular leaders like Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, Shri Jagat Narain and a number of other civilians of various communities.
Dec '84 Gujarat May '85	1984 Assam	Assam agitation against the deportation of foreign nationals continue. Though numbers of violence is reduced in comparison with 1983, the sporadic incidents continue.
		An explosion in Gauhati Railway Station on November 7, 1983 kills 18 people. Negotiation between the Assam agitators and government fails once again.
Dec '84 Gujarat May '85	Dec '84 Gujarat	Anti reservation agitation in Gujarat. More than 50 people died till May 1985.
	May '85	

Note : Only very serious, violent and major incidents have been mentioned and the data have been collected from various newspapers/magazines/books/journals and mainly from K sings Contemporary Archives (Orient Longman Publication).

APPENDIX 2

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Seminar Coordination : PROF. K.S. SHUKLA

Programme Aide : SHRI G.S. PATIAL

APPENDIX 3

Business Sessions

Wednesday, February 12, 1986

1100-1300 I—CONCEPT AND DIMENSIONS OF COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE

Chairmen

Prof. T.N. Madan

Prof. Yogendra Singh

Paper Writers

Prof. Pratap Chandra

Dr. Rajendra Singh

Dr. B.K. Nagla

Discussant

Dr. S.D. Badgaiyan

Rapporteurs

Smt. M. Lakshmiswaramma

Miss Sujata Singh

1430-1730 II—CASTE/CLASS COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Chairmen

Prof. P.C. Joshi

Prof. T.K. Oommen

Paper Writers

Shri B.B. Panda

Prof. I.S. Chauhan

Dr. Uday Jain

Discussant

Prof. K.L. Sharma

Rapporteurs

Dr. B.M. Verma

Dr. B.K. Nagla

Thursday, February 13, 1986

1000-1300 III—INTER-COMMUNITY/SECTORAL COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE

Chairmen

Shri D.R. Goyal

Prof. S. Venugopal Rao

Paper Writers

Prof. A.R. Saiyed

Dr. D.R. Singh

Dr. V.V. Devasia

Shri T. Ananthachari

Discussant

Shri K.F. Rustamji

Rapporteurs

Dr. G. Jha

1400-1700 IV—POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS
OF COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Chairmen

Shri I.K. Gujaral

Paper Writers

Shri J.N. Chaturvedi

Prof. S. Venugopal Rao

Dr. A.K. Mehra

Discussant

Shri Surendra Nath

Rapporteurs

Shri H.N. Singh

Dr. Shanta Kohli Chandra

Friday, February 14, 1986

1000-1300 V—DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE AND COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE

Chairmen

Dr. P.R. Dubhashi

Prof. S.S. Srivastava

Paper Writers

Shri N.C. Saxena

Prof. Ram Ahuja

Shri B.M. Sinha

Dr. R.S. Srivastava
Shri C.D. Tripathi
Discussant
Shri N.S. Saxena
Rapporteurs
Dr. Uday Jain
Dr. B.V. Trivedi

1400-1700 VI—TRENDS IN COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE

Chairmen
Shri K.F. Rusiamji
Prof. D.P. Jatav
Paper Writers
Shri N.S. Saksena
Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon
Discussant
Shri T. Ananthachari
Rapporteurs
Dr. M.K. Narain
Dr. J. Guha Roy

1700 hrs. VALEDICTORY SESSION
Welcome
Dr. P.R. Dubhashi
Director,
Indian Institute of Public Administration
Valedictory Address
Shri Arun Nehru
Minister of State
(Internal Security)
Vote of Thanks
Prof. K.S. Shukla
Seminar Coordinator

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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